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This thesis is composed of three empirical essays that analyse different development and 
labour economics issues about Mexico and its emigrant population residing in the United 
States. 
 
The first essay examines the role of occupational segregation in explaining the low wages 
among first, second and third generation Mexican immigrants in the United States. 
Mexican-Americans earn lower wages than blacks mainly because they possess less 
human capital. With respect to whites, their lower wages are also a product of their 
smaller rewards for skills and underrepresentation at the top of the occupational structure. 
Occupational segregation constitutes an important part of the wage gap between natives 
and Mexican-born immigrants. For subsequent generations, the contribution of 
occupational segregation to the wage gap varies significantly between groups and 
according to the decomposition used. 
 
The second essay examines whether Seguro Popular, a free-of-charge publicly provided 
health insurance program for otherwise uninsured households, crowded-out private 
transfers in Mexico. Using data from the National Household Income and Expenditure 
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Survey, the effects of Seguro Popular are identified using the spatial variation in the 
program’s coverage induced by its sequential roll-out throughout Mexico. The results 
show that Seguro Popular reduced on average a household’s probability of receiving 
private transfers by 5.55 percentage points. This finding appears to be driven by domestic 
private transfers, since the program’s effects are only statistically significant for private 
transfers originating within Mexico. In addition, Seguro Popular had a weak and not 
statistically significant negative effect on the amount of private transfers received. Failure 
to take into account possible changes in private behaviour induced by Seguro Popular 
may overstate the program’s potential benefits or distributional impacts. 
 
Finally, the third essay studies the effect of students’ exposure to violent crimes on 
educational outcomes. Driven by drug-trade related crimes, homicide levels in Mexico 
have dramatically increased since 2007. Using school level data, a panel of Mexico’s 
primary and secondary schools from 2006 to 2012 is constructed to analyse the effect of 
exposure to homicides on standardised test scores and grade failure rates. The results 
show that a one-unit increase in the number of homicides per 10,000 inhabitants reduces 
average test scores between 0.0035 and 0.0142 standard deviations. This effect is larger 
in secondary schools, stronger if the homicide occurs closer to the examination date, and 
is stable when using either total homicides or drug-trade related homicides to measure 
crime. Higher homicides rates are also associated with an increase in the grade failure 
rate. Early exposure to homicides has potential long-term consequences since it may 
affect educational attainment levels and future income streams. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Mexico’s is an upper middle income country and the second largest economy in Latin 
America. In 2014, the country’s population totalled an estimated 123.8 million and its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita stood at 10,361.3 U.S. dollars (World Bank, 
2015). 
 
After decades of sustained economic growth, the country began decelerating in the late 
1970s. Following a sovereign default in 1982 which resulted in the collapse of the 
Mexican peso and a sharp reduction in GDP, the country was forced to make important 
changes to its economic structure. These included an aggressive reduction of the role of 
the state in the economy and the embrace of global markets by entering the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1985 and signing the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 (Hanson, 2010). 
 
Mexico’s economic transformation was successful in reducing inflation, maintaining 
fiscal discipline, reducing its external debt burden, and increasing trade as a share of GDP 
(Hanson, 2010, p. 988). Nevertheless, this was not accompanied by high levels of 
economic growth, where between 1982 and 2014 the country’s GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 2.3% (World Bank, 2015). Moreover, income distribution has remained 
highly unequal, perverse incentives for informality continue to exist, and public resources 
are still largely dependent on oil resources, where approximately 30.0% of government 
revenue comes from Mexico’s state-owned oil company. 
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To escape economic hardships in Mexico or because they are in search of a better life, a 
large fraction of the country’s population has migrated to the United States. Historically, 
migration flows from Mexico to the U.S. have been characterised by the circular 
movement of workers from the country’s western states who maintained their permanent 
residence in Mexico and seasonally went to engage in unskilled labour activities primarily 
in Arizona, California, Illinois and Texas. Upon the mediocre performance of the 
Mexican economy combined with high demographic growth-rates, the development of 
migrant networks, and the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, 
this phenomenon changed from a geographical sorting specific to a few states and 
economic sectors to a nationwide matter for both countries (Borjas and Katz, 2007). 
Furthermore, since migrants are reluctant to go through the bitter experience of crossing 
the border multiple times, often illegally, they are prone to extend the length of their stay 
abroad. This has led many to establish deep roots in the U.S., thus decreasing their long-
run probability of returning to Mexico. In 2010, an estimated 11.2 million Mexicans were 
residing in the U.S., accounting for 14.2% of Mexico’s working age population and 6.3% 
of the U.S. labour force.1 
 
In addition, to alleviate some of the economic difficulties encountered by the population 
located at the lower tail of the income distribution and to help reduce poverty levels in 
Mexico, the federal government put forward a series of social protection programs. In 
1997, Progresa was introduced as the first national conditional cash transfer program 
directed at poor and extremely poor households. The program, which was originally 
constituted by health, education and nutrition components, gives money to a female 
household head as an incentive to send her children to school and to health centres for 
                                                          
1 Figures based on the 2010 Mexican Census and the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS).   
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periodical medical check-ups. Subsequent high impact social assistance programs 
implemented by the state include Seguro Popular, a free-of-charge health insurance 
program for otherwise uninsured households introduced in 2002, and 70 y Más, a non-
contributory pension program for the elderly first implemented in 2007, among others.2 
 
In the political front, due to the high economic costs involved and its underlying factors 
related to corruption, low growth and high income inequality, the rise in violent crime 
and the government’s fight against drug trafficking organizations that began in 2006 have 
dominated the country’s political agenda in recent years. Referred to as the “war against 
drugs”, the government’s battle against organized crime has proved extremely costly. In 
terms of human lives, between 2006 and 2012 more than 120,000 homicides and 65,000 
drug-trade related homicides were registered in Mexico. In economic terms, the costs can 
be attributed to both direct factors, including the expenditures made by governments, 
firms or individuals aimed to prevent or respond to crime, and indirect factors, such as 
the externalities generated by criminal acts and their effect on economic growth 
(Enamorado et al., 2014, p. 10). In 2012, the amount allocated to security agencies, 
criminal justice and judicial institutions represented close to 6.0% of the federal 
government’s budget (DOF, 2012). Furthermore, it is estimated that the costs of crime 
and insecurity totalled 1.4% of Mexico’s GDP in 2012 (INEGI, 2012). 
 
                                                          
2 The related literature on Progresa has shown that the program reduced the incidence of child labour 
(Skoufias et al., 2001) and had a strong positive effect on educational outcomes (Behrman et al., 2005; 
Attanasio et al., 2011). Studies on Seguro Popular have shown that the program significantly reduce out-
of-pocket health expenditures among beneficiary households (King et al., 2009; Barros, 2009; Galárraga et 
al., 2010). Finally, the literature on 70 y Más has shown that the program increased household spending 
and consumption (Salinas-Rodríguez et al. 2014), reduced labour force participation rates among elderly 
adults (Juarez and Pfutze, 2015) and partially crowded-out private support (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 
2015). 
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This thesis develops three empirical essays that analyse different development and labour 
economics issues about Mexico and its emigrant population residing in the United States. 
 
The first essay presented in Chapter 2 examines the role of occupational segregation in 
explaining the low wages among first, second and third generation Mexican immigrants 
in the United States. Based mainly on household survey data from the Current Population 
Survey and applying a variety of decomposition techniques, the results show that 
Mexican-Americans earn lower wages than blacks mainly because they possess less 
human capital. With respect to whites, the lower wages of Mexican-Americans are also a 
product of their smaller rewards for skills and under-representation at the top of the 
occupational structure. The findings show that occupational segregation constitutes an 
important part of the wage gap between natives and Mexican-born immigrants. For 
subsequent generations, the contribution of occupational segregation to the wage gap 
varies greatly between groups and according to the decomposition technique used. The 
chapter suggests that it is necessary to implement policies that tend to equalise Mexican-
American representation across occupations, as well as policies which encourage the 
undoing of moderately segregated positions within different occupations. Moreover, it is 
vital for Mexican-born immigrants to acquire the necessary skills and training that will 
result in an increase in their wages. 
 
The second essay presented in Chapter 3 studies whether Seguro Popular, which provided 
healthcare coverage to a large fraction of the population, crowded-out international and 
domestic private transfers in Mexico. Using household survey data, the effects of Seguro 
Popular are identified using the spatial variation in the program’s coverage brought by its 
roll-out throughout the country between 2000 and 2012. The results show that Seguro 
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Popular reduced on average a household’s probability of receiving private transfers by 
5.55 percentage points. This finding appears to be driven by domestic private transfers, 
since the program’s effects are only statistically significant for private transfers 
originating within Mexico. On the other hand, Seguro Popular did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the amount of private transfers received. The chapter suggests that 
failure to take into account possible changes in private behaviour induced by Seguro 
Popular may overstate the program’s potential benefits or distributional impacts. 
 
Finally, the third essay presented in Chapter 4 analyses whether the rise in violent crime 
observed in Mexico from 2007 onwards affected educational outcomes. Based on school 
level data, a panel of Mexico’s primary and secondary schools from 2006 to 2012 is 
constructed to analyse the effect of exposure to homicides and drug-trade related 
homicides on standardised test scores and grade failure rates. The results show that a one 
unit increase in the number of homicides per 10,000 inhabitants reduces average test 
scores between 0.0035 and 0.0142 standard deviations. Furthermore, this effect is larger 
in secondary schools, stronger if the homicide occurs closer to the examination date, and 
is stable when using either total homicides or drug-trade related homicides to measure 
crime. Higher homicides rates are also associated with an increase in the grade failure 
rate. The chapter suggests that early exposure to homicides has potential long-term 
consequences since it may affect educational attainment levels and future income streams. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first essay titled “Occupational 
Segregation and the Low-Wages among Mexican-Americans”. Chapter 3 presents the 
second essay titled “Does Access to Free Health Insurance Crowd-Out Private Transfers? 
Evidence from Mexico’s Seguro Popular”. Chapter 4 presents the third essay titled 
6 
 
“Crime Exposure and Educational Outcomes in Mexico”. Chapter 5 concludes with a 
summary of the thesis and discusses potential avenues for further research. 
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2 Occupational Segregation and the Low Wages among Mexican-
Americans 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In 2012, 20.3 million U.S. residents were either born in Mexico or were of Mexican-
origin. Rising to 8.7% of the country’s population, Mexican-born immigrants and their 
descendants, henceforth Mexican-Americans, constitute a substantial and rapidly 
increasing share of the U.S. working-age population. A product of the great Mexican 
emigration that began in the early 1960s and a consequence of both legal and illegal 
immigration, this group is mostly composed by Mexican-born labourers with low levels 
of human capital whose skills transfer imperfectly into the U.S. labour market. Despite 
their long history in the U.S., Mexican immigrants have generally performed poorly north 
of the border. Moreover, the existence of a strong relationship between the earnings of 
immigrants and the labour market success of their American-born off-spring has led 
Mexican-Americans to be among the most economically disadvantaged minorities in the 
country. 
 
A series of studies have previously analysed the reasons behind the poor labour market 
performance of Mexican-Americans relative to the U.S.-born non-Mexican origin, 
henceforth native, population (see, e.g. Trejo, 1997; Borjas and Katz, 2007). Common 
explanations focus on their low productivity enhancing characteristics, including 
demographic and socioeconomic factors; their unwillingness to assimilate into the U.S., 
given the proximity to their home country and the historically circulatory nature of their 
migration; and whether or not they are subject to discrimination originating from natives. 
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This chapter adds to this literature by re-examining the earnings discrimination debate 
and analysing the factors behind the low wages of first, second and third generation 
Mexican-Americans and the sources of their wage differentials with respect to native 
black and white wage earners, while emphasising the role of occupational segregation. 
 
Comparing Mexican-Americans against blacks and whites provides a benchmark relative 
to what has historically constituted the country’s main disadvantaged minority and 
against the most privileged cohort in the U.S., respectively. Given that occupational 
attainment has a significant effect on wages and that there may be important barriers to 
entry into certain occupations based on non-productivity related factors, the relationship 
between occupational segregation and the labour market performance of Mexican-
Americans merits attention. 
 
The research questions this chapter attempts to answer are: “Why do Mexican-Americans 
earn low wages and face a significant wage gap with respect to natives?” and “What role 
does occupational segregation play in explaining the low wages among Mexican-
Americans and the magnitude of their wage gap with respect to natives?” 
 
Following the related literature (see, e.g. Liu et al., 2004; Elliot and Lindley, 2008), 
occupational segregation is said to exist if workers are assigned to different occupations 
based on non-productivity enhancing characteristics. This is not to be confused with 
occupational structure, which refers to the distribution of workers between occupations. 
Differences in the occupational structures of natives and Mexican-Americans do not 
necessarily imply that there is discrimination in the labour market. Nonetheless, if 
individuals belonging to a given group face barriers to entry into occupations or if their 
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occupational choices are limited by lower returns to their productivity related 
characteristics within occupations, then different occupational structures do indeed reflect 
discrimination (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012). 
 
The performance of Mexican-American workers has important implications for both the 
U.S. and Mexico. Regarding Mexican-born immigrants, their degree of success in 
American territory will affect whether they choose to settle permanently in the U.S., or if 
they were initially target earners, the amount of time spent abroad. At the same time, this 
impacts the sum of remittances sent to family members left behind, which have been 
shown to affect a great deal of labour market outcomes in Mexico (see, e.g. Taylor et al., 
2005; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). In the case of their descendants, given their 
predominantly young age and the fact that they will most likely spend their entire life in 
the U.S., their performance is vital to the long term development of the country’s 
economy. As argued by Borjas (1993, p. 113), the economic impact of immigration is 
reliant on both how immigrants adapt to the labour market and the adjustment process 
experienced by their descendants. 
 
Although previous studies have looked at wage differentials between natives and 
Mexican-Americans, little attention has been given to the role played by occupational 
segregation. This chapter extends the current literature in several fronts. First, an updated 
analysis based on the traditional Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) framework is 
performed, where the role of occupational attainment is emphasised. Second, the Brown 
et al. (1980) and Démurger et al. (2009) decompositions are utilised where, unlike the 
Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) methodologies, occupational attainment is treated as endogenously 
determined, and earnings differentials are separated into within or between-occupation 
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differences. This allows explicitly seeing the effect that occupational segregation has on 
the observed wage differentials between natives and Mexican-Americans. Furthermore, 
the Duncan and Duncan (1955) index of dissimilarity is calculated to provide an objective 
measure of the degree to which the occupational structures of the different groups 
analysed vary. While previous studies have applied the Brown et al. (1980) and Démurger 
et al. (2009) frameworks to analyse earnings differentials between natives and foreign-
born residents, I am not aware of any study that has applied these techniques to investigate 
the wage gap between natives and immigrants, including Mexican-Americans in the 
United States. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this methodology has not been 
explicitly applied for the case of second and third generation immigrants regardless of 
their country of origin or residence. 
 
Among the main results it is observed that the low wages of Mexican-Americans are 
largely a product of their low education levels and young age, the latter being especially 
relevant in the case of second and third generation workers. Moreover, while significant 
unexplained wage differentials are present between all three generations of Mexican-
Americans and whites, this is not the case with respect to blacks since their returns to 
observable characteristics generally fall behind those of second and third generation 
workers. Pertaining to occupational segregation, this does not seem to play an important 
role in accounting for wage differentials relative to blacks; whereas with respect to whites 
this constitutes between 6.1% and 10.0% of the observed wage differentials for different 
generations of Mexican-Americans. Given the use of broadly defined occupational 
categories, these results may be interpreted as representing a lower-bound of the 
proportion of the wage gap attributed to occupational segregation. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature that studies 
the role of occupations in decomposition analyses, theories of labour market 
discrimination, and the labour market performance of Mexican-Americans. Section 2.3 
describes the data. Section 2.4 presents the empirical and econometric methodologies. 
Section 2.5 presents the results. Section 2.6 reports sensitivity checks and presents some 
extensions. Section 2.7 concludes with a summary and some policy implications. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
2.2.1 Occupational Attainment and Wage Decomposition Techniques 
The majority of studies that focus on the earnings of immigrants and their descendants do 
not incorporate occupation related variables in the estimated wage equations. This is done 
under the belief that both wages and occupations may be imperfect measures of the same 
variable of interest, which is labour market outcome. In such case, occupation of 
employment would not be an adequate variable in the wage function. However, 
occupation is an appropriate variable if the study aims to analyse the channels through 
which wage gains are obtained (Chiswick and Miller, 2009, p. 454). 
 
To identify the role that differences in occupational attainment have on the wage gap, a 
variety of decompositions can be used. In the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
framework, wage differentials are separated into an explained component, attributed to 
differences in average characteristics, and an unexplained component, which captures 
differences in the returns to observed characteristics and is usually interpreted as a 
measure of discrimination. In this type of study, when occupation is inserted as a 
productivity related variable, the proportion of the wage gap attributed to the explained 
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component tends to increase. Nevertheless, if occupational differences reflect the 
presence of barriers encountered by Mexican-Americans to enter native dominated 
occupations, then it would be erroneous to treat occupation as a productivity related 
characteristic. Under this scenario, employment of the OB methodology is subject to 
criticism since it treats occupational attainment as exogenous and does not distinguish 
between wage discrimination and occupational segregation (Liu et al., 2004, p. 396). 
 
To address this issue, an alternative decomposition was developed by Brown et al. (1980). 
This procedure directly models occupational attainment treating it as endogenously 
determined. The Brown-Moon-Zoloth (BMZ) methodology decomposes the wage gap 
into explained and unexplained within-occupation and between-occupation effects, where 
the role of occupational segregation on observed wage differentials is explicitly 
accounted for. This may be relevant from a policy perspective since it offers information 
on whether policies necessary to promote equal pay within occupations ought to be 
implemented, or instead, what is required are policies which promote equal access to 
different occupations for all workers irrespective of their ethnic-origin background. 
 
In a similar spirit, Démurger et al. (2009) propose a decomposition technique based on 
microsimulation that extends the BMZ methodology. This procedure, formally based on 
occupation allocation models, has the advantage of allowing for the evaluation of direct 
as well as indirect changes in the occupational structure on the observed wage 
differentials. While the direct effect refers to changes in the occupational structure under 
different allocation rules, the indirect effect refers to the fact that changes in the 
occupational structure also have an impact on within occupation mean wages.3 
                                                          
3 The literature that focuses on the role of occupations in explaining wage differentials between natives and 
immigrants is small. Studies that use the BMZ decomposition include Liu et al. (2004) for Hong Kong, 
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2.2.2 Theories of Labour Market Discrimination 
Following Lang and Lehmann (2012), discrimination is understood as the unequal 
treatment of equal people, or the unequal treatment of people for reasons unrelated to 
their productivity enhancing characteristics. Discrimination may be reflected not only in 
being paid less to perform the same task, but also in limiting the range of occupations 
workers have access to. 
 
There are different theoretical explanations regarding the presence of discrimination in 
the labour market. One of these consists of taste-based discrimination or personal 
prejudiced models, first put forward by Becker (1957). Under this framework, the 
mainstream group (e.g. whites) comprised of employers, workers and consumers, dislikes 
employing, working with, or purchasing goods and services from the pariah group (e.g. 
Mexican-Americans). Thus economic agents attach an economic cost in order to avoid 
interactions or transactions with members belonging to the group that faces 
discrimination. Nonetheless, this model predicts that in the long-run, if the number of 
employers who do not discriminate is large enough, the wage differential between the two 
groups will fall to zero. Under this scenario, employers who discriminate only hire 
individuals from the mainstream group, and those who do not discriminate are indifferent 
to who they hire since workers from both groups are considered perfect substitutes. While 
this implies that the labour market would be partially separated, it does not mean that 
there would be wage discrimination (Lang and Lehmann, 2012, p. 971). 
 
                                                          
Elliot and Lindley (2008) for the United Kingdom, and Demoussis, Giannakopoulos and Zografakis (2010) 
for Greece, among others. The literature that has used the Démurger et al. (2009) methodology is limited 
to the authors’ original study, which focuses on internal migrants in China.   
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Another branch of the discrimination literature focuses on statistical discrimination, 
which refers to the case where employers discriminate on the basis of imperfect 
information regarding the worker’s skills or productivity. As suggested by Phelps (1972) 
and Arrow (1973), this arises because employers have a difficult time assessing the 
productivity levels of the pariah group relative to mainstream workers. Employers use 
information regarding group membership to infer individual characteristics, where 
members of the pariah group are treated like their average which tends to be constituted 
by relatively lower skilled workers. Over time, employers will use the observable 
characteristic (i.e. ethnic group, race or gender) as a proxy for the unobservable 
characteristics that generate differences in productivity levels. Nevertheless, as argued by 
Arrow (1998, p. 6), ethnic groups may in fact differ according to their unobserved 
characteristics originating from differences in their cultural background or quality of 
education, among others. 
 
Following Ehrenberg and Smith (2012), a third fragment of the discrimination literature 
is constituted by models which are based on the presence of non-competitive forces in the 
labour market. Within this literature, it has been argued that occupational segregation is 
the result of a measured crowding policy intended to lower wages in certain over-crowded 
occupations. On the other hand, dual labour market theory states that the labour market 
is separated into two noncompeting sectors: a primary sector which offers higher wages, 
stability and job growth, and a secondary sector which offers low wages, instability and 
dead-end jobs. In both of the explanations presented above, it is assumed that workers are 
assigned to certain occupational groups from which mobility is restricted or outright 
impossible (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012, p. 422). It has also been suggested that 
employers may engage in collusive behaviour in order to suppress minorities, creating a 
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situation where trough monopsonistic behaviour they can enforce lower wages upon their 
employees (see, e.g. Reich, 1971). 
 
Finally, in one of the few theoretical linkages between discrimination and occupation of 
employment, Baldwin et al. (2001) explicitly model the role of occupational segregation 
and wage determination. In the model, the authors assume that members of the 
mainstream group dislike working under managers of the pariah group. Furthermore, 
there exists an occupational sorting function where the occupational hierarchy of the 
members of the pariah group is a function of their participation in the lower classified 
occupations, the wages of members of the mainstream group in these occupations, and 
their distastes towards working under pariah management. Under this framework, it is 
predicted that as members of the pariah group move up in the job hierarchy, their relative 
proportion in each occupation declines exponentially. Unlike Becker’s taste based 
discrimination framework, the model is based on the hypothesis that discrimination 
against the pariah group is a consequence of their position in the job hierarchy instead of 
just an aversion to work or interact with them. 
 
2.2.3 The Labour Market Performance of Mexican-Americans 
Early studies on immigrants and their descendants in the U.S. include Chiswick (1978), 
where it is observed that among foreign-born workers, those originating from Mexico are 
usually in the most underprivileged position. Furthermore, it is argued that in general the 
Mexican ethnic group performs poorly since first, second and third generation Mexican-
Americans have lower earnings than white workers of the same immigrant generation. 
Focusing on Hispanic men, McManus et al. (1983) find that within this cohort Mexicans 
have the lowest earnings, due to their low schooling completion levels and significant 
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deficiencies in English language proficiency. In analysing the effect of foreign-born 
parentage on the earnings of U.S.-born white men, Chiswick (1977) shows that second 
generation Mexican-Americans earn considerably less than their counterparts of non-
Mexican descent, while the earnings of second generation whites differ little from those 
of white males born to native parents. Farley and Alba (2002) find that workers 
originating from Mexico tend to be situated at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, 
whereas those from Asian, Canadian and European descent are clustered at the top. The 
similar results regarding current immigrants and their descendants suggests that the 
economic disadvantage encountered by Mexican-Americans is not a new occurrence, but 
instead one that has been present for a considerable number of decades. 
 
Among the studies that focus exclusively on Mexican-Americans, Borjas and Katz (2007) 
show that in recent decades there has been a growing disadvantage of Mexican 
immigrants at the top and bottom of the educational distribution. It is argued that this is a 
product of both their low education levels and the rapid growth of native workers and 
non-Mexican immigrants who have acquired at least a college degree. As a result, 
Mexican-origin workers are clustered in low skilled occupations where they have 
encountered a growing disadvantage in their relative wages. Trejo (1997) demonstrates 
that the primary reason why Mexican-Americans have low wages relative to black and 
white workers is because they have lower levels of education, significant deficiencies in 
their English language proficiency, and in the case of first generation immigrants, lower 
private returns to their observable skills. Based on data from the November 1979 and 
1989 Current Population Survey, the author applies an Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) type 
decomposition to analyse wage differentials among third generation blacks, whites and 
Mexican-Americans. It is observed that third generation Mexicans with comparable skills 
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to whites only encounter modest levels of discrimination. This is in contrast to the 
relationship between blacks and whites, where observable measures in human capital do 
not account for much of their wage differentials. In a similar analysis, Livingston and 
Kahn (2002) examine the wages of three generations of Mexican-Americans, where the 
results show that Mexican-born men and women earn less than their second and third 
generation counterparts. Nonetheless, once human capital controls are included, the wage 
pattern shows a steady decline for the case of men and stagnation for the case of women. 
This suggests that current differences in cross-generational wage patterns are not a 
product of the wage structure, but instead arise due to differences in human capital 
endowments. Focusing on inter-generational progress among Mexican-Americans, Trejo 
(2003) observes that there are substantial gains between first and second generation 
workers, which appear to be a result of their significant surge in both their educational 
levels and their returns to education. Moreover, third and higher generation labourers do 
not perform better than second generation workers. 
 
2.3 Data 
 
2.3.1 Current Population Survey 
This chapter uses data from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement from 1994 to 2012, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and collected from 
King et al. (2010). Besides capturing the population’s labour market characteristics, the 
CPS contains information on immigration status, birthplace of the respondent’s parents, 
and a variable denoting origin which provides information on the individual’s ancestry, 
among others. The survey allows distinguishing up to three different generations of 
immigrants. 
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The different cohorts analysed are defined in the following manner. Respondents who 
were born in Mexico and migrated to the U.S. after they were 18 years of age or older are 
classified as first generation (FG) Mexican-Americans. This is done in order to omit those 
immigrants whose decision to move to the U.S. was taken for them.4 Second generation 
(SG) immigrants are constituted by U.S.-born citizens that have either two Mexican-born 
parents (SG-II) or one U.S.-born parent and one Mexican-born parent (SG-I), 
respectively. Second generation immigrants are divided into these two groups since there 
appear to be important differences between them depending on whether both parents were 
born in Mexico or at least one of them was born in the United States. Third generation 
(TG) denotes U.S.-born residents with American-born parents that report being of 
Mexican ancestry. Given the construction of the origin variable, this cohort includes third 
and higher-order generation immigrants. The reference group throughout the analysis is 
comprised by U.S.-born citizens with American-born parents who do not report being of 
Mexican ancestry. Referred to as natives, they are distinguished according to their self-
reported race, which can either be black (NB) or white (NW). Remaining individuals not 
belonging to any of the previous groups are excluded. 
 
The study uses hourly wages and is restricted to full-time workers between 18 and 59 
years old. It focuses on male labourers to avoid possible biases associated with selection 
into the labour force based on cultural differences between natives and different 
generations of Mexican-Americans. In addition, it excludes the self-employed.5 
                                                          
4 For an analysis on this so called “1.5” generation see Allensworth (1997). 
5 The measurement of years of schooling, denoted by the highest grade completed variable, is not 
continuous in the CPS. The following recoding is used to compute years of education in the sample: no 
school completed or preschool = 0 years; first through fourth grade = 2.5 years; fifth or sixth grade = 5.5 
years; seventh or eighth grade = 7.5 years; ninth grade = 9 years; tenth grade = 10 years; eleventh grade or 
twelfth grade without diploma = 11 years; high school graduate = 12 years; some college, no degree = 13 
years; associate degree = 14 years; bachelor’s degree = 16 years; master’s degree = 17 years; professional 
or doctorate degree = 20 years. 
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By pooling cross-sections from the CPS it is possible to identify the impact that 
occupational segregation has on the earnings differentials between Mexican-Americans 
and black and white workers. Nonetheless, a potential caveat is that the CPS March 
supplement does not provide information on English language proficiency, which has 
been shown to be an important variable when explaining wage differentials between 
natives and first generation immigrants (see, e.g. Trejo, 1997; Chiswick and Miller, 
2009). Furthermore, while the versions of the CPS employed by Trejo (1997, 2003) offer 
more detailed data in this respect given their inclusion of language proficiency variables, 
their small sample size prevents them from being a viable data source when studying the 
impact of occupational segregation on wages. Given that the exclusion of this variable 
may generate shortcomings in the analysis (e.g. omitted variable bias), this issue is 
addressed in Section 2.6.3 where census data is used to examine how the results vary 
when English language proficiency is incorporated. 
 
2.3.2 Occupational Classification 
Occupations are classified according to a modified version of the 1990 U.S. Census 
Bureau occupational classification scheme provided by King et al. (2010). This offers a 
consistent long-term classification of occupations which allows direct comparability 
throughout the period of study. Given the restrictions of the sample size, workers are 
grouped into six broadly defined occupational categories taken from the highest level of 
aggregation presented in the scheme. The categories are: “Managerial and Professional 
Specialty”; “Technical, Sales and Administrative Support”; “Precision Production, Craft 
and Repair”; “Service”; “Operators, Fabricators and Labourers”; and “Other”. 
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2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.1. The group with the highest earnings is 
composed by whites, with mean log hourly wages of 2.79. This figure is 0.60 log points 
higher than that of first generation immigrants, who constitute the most disadvantaged 
group. Blacks and second and third generation Mexican-Americans have similar mean 
wages, where among these blacks and second generation immigrants with two Mexican-
born parents workers have the highest and lowest earnings, respectively. Furthermore, in 
each of the six occupations whites have the highest earnings and first generation 
immigrants have the lowest. On the other hand, blacks do not always earn more than 
Mexican-Americans. It is observed that substantial progress appears to be made between 
the first and second generation, but not between the second and third. With respect to first 
generation immigrants, wages increase by 0.24, 0.36 and 0.35 log points for the case of 
second generation immigrants with two Mexican-born parents, one Mexican-born parent, 
and third generation immigrants, respectively. Regarding human capital levels, whites 
have the highest years of education, while Mexican-born workers have the lowest. Similar 
to the pattern observed with wages, an increase in years of schooling occurs between the 
first and second generation. Concerning the age structure, whites constitute the oldest 
group while second generation immigrants with two Mexican parents make up the 
youngest. 
 
For all generations of Mexican-Americans it is observed that their age and human capital 
levels are lower than those presented by blacks and whites. These facts suggest that a 
possible reason why natives have higher wages is because they have more experience and 
schooling than Mexican-Americans. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the observed 
differences in wages may be driven by socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. 
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Additional elements that should be taken into account include the fact that Mexican-origin 
workers tend to be concentrated in California and Texas, which have higher wages than 
those prevalent in the south-eastern part of the U.S. where a large part of the black 
population resides. Furthermore, although all figures are in real terms, the increase of the 
Mexican-American population in recent years suggests that the positive trend in wages 
could also be playing a role. 
 
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mexicans by generation Natives 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG Black White 
Age 37.32 31.31 36.26 36.73 39.62 39.61 
 (9.75) (9.63) (10.98) (10.56) (10.43) (10.30) 
Years of education 8.86 12.28 12.69 12.61 13.07 13.78 
 (3.84) (2.26) (2.13) (2.15) (1.98) (2.27) 
Wages 2.19 2.43 2.55 2.54 2.56 2.79 
 (.512) (.573) (.583) (.573) (.570) (.598) 
       
Observations 25,800 5,590 3,631 15,007 42,676 376,187 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Wages represent the natural logarithm of hourly earnings in 1999 USD. 
 
Looking at wages within occupations, some interesting results emerge. As seen in Table 
2.2, within all occupations whites have the highest average earnings and Mexican-born 
immigrants have the lowest. On the other hand, blacks do not always earn more than 
Mexican-Americans. In the highest paying occupation, which is “Managerial and 
Professional Specialty”, SG-I workers have higher wages than blacks, while in the 
“Service” category they are once again surpassed by third generation labourers. 
 
While the fact that the third generation cohort seems to perform slightly worse than their 
SG-I counterparts may seem counterintuitive, this is consistent with the previous 
literature (see, e.g. Trejo, 2003). This occurrence appears to arise because ethnic 
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identification is endogenous, where individuals self-report in a non-random manner as 
belonging to a certain group. As argued by Alba and Islam (2009) and Duncan and Trejo 
(2011) the least successful second generation workers, i.e. those with two parents born in 
Mexico, are the ones most likely to report being of Hispanic origin. On the contrary, the 
descendants of immigrants who engage in intermarriage or encounter the most success in 
the labour market assimilate to such a high degree that they gradually fade away from 
empirical observation. Evidence of this is presented by Duncan and Trejo (2007) who 
observe that 97.0% of U.S.-born individuals with Hispanic ancestors on both sides of their 
family identify themselves as being of Hispanic-origin, while only 21.0% of those with 
Hispanic ancestors on one side of their family answer in the same manner. Therefore, it 
is likely that most of the third generation Mexican-Americans included in the sample are 
descendants of SG-II individuals and not SG-I immigrants. 
 
Table 2.2 Wages by occupation 
Occupation  Mexicans by generation  Natives 
  FG SG-II SG-I TG  Black White 
Managerial and Professional Specialty  2.73 2.84 2.91 2.87  2.90 3.11 
  (.682) (.576) (.533) (.567)  (.564) (.572) 
Technical, Sales and Administrative Support  2.37 2.42 2.55 2.55  2.57 2.79 
  (.550) (.555) (.583) (.567)  (.544) (.592) 
Precision Production, Craft and Repair  2.28 2.46 2.59 2.58  2.61 2.71 
  (.495) (.524) (.525) (.525)  (.515) (.488) 
Service  2.02 2.32 2.36 2.38  2.36 2.52 
  (.440) (.596) (.604) (.587)  (.553) (.590) 
Operators, Fabricators and Labourers  2.21 2.32 2.39 2.40  2.43 2.52 
  (.489) (.521) (.536) (.508)  (.522) (.500) 
Other  2.00 2.15 2.33 2.24  2.38 2.47 
  (.438) (.493) (.504) (.517)  (.520) (.571) 
         
Observations  25,800 5,590 3,631 15,007  42,676 376,187 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Wages represent the natural logarithm of hourly earnings in 1999 USD. 
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2.4 Methodology 
 
2.4.1 Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) Decomposition 
Before proceeding, the following notation is defined. Two main categories of workers are 
considered, natives (𝑁) and Mexican-Americans (𝑀), who can be employed in 𝐾 different 
occupations denoted by 𝑘. Natives are divided into two different ethnic groups indexed 
by 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 = {NB, NW}, while Mexican-Americans are separated into four different 
generation groups indexed by 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 = {FG, SG − II, SG − I, TG}. Furthermore, let 𝑃௞௡ 
and 𝑃௞௠ denote the proportion of workers belonging to groups 𝑛 and 𝑚 who are employed 
in occupation 𝑘.  
 
In the OB decomposition, the role of the occupational structure in explaining the wage 
gap between blacks or whites and Mexican-Americans can be calculated through the 
estimation of a single wage equation for each different group. In this framework, the role 
of occupations in explaining the wage gap is accounted for through the inclusion of 
occupation of employment dummy variables in the following manner: 
 
𝑤௜
௡ = 𝑋௜
௡𝛽መ௡ + ∑ 𝐷௜௞
௡ 𝛽መ଴௞
௡ + 𝜀௜
௡௄ିଵ
௞ୀଵ                                        (2.1) 
𝑤௜
௠ = 𝑋௜
௠𝛽መ௠ + ∑ 𝐷௜௞
௠𝛽መ଴௞
௠ + 𝜀௜
௠௄ିଵ
௞ୀଵ                                      (2.2)  
 
where 𝑤௜ is the natural logarithm of hourly wages for individual 𝑖, 𝑋௜ is a vector of 
exogenous variables and 𝛽መ  its vector of corresponding coefficients, 𝐷௜௞ is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the individual is in occupation 𝑘, 𝛽መ଴௞ is the coefficient for 
the 𝑘th occupational dummy, and 𝜀௜ is the error term. Since in the OB decomposition 
only one regression is estimated for each group, the coefficients in the vector 𝛽መ  are 
24 
 
 
 
constrained to be same for all 𝐾 occupations, with the exception of the constant term 
which varies according to the occupation of employment. Once Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) are 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), the OB decomposition can be performed: 
 
𝑤ഥ ௡ − 𝑤ഥ ௠ = (𝑋ത௡ − 𝑋ത௠)𝛽መ௡ + ∑ 𝛽መ଴௞
௡ (𝑃௞
௡ − 𝑃௞
௠)௄ିଵ௞ୀଵ   
          +𝑋ത௠൫𝛽መ௡ − 𝛽መ௠൯ + ∑ ൫𝛽መ଴௞௡ − 𝛽መ଴௞௠ ൯𝑃௞௠௄ିଵ௞ୀଵ                      (2.3) 
 
where 𝑤ഥ  is the mean of the natural logarithm of hourly wages, 𝑋ത is a vector of the mean 
values of the exogenous variables, and 𝛽መ  is the estimated wage equation coefficients. 𝑃௞௡ 
and 𝑃௞௠ enter the decomposition since the sample mean of occupational dummy 𝑘 is equal 
to the proportion of individuals in groups 𝑛 or 𝑚 belonging to occupation 𝑘. 
 
The first component on the right hand side of Eq. (2.3) captures differences in wages 
arising from differences in observable characteristics, while the second component 
accounts for dissimilarities in the levels of participation in each occupation. These two 
terms constitute the explained component or endowment effect. The third component 
captures different returns to observable characteristics, while the fourth component 
accounts for compensating differentials related to the occupation of employment. These 
last two terms constitute the unexplained component or coefficient effect, and are 
commonly used as a measure of discrimination. Since differences in the coefficients likely 
capture variations in unobserved characteristics that also impact wages, these terms need 
to be taken as an upper-bound of the possible discrimination that exists in the labour 
market. 
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Nevertheless, the OB methodology is subject to concerns. The first is the index number 
problem, which refers to fact that the results are dependent on which group is assumed to 
reflect the true wage structure encountered in the absence of discrimination. In this study, 
the black and white wage structures are taken as the non-discriminatory standard. A 
second concern corresponds to the fact that for sets of dummy variables, the detailed 
decomposition results are dependent on the choice of the omitted group category. Finally, 
the main disadvantage of the OB decomposition is that it takes the differentials in 
occupational proportions between groups 𝑛 and 𝑚 as exogenous, thus treating them as 
part of the endowment effect. This approach presents serious deficiencies if the 
distribution of workers between occupations is affected by discriminatory practice. To 
minimise this issue, Brown et al. (1980) extend the analysis by treating occupational 
attainment as endogenous and allowing the wage equation coefficients to vary between 
occupations.  
 
2.4.2 Brown-Moon-Zoloth (BMZ) Decomposition 
Unlike the OB decomposition, the approach developed by Brown et al. (1980) requires 
the estimation of occupation-specific wage regressions for each group 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 and 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀: 
 
𝑤௜௞
௡ = 𝑋௜௞
௡ 𝛽መ௞
௡ + 𝜀௜௞
௡                                                    (2.4) 
𝑤௜௞
௠ = 𝑋௜௞
௠𝛽መ௞
௠ + 𝜀௜௞
௠                                                  (2.5) 
 
where 𝛽መ௞ is a vector of wage coefficients specific to occupation 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾. Since 𝑃௞ 
is the proportion of workers in occupation 𝑘, the overall mean wage differential between 
individuals belonging to groups 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 and 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 can be calculated from Eqs. (2.4) and 
(2.5) in the following manner: 
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𝑤ഥ ௡ − 𝑤ഥ ௠ = ∑ (𝑃௞
௡𝑤ഥ௞
௡ − 𝑃௞
௠𝑤ഥ௞
௠)௄௞ୀଵ                                      (2.6) 
 
𝑤ഥ ௡ − 𝑤ഥ ௠ = ∑ 𝑃௞
௠(𝑋ത௞
௡ − 𝑋ത௞
௠)𝛽መ௞
௡ + ∑ 𝑋ത௞
௡𝛽መ௞
௡൫𝑃௞
௡ − 𝑃෠௞
௠൯௄௞ୀଵ
௄
௞ୀଵ   
                                    +∑ 𝑃௞௠𝑋ത௞௠൫𝛽መ௞௡ − 𝛽መ௞௠൯ + ∑ 𝑋ത௞௡𝛽መ௞௡൫𝑃෠௞௠ − 𝑃௞௠൯             ௄௞ୀଵ௄௞ୀଵ (2.7) 
 
where adding and subtracting terms on the right hand side of Eq. (2.6) and manipulating 
terms yields Eq. (2.7). In this case, 𝑃෠௞௠ denotes the proportion of Mexican-American 
workers 𝑖 ∈ 𝑚 who would be employed in occupation 𝑘 if they were to face the same 
occupational structure as that encountered by native workers 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛. 
 
The first component on the right hand side of Eq. (2.7) captures wage differentials derived 
from differences in measured characteristics within occupations, while the second 
component explains differentials generated by dissimilarities in allocation shares between 
occupations. These two terms constitute the within explained (WE) and between 
explained (BE) components, respectively. The third term reflects compensating 
differentials within occupations, while occupational segregation and different preferences 
between the two groups are captured by the fourth term. These two terms constitute the 
within unexplained (WU) and between unexplained (BU) components, respectively. 
 
The BMZ procedure requires the estimation of occupation specific wage regressions and 
a method for predicting 𝑃෠௞௠. Given the constraints of the data set, the latter is done through 
an estimation of a reduced form multinomial logit (MNL) model. The MNL captures how 
different variables affect the probability of an individual working in an occupation, 
treating the occupational choice as endogenously determined. This probability may be 
defined as: 
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𝑃௜௞ = Pr(𝑦௜ = 𝑂𝑐𝑐௞) =
ୣ୶୮(௓೔ఊෝೖ)
ଵା∑ ୣ୶୮(௓೔ఊෝೖ)
಼షభ
ೖసభ
+ 𝜂௜௞                             (2.8) 
 
where 𝑍௜ is a vector of labour supply and demand related exogenous variables presumed 
to determine occupational attainment, 𝛾ො௞ is a vector of coefficients corresponding to the 
𝑘th occupation, and 𝜂௜௞ is the error term. As stated by Démurger et al. (2009, p. 613), the 
reduced form MNL captures both supply driven differences in group preferences and 
demand driven constraints. Both of these factors are likely to generate differences in the 
estimated coefficients between natives and Mexican-Americans, where the influence of 
limited access to some occupations for certain groups indicates occupational segregation. 
 
To obtain 𝑃෠௞௠, estimates of the parameters of Eq. (2.8) are calculated for natives, and the 
Mexican-American data is subsequently substituted into the estimated equations. This 
produces for every individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑚 a vector of predicted probabilities of belonging to 
each occupation 𝑘. Afterwards, these probabilities are added over observations to produce 
the predicted or non-discriminatory occupational distribution of each group of Mexican-
American workers.  
 
Since occupational attainment is determined by the interaction between demand and 
supply factors where workers may differ among unobservable characteristics between 
occupations, the samples of individuals observed in each occupation may not be random. 
Thus, it is necessary to use the information obtained from Eq. (2.8) to adjust the 
occupation-specific wage equations for potential effects generated by selection bias. 
Following Lee (1983), the wage equations are modified and conditional on occupation 𝑘 
being chosen are given by: 
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𝑤௜௞ = 𝑋௜௞𝛽መ௞ + 𝜃෠௞𝜆௜௞ + 𝜉௜௞                                            (2.9) 
 
where 𝜃෠௞ = 𝜎௞𝜌௞, 𝜆௜௞ = −
థ[ఛ(௓೔ೖఊෝೖ)]
ி(௓೔ೖఊෝೖ)
 and 𝜉௜௞ is an error term.  
 
In Eq. (2.9), 𝜙 is the standard normal probability density function, 𝜎௞ is the standard error 
of the disturbance term, and 𝜌௞ is the correlation between the error terms of Eqs. (2.8) 
and (2.9). The function 𝜏 is a strictly increasing transformation that converts the random 
variables associated with occupational attainment into a standard normal variant, i.e. 𝜏 =
Φିଵ(𝐹), where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 𝐹 is the 
distribution function of the MNL as defined in Eq. (2.8). Estimation is carried out in two 
stages. First, estimates of the coefficient vector in the MNL equation are obtained from 
Eq. (2.8), and second, these estimated coefficients are used to calculate 𝜆௜௞. The variables 
included in 𝑍௜௞ are expected to affect the individual’s desire for a particular occupation 
as well as the willingness of employers to hire an individual. The analysis employs as 
excluded instruments that identify selectivity indicators for number of children below six 
and household size. These variables are assumed to shift the probability of being 
employed in occupation 𝑘 and not affect wages. Nonetheless, attaining identification in 
the selectivity model is difficult since no available variable can be considered completely 
exogenous.6 
 
 
                                                          
6 Attaining identification in the selectivity model is, in general, not an easy task. While certain cases offer 
an obvious instrument or set of instruments to identify the selection effect (e.g. when analysing the wage 
determination of participating women, it is likely that the age of dependent children will affect the 
participation decision but not the wage, therefore representing an obvious instrument) other applications 
may not allow such straightforward solutions. More specifically, it is difficult to find exogenous variables 
that shift the probability of occupation of employment and not the mean wage. This represents an obvious 
limitation of the chapter. 
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2.4.3 Démurger-Gurgand-Shi-Ximing (DGSX) Decomposition 
Démurger et al. (2009) extend the BMZ methodology where the authors develop a 
decomposition based on microsimulation. The procedure decomposes mean wage 
differentials between two groups into the same four components as the BMZ approach. 
However, the method proposed by DGSX allows evaluating the effect that both indirect 
and direct changes in occupation allocations have on wage differentials. While the direct 
effect corresponds to the BU term in the BMZ procedure, the indirect effect refers to the 
fact that changes in the occupational structure have an ancillary impact on within 
occupation mean wages, as they alter the population composition of the different 
occupations. 
 
Démurger et al. (2009) argue that in the BMZ decomposition, the change in the proportion 
in each occupation, i.e. 𝑃෠௞௠ − 𝑃௞௠, is evaluated at wage 𝑋ത௞௡𝛽መ௞௡, which is the observed 
average wage rate in occupation 𝑘. However, by changing the occupation allocation rule 
of 𝑚 from 𝛾ො௠ to 𝛾ො௡, mean wages in each occupation are modified accordingly given that 
the workers allocated into each occupation are no longer the same. To address this issue, 
the authors propose that each counterfactual occupation proportion be evaluated using 
mean wages consistent with its counterfactual population structure. Thus, the following 
decomposition is specified: 
 
𝑤ഥ ௡ − 𝑤ഥ ௠ = ∑ 𝑃௞
௠൫𝑋ത௞
௡ − 𝑋ധ௞
௠൯𝛽መ௞
௡ + ∑ 𝑋ത௞
௡𝛽௞
௡൫𝑃௞
௡ − 𝑃෠௞
௠൯௄௞ୀଵ
௄
௞ୀଵ   
+∑ 𝑃௞௠𝑋ധ௞௠൫𝛽መ௞௡ − 𝛽መ௞௠൯ + ∑ 𝑋ത௞௡𝛽መ௞௡൫𝑃෠௞௠ − 𝑃௞௠൯ + ∑ 𝑃௞௠൫𝑋ധ௞௠ − 𝑋ത௞௠൯𝛽መ௞௠௄௞ୀଵ௄௞ୀଵ௄௞ୀଵ    (2.10) 
 
where 𝑋ധ௞௠𝛽መ௞௠ is the average earnings computed over the individuals 𝑖 ∈ 𝑚 that would be 
in sector 𝑘 under the allocation rule of 𝑛. The first two terms of Eq. (2.10) represent the 
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WE and BE components and constitute what Démurger et al. (2009) refer to as the 
population effect. The third term denotes the WU component and is denoted as the 
earnings or hourly wage effect. Furthermore, the fourth term symbolizes the BU 
component, while the fifth term is added by the DGSX approach. The fourth and fifth 
terms represent the allocation or occupation effect, where the former embodies the direct 
allocation effect and the latter the indirect effect. The fifth term depends on a gap in 
average earnings between those individuals 𝑖 ∈ 𝑚 that would be in occupation 𝑘 under 
the allocation rule of 𝑛 and the individuals in 𝑖 ∈ 𝑚 who are initially observed to be in 
occupation 𝑘. 
 
Following Démurger et al. (2009, p. 615), the implementation of the DGSX 
decomposition requires simulating individual counterfactual occupations. In order to 
accomplish this, values of 𝜂 are initially drawn for each worker, conditional on 𝑍௜ and the 
worker’s observed occupation. Subsequently, these drawn values are used to determine 
each individual’s allocation into counterfactual occupations. Specifically, if individual 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑚 has received (?̂?௜ଵ … ?̂?௜௞) compatible with his observed occupation, the occupation 
allocation counterfactual according to the black or white structure will denote that the 
worker is employed in occupation 𝑘 if (𝑍௜௞𝛾ො௞௡ + ?̂?௜௞) = max௝∈௄൛𝑍௜௝𝛾ො௝௡ + ?̂?௜௝ൟ. Finally, 
wage counterfactuals also incorporate residuals from the occupation specific wage 
regressions based on observed status. 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
2.5 Results 
 
2.5.1 Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) 
This section presents the first set of estimation based results. OLS regressions are 
performed where the natural logarithm of hourly wages is taken as the dependent variable. 
Exogenous variables include years of education, potential experience, potential 
experience squared and a dummy variable for marriage status. Additional controls include 
the state of residence unemployment rate, a time trend and regional dummies, including 
separate dummies for California and Texas. Regional dummy variables are inserted in 
order to control for geographical differences in labour market characteristics and living 
costs. These include metropolitan status and the nine census regions. 
 
Table 2.3 OLS log wage regressions 
Coefficients Mexican Americans Natives 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG Blacks Whites 
Intercept 1.589*** 1.238*** .930*** 1.075*** .917*** .941*** 
 (.050) (.162) (.129) (.075) (.032) (.009) 
Education .031*** .079*** .082*** .077*** .086*** .083*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Experience .020*** .041*** .036*** .036*** .027*** .041*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.003) 
Experience2/100 -.021*** -.068*** -.055*** -.059*** -.039*** -.071*** 
 (.002) (.005) (.006) (.003) (.002) (.001) 
Married .096*** .183*** .171*** .176*** .151*** .189*** 
 (.006) (.014) (.017) (.008) (.005) (.001) 
State unemployment rate -.002 -.013* -.000 -.011*** -.006*** -.001** 
 (.003) (.006) (.008) (.004) (.002) (.000) 
In metropolitan area .023** .036 .029 .095*** .118*** .141*** 
 (.009) (.024) (.023) (.011) (.008) (.001) 
       
Observations 25,800 5,590 3,631 15,007 42,676 376,187 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Additional controls include dummy variables for occupations, year, state, and census division. 
 
As seen in Table 2.3, Mexican-born immigrants have substantially lower returns to 
schooling compared to the U.S.-born population. This is in part due to the fact that FG 
workers generally obtained their education in a different language (i.e. Spanish) and that 
they were exposed to a lower quality schooling system in Mexico. Unlike U.S.-born 
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workers, immigrants encounter an imperfect transferability of their skills upon entering 
the American labour market. Furthermore, the returns to education of SG and TG workers 
are lower than those of blacks and whites. Previous explanations include the fact that 
many U.S.-born Mexican-origin workers spend a share of their childhood in Mexico 
where they receive part of their formal schooling (Rendall and Torr, 2008). Moreover, 
Trejo (2003) argues that since many FG immigrants are employed in agriculture and 
similar seasonal industries, their children may be subject to constant movement within 
the U.S. which may disrupt their education. Additionally, given that a large share of 
Mexican-Americans live in rural areas, their lower returns to education may be a 
consequence of their exposure to lower quality schools within the United States. 
 
On the other hand, there is a great deal of variation regarding the returns to potential 
experience. For the case of Mexican-born workers, their low returns reflect the low 
premium associated with pre-immigration experience, since the variable captures the 
returns to job training and work experience in both the U.S. and Mexico. Pertaining to 
SG and TG workers, their returns to potential experience greatly surpass those of FG 
immigrants and blacks, while they are slightly lower than those of whites. An explanation 
for the low returns to experience of blacks is given by the fact that they have lower levels 
of labour force participation and higher unemployment rates than the other groups, in 
which case there is a measurement problem where their levels of potential experience are 
overstated. As an example, during the period of study blacks had a labour force 
participation rate of 88.0% compared to 95.1% for FG immigrants, while their 
unemployment rate ascended to 10.8% compared to 5.0% for the case of whites. 
 
33 
 
 
 
Additional controls show that married individuals tend to have higher wages than those 
who are not married. Regarding the impact of the state unemployment rate, this has a 
negative effect where the cohorts most sensitive to economic downturns are SG-II and 
TG workers. Finally, while natives and TG workers who reside in metropolitan areas earn 
substantially more than their counterparts who live in suburban or rural areas, FG and SG 
workers have much more heterogeneous wages irrespective of their place of residence. 
 
Table 2.4 OB decomposition: Blacks and Mexican-Americans 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential .361*** .120*** .003 .014** 
 (.004) (.008) (.010) (.005) 
     
Explained: Differences in average characteristics .319*** .132*** .038*** .040*** 
 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.005) 
Education .361*** .067*** .031*** .039*** 
 (.006) (.002) (.003) (.001) 
Experience -.017*** .100*** .041*** .031*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
Occupation .031*** -.004*** -.012*** -.012*** 
 (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Region -.028*** -.035*** -.015*** -.006 
 (.003) (.005) (.004) (.004) 
Period -.001 .001 .002*** .001** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
     
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients .042*** -.011 -.035*** -.026*** 
 (.008) (.008) (.009) (.006) 
Education .486*** .082* .036 .106*** 
 (.015) (.043) (.058) (.032) 
Experience .051*** -.098*** -.090*** -.075*** 
 (.015) (.016) (.024) (.014) 
Occupation .026*** -.006 -.006 -.006 
 (.005) (.011) (.015) (.008) 
Region .105** .307** .005 .073 
 (.046) (.152) (.101) (.067) 
Period .005 .042 .045 .049** 
 (.018) (.028) (.038) (.021) 
Intercept -.672*** -.321* -.013 -.158* 
 (.059) (.166) (.133) (.081) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of black workers are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.4 presents the results of the OB decomposition of log wage differentials between 
blacks and Mexican-Americans. The total wage gap between blacks and FG workers 
stands at .361 log points. This difference is reduced to .120 log points for the case of SG-
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II workers, whereas SG-I and TG labourers have similar wages to those of African-
Americans. For Mexican-born immigrants, the explained component accounts for 88.4% 
of the total wage gap. Therefore, while FG workers have significantly lower wages than 
blacks, this is driven by differences in average characteristics and not by differences in 
the returns to these characteristics. Considering that FG workers tend to have low levels 
of English language proficiency and that the cohort includes illegal immigrants, Mexican-
born workers do not seem to be discriminated against relative to blacks. With respect to 
second and third generation Mexican-Americans, the results suggest that based on 
differences in observables their total wage gap with respect to blacks should be larger 
than what is actually observed. This implies that U.S.-born Mexican-Americans have 
higher returns to their observable characteristics and could be interpreted as blacks being 
exposed to a negative wage premium. A partial explanation for this is that blacks are more 
heavily concentrated in regions of the country where racial prejudice is most severe. 
 
Pertaining to the detailed decomposition, the explained component between blacks and 
FG workers is dominated by differences in average levels of schooling. On the other hand, 
for second and third generation Mexican-Americans wage differentials are mostly a 
product of their lower schooling levels and fewer years of work experience, where the 
latter is not an issue of concern as it is driven by age differentials. Observing differences 
in occupational attainment, these explain 8.6% of the total wage gap between blacks and 
FG immigrants, suggesting that the former are employed in better compensated 
occupations. Nevertheless, the same cannot be said for U.S.-born Mexican origin 
workers, since the negative sign of the occupational component implies that it is them 
who are employed in better remunerated occupations with respect to blacks. The negative 
effect of the regional term denotes the fact that Mexican-Americans tend to be 
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concentrated in areas with higher mean wages than blacks. Concerning unexplained wage 
differentials, for the case of FG immigrants these are largely driven by differences in the 
returns to education, while this effect is also positive for second and third generation 
immigrants. Furthermore, differences in returns to experience have a positive effect on 
the unexplained wage gap between blacks and FG workers, while this contributes 
negatively for the case of SG and TG immigrants. Regarding occupations, blacks have 
higher returns to occupation of employment than FG immigrants. This is not the case for 
subsequent generations, where the occupation coefficient effect is not statistically 
different from zero. Finally, differences in the intercepts between blacks and Mexican 
immigrants arise because the latter have significantly lower returns to education and 
experience and thus a much flatter wage profile. A similar relationship occurs for the case 
of second and third generation immigrants, where their lower returns to education and 
comparable wages relative to blacks lead to larger intercepts. These results also depend 
on the base categories elected for the categorical variables. 
 
A different picture emerges when analysing wage differentials between whites and 
Mexican-Americans. Table 2.5 shows that the largest wage gap observed for any two 
groups is the one between whites and FG workers, which ascends to .599 log points. 
Between first and subsequent generation immigrants substantial progress is made. For 
SG-II workers their total wage gap with respect to whites is .358 log points while for the 
SG-I population it stands at .247 log points. This accounts for a 40.2% reduction in the 
total wage gap relative to their direct ancestors for the case of the SG-II population and a 
59.8% reduction for the case of SG-I labourers. TG workers present a total wage gap of 
.252 log points with respect to whites. Relative to the SG-II population, this represents a 
reduction of the wage gap of 29.6%, yet comparing this to SG-I workers leads to a 4.6% 
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increase of the total wage gap. Analysing the explained component, the observable 
characteristics of FG immigrants explain 67.6% of their total wage gap with respect to 
whites, while for the SG-II and SG-I population this drops to 67.0% and 61.0% 
respectively, before descending to 58.3% for the case of TG workers. Analogously, these 
results imply that the magnitude of the unexplained component increases by generation. 
This is surprising, since it is expected that as different generations of Mexican-Americans 
assimilate into the U.S. their resemblance to native workers increases in terms of both 
their observable and unobservable characteristics. 
 
Regarding the detailed decomposition, the endowment effect is largely driven by 
differences in average education levels. For all generations, this term accounts for at least 
49.6% of the explained component. Analysing work experience, FG immigrants are on 
average more experienced than whites. The negative effect of this component assumes 
that both pre-immigration and post-immigration experience is remunerated at the same 
rate that experience is compensated for whites. In the case of U.S.-born Mexican-origin 
workers, the results suggest that among the reasons whites have higher wages is because 
they have more years of experience. On the other hand, occupation of employment is 
significant in explaining wage differentials for all generations, implying that whites 
occupy better remunerated positions than Mexican-Americans. The negative effect of the 
region component signifies that the Mexican- origin population is concentrated in areas 
with higher mean wages than whites. With respect to the unexplained component, 
differences in returns to education have a large positive effect on the wage gap between 
whites and Mexican-Americans. Moreover, returns to experience play a similar role to 
the one found when analysing wage differentials relative to blacks. Concerning the role 
of occupations, FG workers have lower returns to being employed in the same 
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occupations as whites, while this effect is not significant for succeeding generations. 
Nevertheless, this does not take into account the possible presence of barriers to entry 
into different occupations. The negative values of the intercepts are again driven by 
differences in the wage profile originated by variations in the returns to education and 
experience. 
 
Table 2.5 OB decomposition: Whites and Mexican-Americans 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential .599*** .358*** .241*** .252*** 
 (.003) (.007) (.009) (.004) 
     
Explained: Differences in average characteristics .405*** .240*** .147*** .147*** 
 (003) (.004) (.005) (.003) 
Education .390*** .119*** .086*** .093*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
Experience -.019*** .112*** .044*** .030*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
Occupation .090*** .042*** .033*** .034*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Region -.050*** -.065*** -.038*** -.026*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
Period -.002*** -.004*** .001*** -.001*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) 
     
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients .194*** .118*** .093*** .105*** 
 (.004) (.006) (.008) (.004) 
Education .466*** .040 -.009 .061* 
 (.009) (.039) (.055) (.037) 
Experience .160*** -.003 .013 .032*** 
 (.013) (.015) (.023) (.012) 
Occupation .034*** .012 .014 .013* 
 (.004) (.011) (.014) (.007) 
Region .133*** .343** .033 .099 
 (.042) (.151) (.099) (.063) 
Period -.018 .019 .019 .023 
 (.014) (.026) (.036) (.018) 
Intercept -.647*** -.297* .011 -.133* 
 (.051) (.163) (.129) (.075) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of white workers are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table 2.3. 
 
To put the results into context, it is observed that the total wage gap between blacks and 
whites stands at .238 log points, of which .115 log points or 48.3% is attributed to the 
explained component. Hence if the unexplained component is interpreted as a measure of 
discrimination, the analysis shows that blacks are exposed to a higher degree of 
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discrimination from whites than first, second and third generation Mexican-Americans. 
Nevertheless, Trejo (1997, p. 1263) argues that is not necessarily true since the 
productivity related measures captured in the CPS may be more informative for Mexican-
Americans than for blacks. 
 
2.5.2 Brown-Moon-Zoloth (BMZ) 
The MNL occupational attainment model specified in Eq. (2.8) is estimated separately 
for all groups, where the occupational category “Other” is used as the default group. Table 
2.6 presents the model’s marginal effects. Among the explanatory variables, education 
appears to play an important role in predicting employment into the highest paying 
occupations, where its effect is strongest for natives. An opposite story emerges regarding 
lower skilled categories, where an additional year of schooling tends to reduce the 
probability of attachment. Nevertheless, while this is true for all cohorts, for FG 
immigrants the effect is much weaker at the top and bottom of the occupational 
distribution. This gives credence to the anecdotal thinking that irrespective of their 
educational levels Mexican-born workers are clustered in low-skilled jobs. 
 
Regarding potential experience, the model shows that this is generally associated with an 
increase in the probability of attachment in the “Managerial and Professional Specialty”, 
“Precision Production, Craft and Repair” and “Operators, Fabricators and Labourers” 
categories. For other occupations, its effect tends to be negative for low levels of years of 
experience but positive for higher amounts. 
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Table 2.6 MNL occupational attainment. Marginal effects 
 Mexican Americans Natives 
Coefficients FG SG-II SG-I TG Blacks Whites 
 Managerial and Professional Specialty 
Education .005*** .053*** .078*** .072*** .080*** .133*** 
 (.000) (.002) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Experience .001*** .004*** .001 .003*** .001 .005*** 
 (.000) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Experience2/100 -.000 -.006** -.001 -.006*** -.001 -.005*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.005) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Married .002** .006 .030** .016** .018*** .053*** 
 (.001) (.008) (.014) (.006) (.004) (.002) 
State unemployment rate .000 .002 .006* .003** .000 .001*** 
 (.000) (.001) (.003) (.001) (.000) (.000) 
In metropolitan area .002** .015 .032* .026*** .044*** .052*** 
 (.001) (.013) (.014) (.007) (.004) (.002) 
# Children <=5 .001 -.005 -.001 -.001 .011*** .008*** 
 (.001) (.006) (.011) (.004) (.004) (.001) 
Household size -.001*** -.003 -.005 -.005*** -.007*** -.003*** 
 (.000) (.002) (.004) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
 Technical, Sales and Administrative Support 
Education .008*** .043*** .039*** .039*** .036*** .020*** 
 (.000) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.000) 
Experience .001** -.008*** -.001 -.004*** -.007*** -.003*** 
 (.000) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Experience2/100 -.000 .019*** .002 .005* .011*** .006*** 
 (.001) (.005) (.006) (.003) (.001) (.001) 
Married -.000 -.037** -.054*** -.018** -.017*** -.017*** 
 (.003) (.015) (.019) (.009) (.005) (.002) 
State unemployment rate .001 .003 .001 -.001 .000 -.001** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.000) (.000) 
In metropolitan area .013*** .084*** .022 .086*** .100*** .066*** 
 (.004) (.020) (.022) (.009) (.005) (.001) 
# Children <=5 -.002 .001 .003 -.014** -.001 -.003** 
 (.002) (.011) (.015) (.007) (.005) (.001) 
Household size .000 -.001 .008* .001 -.001 -.001** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.000) 
 Precision Production, Craft and Repair 
Education -.002** -.032*** -.033*** -.043*** -.020*** -.069*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.000) 
Experience .003*** .006*** .004 .005*** .004*** .004*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Experience2/100 -.011*** -.017*** -.005 -008*** -.004*** -.010*** 
 (.002) (.005) (.006) (.003) (.001) (.001) 
Married .028*** .023 .055*** .035*** .020*** .004** 
 (.007) (.014) (.017) (.009) (.004) (.001) 
State unemployment rate -.009*** .000 -.008* -.005** -.001 -.002*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.000) 
In metropolitan area .036*** -.006 -.011 -.040*** -.036*** -.036*** 
 (.008) (.020) (.021) (.010) (.005) (.001) 
# Children <=5 .015*** .007 .005 .012* -.003 .001 
 (.005) (.010) (.013) (.006) (.004) (.001) 
Household size -.003* -.000 -.002 -.000 .001 .001*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.000) 
 Service 
Education .001 -.003 -.006 -.002 -.018*** -.013*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Experience -.003*** -.002 -.005** -.003*** -.001 -.003 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Experience2/100 .005*** .008** .013** .008*** .002 .006*** 
 (.001) (.004) (.005) (.002) (.001) (.000) 
Married -.025*** -.001 -.046*** -.023*** -.053*** -.030*** 
 (.006) (.012) (.016) (.007) (.005) (.001) 
State unemployment rate .009*** .002 .000 .005*** .004*** .002*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
In metropolitan area .093*** .021 -.010 -.000 .031*** -.007*** 
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 (.006) (.016) (.017) (.008) (.005) (.001) 
# Children <=5 -.006 -.009 .018 -.006 .003 -.001 
 (.004) (.009) (.011) (.006) (.005) (.001) 
Household size -.004*** -.004 -.005 -.001 .002* -.001 
 (.001) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
 Operators, Fabricators and Labourers 
Education .001 -.048*** -.070*** -.054*** -.074*** -.066*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Experience .002** .002 .003 .001 .004*** -.001*** 
 (.000) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Experience2/100 .000 -.007 -.015** -.002 -.008*** .002*** 
 (.002) (.005) (.006) (.003) (.002) (.000) 
Married -.009 .001 -.008 -.033*** -.005 -.029*** 
 (.008) (016) (.018) (.009) (.005) (.001) 
State unemployment rate -.001 -.005 .001 -.002 -.002* .001*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.000) 
In metropolitan area -.009 -.096*** -.022 -.049*** -.115*** -.057*** 
 (.010) (.025) (.022) (.010) (.007) (.001) 
# Children <=5 -.010* -.004 -.027* .004 -.010* -.003*** 
 (.005) (.011) (.014) (.006) (.005) (.001) 
Household size .007*** .008** .003 .006*** .004*** .002*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.000) 
 Other 
Education -.014*** -.011*** -.007*** -.011*** -.020*** -.004*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Experience -.004*** -.001** -.003*** -.002*** .004*** -.002*** 
 (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) 
Experience2/100 .006*** .003 .006*** .003*** .001 .001*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Married .003 .007 .023*** .024*** .020*** .019*** 
 (.005) (.006) (.006) (.003) (.004) (.001) 
State unemployment rate .000 -.003** .001 -.000 -.000 -.001*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
In metropolitan area -.136*** -.018* -.010 -.022*** -.036*** -.017*** 
 (.009) (.010) (.008) (.004) (.005) (.001) 
# Children <=5 .003 .010** .001 .005** -.003 -.001 
 (.003) (.004) (.005) (.002) (.004) (.001) 
Household size .001 -.000 .001 -.001 .001 .001*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
       
Pseudo-R-squared .055 .087 .101 .093 .107 .138 
Observations 25,800 5,590 3,631 15,007 42,676 376,187 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Additional controls incorporated in the regressions include a time trend and dummy variables for state, and census 
division. 
 
On the other hand, variables related to the worker’s family situation show that the married 
population has a higher probability of being employed at the top of the occupational 
distribution. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of variation in the magnitude of the 
coefficients for different cohorts. Pertaining to the number of children under age six, this 
has a positive effect on the probability of working in the “Managerial and Professional 
Speciality” category for the case of natives, whereas for Mexican-Americans its effect is 
not statistically different from zero. Moreover, its effect in the “Operators, Fabricators 
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and Labourers” category is negative, except for SG-I workers where it is not significant. 
In medium and low-skilled categories, no clear pattern emerges. Observing household 
size, for all workers this has a negative effect on the probability of attachment in the 
highest paying occupation and a positive effect for the case of the lowest paying 
occupation. 
 
Additional controls show that an increase in the state unemployment rate is generally 
associated with a higher probability of being employed at the top of the distribution. 
Nevertheless, this effect is not statistically significant for the case of blacks, first 
generation immigrants and SG-II workers. A similar relationship is present in the 
“Service” category, whereas in the “Precision Production, Craft and Repair” occupation 
its effect is mostly negative. Furthermore, workers residing in metropolitan areas are less 
likely to be employed at the bottom of the distribution, except for FG immigrants. In 
summary, the effect of the explanatory variables on occupational attainment varies 
significantly between the populations of interest, meaning that natives and Mexican-
Americans are allocated quite differently based on their observed characteristics. 
 
Attention now turns to the occupation specific wage regressions presented in Table 2.7. 
While the results are similar to the ones observed in Table 2.3, not all patterns are 
consistent between different occupations. For instance, at the top of the occupational 
distribution the returns to education of FG immigrants are much more similar to those of 
natives compared to what had been previously observed. This suggests that differences in 
returns to schooling are in large part driven by the fact that FG immigrants are 
concentrated in low-paying jobs. Nonetheless, the remaining gap implies that 
compensating differentials within occupations are also present. Additionally, it can be 
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seen that in the “Operators, Fabricators and Labourers” category the returns to education 
of whites are lower than those of other cohorts excluding FG immigrants. Regarding 
returns to potential experience, SG and TG workers are commonly better compensated 
than whites for low experience levels in the highest paying occupations. In addition, for 
all categories the returns to experience of blacks and FG immigrants are always low. 
While this is expected at bottom of the distribution, it is also true for individuals who are 
higher-up in the occupational ladder. The findings indicate that there is variation in the 
effects of the covariates on the different groups depending on their occupation of 
employment. 
 
The results of the BMZ decomposition of log wage differentials between blacks and 
Mexican-Americans are provided in Table 2.8. For FG immigrants, 79.2% of their total 
wage gap with respect to blacks can be accounted by the WE and BE components. As 
with the OB decomposition, this implies that the majority of the wage gap between blacks 
and Mexican-born workers arises due to differences in the average characteristics of the 
two groups. These differences are mainly observed among individuals working in the 
same occupations, where the WE term has the largest effect and rises to 60.1% of the total 
wage gap. On the other hand, the BU component, which captures the effect of 
occupational segregation, represents 1.1% of the total wage gap. Given that the BU term 
is not statistically significant, it can be inferred that occupational segregation does not 
play a meaningful role in explaining the observed wage differentials between blacks and 
FG immigrants. For subsequent generations a common situation arises, where wage 
differentials associated to both explained terms are greater than the total wage gap with 
respect to blacks. This results in the unexplained components having a negative effect, 
implying that the total wage gap between blacks and SG-II, SG-I and TG workers should 
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be larger than what is actually observed. Pertaining to the BU term, its negative effect 
suggests that blacks encounter more barriers to entry into the higher paying occupations 
than second and third generation Mexican-Americans. Nonetheless, it cannot be 
discarded that this may also be a product of the different preferences of blacks which limit 
their occupational attachment at the top of the distribution. 
 
Table 2.9 displays the results of the BMZ decomposition between whites and Mexican- 
Americans. Substantially different patters emerge relative to those previously obtained. 
In general, the WE and BE components never jointly represent more than 62.6% of the 
total wage gap, where this terms carry the most weight for the case of SG-II workers. As 
a result, even within occupations a large unexplained component that affects the wage 
gap between whites and Mexican-Americans is present. Regarding FG immigrants, the 
WE, BE and WU components constitute most of the observed wage differentials, while 
the BU term is statistically significant and represents 9.3% of the total wage gap. 
Moreover, for second and third generation Mexican-Americans a different pattern 
emerges as all four terms play an important role. Among these, the WU represents 
between 31.3% and 40.5% of the total wage gap for different cohorts, as a result of 
different compensating differentials within occupations. Finally, the BU term contributes 
6.1% to the total wage gap for SG-II workers, 10.0% for SG-I individuals, and 9.5% for 
the TG population. The results suggest that relative to whites all three generations of 
Mexican-Americans encounter barriers to attachment into high-paying occupations, 
which in turn has an adverse effect on the wage levels of Mexican-Americans and 
therefore increases the wage gap with respect to whites. 
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Table 2.7 OLS log wage regressions by occupation 
Coefficients Mexican Americans Natives 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG Blacks Whites 
 Managerial and Professional Specialty 
Intercept 1.353*** .778*** 1.326*** .788*** .875*** .941*** 
 (.182) (.178) (.206) (.116) (.054) (.014) 
Education .070*** .086*** .067*** .080*** .088*** .085*** 
 (.005) (.008) (.069) (.005) (.002) (.001) 
Experience .010 .037*** .027*** .048*** .029*** .046*** 
 (.008) (.007) (.007) (.004) (.002) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.001 -.060*** -.032* -.086*** -.045*** -.081*** 
 (.020) (.017) (.018) (.009) (.006) (.001) 
Married .088* .169*** .072 .112*** .130*** .173*** 
 (.050) (.042) (.043) (.022) (.011) (.003) 
State unemployment rate .004 -.007 .006 -.002 -.007** .001* 
 (.011) (.009) (.010) (.006) (.003) (.000) 
In metropolitan area .175** .265*** .113** .144*** .178*** .241*** 
 (.076) (.081) (.057) (.035) (.024) (.003) 
       
R-squared .192 .288 .660 .242 .202 .233 
Observations 894 777 221 2,542 7,847 117,373 
 Technical, Sales and Administrative Support 
Intercept 1.451*** .783*** .455** .540*** .690*** .574*** 
 (.153) (.211) (.213) (.118) (.055) (.017) 
Education .057*** .097*** .098*** .098*** .093*** .097*** 
 (.004) (.009) (.010) (.006) (.003) (.001) 
Experience .021*** .046*** .052*** 041*** .032*** .048*** 
 (.005) (.004) (.006) (.003) (.002) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.020* -.079*** -.090*** -.073*** -.051*** -.089*** 
 (.010) (.013) (.015) (.008) (.004) (.001) 
Married .107*** .174*** .193*** .215*** .155*** .212*** 
 (.033) (.029) (.040) (.019) (.011) (.004) 
State unemployment rate -.025*** -.014** -.004 -.009* -.001 -.001 
 (.007) (.006) (.008) (.005) (.003) (.001) 
In metropolitan area .047 .117* .045 .134*** .084*** .163*** 
 (.049) (.065) (.050) (.027) (.021) (.004) 
       
R-squared .150 .294 .363 .274 .220 .276 
Observations 1,401 1,264 768 3,079 8,238 77,093 
 Precision Production, Craft and Repair 
Intercept 1.572*** 1.126*** .618** 1.046*** 1.009*** 1.189 
 (.047) (.123) (.313) (.087) (.066) (.017) 
Education .028*** .070*** .087*** .069*** .078*** .074*** 
 (.001) (.006) (.012) (.005) (.004) (.001) 
Experience .024*** .036*** .032*** .035*** .026*** .035*** 
 (.002) (.004) (.007) (.003) (.002) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.029*** -.063*** -.046*** -.054*** -.035*** -056*** 
 (.004) (.012) (.017) (.007) (.005) (.001) 
Married .094*** .170*** .148*** .149*** .140*** .167*** 
 (.013) (.030) (.040) (.018) (.013) (.003) 
State unemployment rate -.001 .017** -.005 .003 -.003 .002** 
 (.003) (.007) (.009) (.005) (.003) (.001) 
In metropolitan area .018 .006 -.013 .054*** .136*** .092*** 
 (.017) (.046) (.050) (.020) (.018) (.003) 
       
R-squared .093 .205 .248 .210 .162 .195 
Observations 6,740 1,128 719 3,380 5,833 73,432 
 Service 
Intercept 1.433*** .556*** .402* .468*** .421*** .435*** 
 (.055) (.194) (.227) (.122) (.066) (.027) 
Education .028*** .085*** .091*** .097*** .101*** .097 
 (.001) (.010) (.013) (.006) (.004) (.001) 
Experience .013*** .050*** .028*** .040*** .030*** .044*** 
 (.002) (.006) (.008) (.004) (.002) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.009* -.093*** -.045** -.077*** -.049*** -.085*** 
 (.004) (.016) (.019) (.010) (.005) (.002) 
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Married .076*** .219*** .280*** .248*** .143*** .249*** 
 (.014) (.042) (.054) (.024) (.012) (.006) 
State unemployment rate .001 -.017** -.009 -.000 -.004 -.000 
 (.003) (.010) (.012) (.006) (.003) (.001) 
In metropolitan area -.006 -.075 -.069 .173*** .101*** .129*** 
 (.031) (.067) (.066) (.028) (.019) (.006) 
       
R-squared .084 .312 .352 .335 .198 .301 
Observations 4,559 675 450 1,860 7,145 29,975 
 Operators, Fabricators and Labourers 
Intercept 1.504*** .864*** 1.078*** 1.073*** 1.185*** 1.307*** 
 (.039) (.128) (.195) (.083) (.046) (.018) 
Education .027*** .070*** .079*** .054*** .058*** .047*** 
 (.001) (.006) (.009) (.005) (.003) (.001) 
Experience .021*** .036*** .037*** .032*** .024*** .034*** 
 (.001) (.004) (.005) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.023*** -.055*** -.056*** -.046*** -.031*** -.057*** 
 (.003) (.011) (.012) (.006) (.003) (.001) 
Married .117*** .185*** .180*** .162*** .162*** .174*** 
 (.011) (.028) (.037) (.017) (.009) (.004) 
State unemployment rate -.003 .001 -.009 -.004 -.008*** .000 
 (.002) (.006) .009 (.004) (.002) (.001) 
In metropolitan area .000 .007 .094** .064*** .113*** .082*** 
 (.015) (.036) (.038) (.019) (.011) (.003) 
       
R-squared .091 .243 .257 .203 .138 .171 
Observations 8,712 1,464 885 3,459 12,016 65,543 
 Other 
Intercept 1.342*** 1.059*** .767*** .847*** .774*** .374*** 
 (.063) (.257) (.243) (.146) (.101) (.034) 
Education .021*** .047*** .107*** .067*** .077*** .103*** 
 (.002) (.012) (.017) (.008) (.007) (.002) 
Experience .018*** .032*** .010 .024*** .031*** .038*** 
 (.002) (.008) (.011) (.005) (.004) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.022*** -.048** .009 -.039*** -.058*** -.071*** 
 (.004) (.019) (.028) (.013) (.010) (.004) 
Married .065*** .110* .071 .195*** .155*** .159*** 
 (.017) (.060) (.084) (.037) (.029) (.010) 
State unemployment rate -.011*** -.039** -.012 -.023** -.022*** .001 
 (.004) (.017) (.021) (.009) (.006) (.002) 
In metropolitan area .076*** .160** -.048 .156*** .201*** .170*** 
 (.019) (.077) (.087) (.040) (.028) (.009) 
       
R-squared .080 .209 .381 .289 .278 .328 
Observations 3,494 282 149 687 1,597 12,771 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Additional controls incorporated in the regressions include a time trend and dummy variables for state, and census 
division. 
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Table 2.8 BMZ decomposition: Blacks and Mexican-Americans 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential .361*** .120*** .003 .014*** 
 (.011) (.006) (.005) (.005) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .217*** .122*** .047*** .047*** 
 (.010) (.006) (.005) (.005) 
Between .069*** .022*** .010*** .013*** 
 (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in average coefficients     
     
Within .070*** -.004 -.028*** -.020*** 
 (.011) (.009) (.009) (.006) 
Between .004 -.020*** -.025*** -.027*** 
 (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of blacks are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.9 BMZ decomposition: Whites and Mexican-Americans 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential .599*** .358*** .241*** .252*** 
 (.004) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .209*** .151*** .077*** .072*** 
 (.003) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Between .139*** .073*** .050*** .054*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .194*** .112*** .089*** .102*** 
 (.004) (.006) (.008) (.004) 
Between .056*** .022*** .024*** .024*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of whites are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table 2.7. 
 
2.5.3 Démurger-Gurgand-Shi-Ximing (DGSX) 
Table 2.10 presents the results of the DGSX decomposition for blacks and Mexican- 
Americans. Some important differences arise with respect to the BMZ methodology, as 
the WE, WU and BU components are now different. In particular, I focus on the BU term 
as it partly reflects occupational segregation. For FG immigrants the BU component 
accounts for 22.2% of the total wage gap, while for SG-II workers this rises to 27.5% of 
the total wage gap but the term is not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, for 
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SG-I workers the BU term is also larger yet it is still negative and not significant. 
Regarding the TG population, the BU component substantially increases more than the 
doubling the observed total wage gap. The increase in the BU term present for all groups 
is a consequence of the indirect allocation effect. Specifically, the Mexican-born workers 
who would be in occupation 𝑘 if they were to follow the same occupational structure as 
blacks have on average higher mean wages than those Mexican-born workers who are 
actually observed to be in occupation 𝑘. Furthermore, this is true not only for FG 
immigrants but for all generations of Mexican-Americans. 
 
Table 2.10 DGSX decomposition: Blacks and Mexican-Americans 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential with respect to blacks .361*** .120*** .003 .014 
 (.023) (.031) (.034) (.020) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .045*** .060*** .010 -.001 
 (.012) (.009) (.008) (.009) 
Between .069*** .022*** .010*** .013*** 
 (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .166*** .004 -.008 -.028*** 
 (.013) (.015) (.016) (.011) 
Between .080*** .033 -.009 .029** 
 (.014) (.025) (.028) (.013) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of blacks are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.11 shows the results of the DGSX decomposition relative to whites. In the BMZ 
decomposition results the BU component had in all cases a positive effect on the total 
wage gap. Nevertheless, in the DGSX decomposition the BU term is reduced 
considerably, so much so that for U.S.-born Mexican-origin workers the effect of this 
component is negative. Specifically, for FG immigrants this goes from representing 9.3% 
of the total wage gap down to 3.5%. The reason behind the reduction in the BU term is in 
essence a product of Mexican-born immigrants being pushed-up the occupational ladder. 
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The intuition is that, if Mexican-born workers were to follow the same occupational 
structure as whites, then many more of them would be employed in the higher skilled 
occupations as entry into these categories would now be easier. This implies that people 
with lower observed productivity enhancing characteristics would be employed in higher 
paying occupations, therefore reducing mean wages in these categories. On the other 
hand, only the workers with the lowest skills or human capital measures are left in the 
bottom occupations, hence lowering mean wages in these categories. Analogously, this 
is also the case for second and third generation Mexican-Americans. 
 
Table 2.11 DGSX decomposition: Whites and Mexican-Americans 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential with respect to whites .599*** .358*** .241*** .252*** 
 (.019) (.025) (.037) (.017) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .182*** .193*** .129*** .145*** 
 (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Between .139*** .073*** .050*** .053*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .257*** .122*** .107*** .099*** 
 (.008) (.011) (.015) (.007) 
Between .021 -.029 -.046 -.045*** 
 (.016) (.023) (.033) (.015) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of whites are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table 2.7. 
 
Finally, an important caveat is that given the broad definition of the occupational 
categories, it is likely that part of the within occupation wage differentials in both the 
BMZ and DGSX decompositions are actually a product of between occupation 
differences. 
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2.5.4 Differences in the Occupational Structure 
Table 2.12 presents observed and predicted occupational distributions for natives and 
Mexican-Americans. In the simulated structures, the allocation rules of blacks and whites 
derived from Eq. (2.8) are used in order to obtain the predicted distributions. This can be 
interpreted as natives and Mexican-Americans having similar preferences and the labour 
market providing equal opportunity and occupational access to all groups. Moreover, the 
Duncan and Duncan (1955) index of dissimilarity is used to provide a better 
understanding of the degree of differences in the occupational structures between natives 
and Mexican-Americans. The index for any two groups is given by: 
 
𝐷 = (1/2) ∑ |𝑃௞
௠ − 𝑃௞
௡|௄௞ୀଵ                                        (2.11) 
 
Eq. (2.11) is interpreted as measuring the proportion of workers in group 𝑚 required to 
change occupations to obtain the same occupational distribution generated by the workers 
in group 𝑛. An index value equal to zero reflects that there is no occupational dissimilarity 
between both groups. An index equal to one indicates that the members of 𝑛 and 𝑚 are 
never in the same occupations. 
 
The Duncan and Duncan (1955) index of dissimilarity is employed due to its direct 
interpretation and because it constitutes one of the most broadly used measures of 
segregation. The index allocates equal weights to each occupation, irrespective of the 
occupation’s relative share of the total workforce.7 Nonetheless, in spite of its popularity, 
                                                          
7 Previous studies that have used the Duncan index of dissimilarity include Butler (1987) for the U.S., Reilly 
(1991) for Ireland, Watts (1998) for the U.K. and Salardi (2012) for Brazil, among others. 
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alternative measures of occupational segregation have been proposed in the literature 
(see, e.g. Moir and Selby-Smith, 1979; Karmel and Maclachlan, 1988) (Salardi, 2012). 
 
Table 2.12 Distribution by occupation. Observed and predicted 
Occupation FG SG-II SG-I TG NB NW 
 Observed 
Managerial & Professional Specialty 3.3 14.0 17.5 16.8 17.0 30.7 
Technical, Sales & Administrative Support 5.2 23.7 22.2 21.1 19.4 21.0 
Precision Production, Craft & Repair 26.2 20.2 19.3 22.2 13.7 19.4 
Service 17.7 11.7 12.6 12.7 16.8 8.1 
Operators, Fabricators & Labourers 33.6 25.9 24.8 22.9 29.9 17.9 
Other 13.9 4.5 3.6 4.4 3.3 3.0 
𝐷௕௟௔௖௞௦ 28.8 11.1 8.3 10.9 --- 19.9 
𝐷௪௛௜௧௘௦ 42.8 17.3 13.0 14.3 19.9 --- 
 Predicted according to black structure 
Managerial & Professional Specialty 6.1 13.7 16.2 15.6 18.3 25.5 
Technical, Sales & Administrative Support 11.3 23.4 21.4 20.6 19.3 18.5 
Precision Production, Craft & Repair 14.5 11.5 12.8 13.1 13.7 12.4 
Service 16.1 18.5 17.1 17.0 16.7 14.2 
Operators, Fabricators & Labourers 46.2 26.6 26.8 27.8 28.1 24.1 
Other 5.8 6.2 5.7 5.9 3.7 5.3 
𝐷෡௕௟௔௖௞௦ 20.9 8.4 4.4 3.8 --- 8.6 
 Predicted according to white structure 
Managerial & Professional Specialty 7.9 17.0 21.0 20.3 23.3 31.2 
Technical, Sales & Administrative Support 10.8 21.0 21.4 21.2 21.5 20.5 
Precision Production, Craft & Repair 30.9 24.2 23.4 24.0 22.4 19.5 
Service 6.5 10.8 9.7 9.6 9.4 8.0 
Operators, Fabricators & Labourers 41.3 22.4 20.6 21.1 20.5 17.4 
Other 2.5 4.6 3.9 3.9 3.0 3.4 
𝐷෡௪௛௜௧௘௦ 35.3 14.2 10.2 10.9 8.3 --- 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Predicted distribution by occupation 
denotes the proportion of workers who would be in each occupation if they were to follow the same occupational sorting 
function as natives, based on the estimation of MNL models of occupational attainment for black and white workers. 
 
With respect to the observed distribution, a clear hierarchy emerges between groups. FG 
immigrants are mostly allocated in low-paying occupations in traditional sectors covering 
low-level service work and labour intensive professions. Blacks and SG and TG workers 
have higher participation levels in high-paying occupations, but also employ a substantial 
number of workers in low-skilled categories. Whites constitute the most privileged group 
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where its largest shares of workers are employed in the “Managerial and Professional 
Specialty” and “Technical, Sales and Administrative Support” categories. The Duncan 
index shows that more than 28.8% of the Mexican-born workforce would need to change 
occupations in order to obtain the same occupational distribution as blacks. On the other 
hand, the SG and TG populations have a structure that is much more similar to that of 
blacks as the index never surpasses 11.1%. Looking at how Mexican-Americans compare 
to whites, 42.8% of Mexican immigrants would need to change occupations to equalise 
the structures of both groups. Relative to FG workers, the U.S.-born Mexican origin 
population has a distribution that more closely resembles that of whites. Nonetheless, 
differences still remain as the index never drops below 13.0%. Among Mexican-
Americans, SG-I workers represent the group whose occupational structure most closely 
resembles that of natives. 
 
Comparing observed distributions to predicted ones, according to the black allocation rule 
FG immigrants are underrepresented at the top of the occupational structure. On the other 
hand, SG and TG workers are actually over-represented at the top of the distribution and 
under-represented at the bottom. Unsurprisingly, when Mexican-Americans have the 
same sorting function as blacks, the Duncan index is reduced. According to the white 
occupational structure, all three generations of Mexican-Americans are under-represented 
at the top and medium parts of the occupational distribution. Furthermore, when Mexican-
Americans follow the sorting function of whites the index is reduced by a smaller amount 
relative to the black structure, where on average this drops by 20.1% for all groups. This 
implies that a larger part of the differences in the occupational structures between whites 
and Mexican-Americans are driven by differences in observed characteristics. 
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The evidence suggests that Mexican immigrants do not engage in the same occupations 
as the U.S.-born population. Nonetheless, when they do, they follow an occupational 
distribution that is much more similar to that of blacks than of whites. While differences 
are also observed for SG and TG workers, these are considerable smaller than those 
previously encountered. Yet, it is not unexpected that Mexican-Americans, especially FG 
workers, present a significant degree of occupational dissimilarity with respect to natives. 
Differences in occupational structures may arise because natives and Mexican-Americans 
differ in characteristics such as culture, way of life, work habits and wealth, among others. 
 
2.6 Sensitivity Checks and Extensions 
 
2.6.1 Selectivity Corrected Decompositions 
Given that both the BMZ and DGSX methodologies require modelling occupational 
attainment as being endogenously determined, it cannot be discarded that workers are 
non-randomly allocated into different occupations. To analyse the effect that self-
selection into each occupational category has on the on previous findings, this section 
performs decompositions based on selectivity corrected wage regressions following the 
Lee (1983) methodology.8 
 
Before proceeding to the decomposition results, wage regression estimations and the 
intuition behind them are briefly discussed.9 Following the related literature (see, e.g. 
Gyourko and Tracy, 1988; Reilly, 1991), the impact of the selection term in the wage 
                                                          
8 Nevertheless, a couple of caveats arise with the use of this procedure. First, the literature has commonly 
found that the results are quite sensitive to the specification of the MNL model in the first stage (see, e.g. 
Miller, 1987; Kidd and Shannon, 1994). Second, the arbitrariness of the chosen instruments implies that 
the identifying assumptions in the two-stage procedure are commonly only weakly satisfied. 
9 First-stage occupation specific wage regressions are presented in Table A.2.4 in the Appendix. 
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regression can be computed by multiplying the selection coefficient, by the mean value 
of the selection variable. The non-statistical significance of the correction term may be 
interpreted as the occupational choice being largely random in the sample. 
 
Among the main findings, it is observed that in the “Managerial and Professional 
Specialty” category, the selectivity bias term is positive for FG and SG-II workers and 
not statistically significant for other cohorts. This indicates that the unobservable 
characteristics that predict attachment into the highest paying occupation are positively 
correlated with the wage levels. The result is not surprising considering the substantial 
barriers to entry into high-paying occupations that FG and SG-II workers face, suggesting 
that only those who perform best in the labour market are able to gain entry. At the other 
end of the distribution, the negative selection term observed for whites in the “Operators, 
Fabricators and Labourers” category portrays the opposite picture. This denotes that on 
average, the wages of whites employed in the lowest-paying occupation are lower than 
those obtained by an average worker drawn at random from the population. However, the 
high values of the estimated selectivity term coefficients suggest that the results require 
a cautions interpretation. 
 
In the forthcoming decomposition analysis, the correction term is not considered as 
constituting part of the explained or unexplained components and instead is examined 
separately. Furthermore, the four previously defined terms of the BMZ and DGSX 
methodologies are grouped and demarcated as representing the wage offer gap or 
unconditional wage differential. This is equivalent to setting the selectivity effects to zero 
in each equation, where the wage offer gap is taken to mean the wage a worker randomly 
drawn from the population would receive if selected into the occupational category in 
question (Gyourko and Tracy, 1988). 
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Table 2.13 BMZ decomposition: 
Blacks and Mexican-Americans with Lee (1983) correction 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential .361*** .120 .003 .014 
 (.120) (.100) (.110) (.057) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .189*** .121*** .046*** .047*** 
 (.014) (.006) (.005) (.005) 
Between .122*** .045*** .026*** .033*** 
 (.016) (.007) (.004) (.004) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .162 .020 .148 .158* 
 (.130) (.115) (.124) (.081) 
Between .062** -.058*** -.065*** -.069*** 
 (.023) (.014) (.012) (.014) 
     
Wage offer gap .537*** .129 .156 .170*** 
 (.134) (.116) (.125) (.083) 
Selection term differential -.175 -.009 -.153 -.156*** 
 (.115) (.098) (.109) (.056) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of blacks are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table A.2.4. 
 
Table 2.14 BMZ decomposition: 
Whites and Mexican-Americans with Lee (1983) correction 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential .599*** .358*** .241** .252*** 
 (.123) (.106) (.116) (.067) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .255*** .151*** .077*** .073*** 
 (.006) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Between .053*** .060*** .039*** .040*** 
 (.008) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .396*** .201* 325*** .340*** 
 (.123) (.107) (.117) (.069) 
Between .141*** .026*** .023*** .026*** 
 (.010) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
     
Wage offer gap .846*** .439*** .466*** .480*** 
 (.124) (.107) (.117) (.069) 
Selection term differential -.247** -.080 -.224* -.227*** 
 (.121) (.106) (.116) (.067) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of whites are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table A.2.4. 
 
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 present the results of the BMZ decomposition corrected for self- 
selection between Mexican-Americans and blacks and whites, respectively. It can be seen 
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that the selection term differential is always negative, implying that the wage offer gap is 
larger than the total wage gap and that wage differentials between natives and Mexican-
Americans are larger after correcting for self-selection. Relative to blacks, the selection 
term differential is only significant for the case of TG workers. Focusing on the BU 
component, it is observed that for FG immigrants this represents 11.5% of the wage offer 
gap, while for second and third generation Mexican-Americans the contribution of this 
term to the unconditional wage differentials is negative. With respect to whites, the 
selection term differential is significant for all cohorts except SG-II workers. The 
magnitude of the BU term in accounting for the wage offer gap ranges from 16.7% for 
FG immigrants to 4.9% for SG-I workers. 
 
Finally, Tables 2.15 and 2.16 present the results of the DGSX decomposition between 
Mexican-Americans and blacks and whites, respectively. Given that the MNL model 
estimated in the first stage and the selectivity corrected wage regressions are the same as 
the ones employed in the BMZ methodology, the unconditional wage differentials do not 
change. With respect to blacks, the biggest change is observed for FG immigrants, where 
the contribution of the BU term to the observed wage differential is now larger. For 
subsequent generations the effect of this term is small and not statistically different from 
zero. With respect to whites in the case of FG workers the BU component accounts for 
17.5% of the wage offer gap, yet this term is not significant for any of the three 
generations of Mexican-Americans. 
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Table 2.15 DGSX decomposition: 
Blacks and Mexican-Americans with Lee (1983) correction 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential with respect to whites .361*** .120 .003 .014 
 (.093) (.076) (.065) (.070) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within -.043** .036*** -.007 -.023** 
 (.021) (.011) (.010) (.011) 
Between .122*** .045** .026** .033*** 
 (.039) (.018) (.011) (.011) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .294*** .066 .157 .154** 
 (.113) (.103) (.114) (.073) 
Between -.163* -.019 -.019 .005 
 .084 (.065) (.054) (.047) 
     
Wage offer gap .537*** .129 .156 .170* 
 (.148) (.124) (.127) (.088) 
Selection term differential -.175* -.009 -.153 -.156*** 
 (.115) (.098) (.109) (.054) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of whites are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regressions presented in Table A.2.4. 
 
Table 2.16 DGSX decomposition: 
Whites and Mexican-Americans with Lee (1983) correction 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG 
Total log wage differential with respect to whites .599*** .358*** .241*** .252*** 
 (.065) (.025) (.019) (.016) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .211*** .197*** .132*** .149*** 
 (.009) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Between .053*** .060*** .039*** .040*** 
 (.020) (.007) (.004) (.005) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .432*** .216** .300*** .300*** 
 (.096) (.094) (.104) (.059) 
Between .148 -.034 -.006 -.010 
 (.096) (.053) (.054) (.035) 
     
Wage offer gap .846*** .439*** .466*** .480** 
 (.138) (.109) (.118) (.069) 
Selection term differential -.247** -.080 -.224* -.227*** 
 (.121) (.106) (.116) (.067) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: the OLS coefficients of whites are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decomposition based on OLS regression results presented in Table A.2.4. 
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2.6.2 Sensitivity of the Results to the Level of Occupational Aggregation 
In this section, the main results of the OB and BMZ methodologies are presented under 
various levels of occupational aggregation to examine the sensitivity of the results to the 
number of occupational categories.10 Given the consistency of the results and in order to 
economise space the outcomes for SG-II and SG-I workers are neither presented nor 
discussed. 
 
Table 2.17 Effect of different levels of occupational aggregation. OB decomposition 
Occupation FG TG 
Dummies Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
 Relative to blacks 
Six .319 .042 .040 -.026 
 (88.4) (11.6) (285.7) (-185.7) 
Fourteen .323 .038 .037 -.023 
 (89.5) (10.5) (264.3) (-164.3) 
Nineteen .346 .015 .042 -.028 
 (95.8) (4.2) (300.0) (-.200.0) 
 Relative to whites 
Six .405 .194 .147 .105 
 (67.6) (32.4) (58.3) (41.7) 
Fourteen .435 .164 .155 .097 
 (72.6) (27.4) (61.5) (38.5) 
Nineteen .448 .151 .156 .096 
 (81.5) (18.5) (61.9) (38.1) 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Figures in parentheses 
represent the percentage of the total wage gap. 
 
Table 2.17 shows that in the case of the OB methodology, expanding the number of 
occupational categories generally increases the proportion of the total wage gap attributed 
to the explained component. Relative to blacks, for FG immigrants going from six to 19 
occupations augments the explained term from 88.4% to 95.8% of the total wage gap, 
while for TG immigrants this grows from 285.7% to 300.0%. With respect to whites, for 
FG workers going from six to 19 occupations increases the explained term from 67.6% 
                                                          
10 A DGSX decomposition that employs more than six occupational categories could not be computed as a 
large number of counterfactual-occupation cells were not populated, therefore making it impossible to 
construct counterfactual wages for certain occupation-group cells. 
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to 81.5% of the total wage gap, while for TG workers this rises from 58.3% to 61.9%. 
The results support the belief that the use of broadly defined categories conceals the 
importance of occupations when performing wage decompositions (Kidd and Shannon, 
1996, p. 324). 
 
Table 2.18 Effect of different levels of occupational aggregation. BMZ decomposition 
Occupation FG TG 
Equations Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
 WE BE WU BU WE BE WU BU 
 Relative to blacks 
Six .217 .069 .070 .004 .047 .013 -.020 -.027 
 (60.1) (19.1) (19.4) (1.1) (335.7) (92.9) (-142.9) (-192.9) 
Fourteen .165 .094 .090 .011 .044 .016 -.015 -.031 
 (45.7) (26.0) (24.9) (3.1) (314.3) (114.3) (-107.1) (-221.4) 
Nineteen .097 .105 .117 .040 .035 .012 -.012 -.021 
 (26.9) (29.1) (32.4) (11.1) (250.0) (85.7) (-85.7) (-150.0) 
 Relative to whites 
Six .209 .139 .194 .056 .072 .054 .102 .024 
 (34.9) (23.2) (32.4) (9.3) (28.6) (21.4) (40.5) (9.5) 
Fourteen .171 .149 .188 .089 .065 .056 .097 .033 
 (28.5) (24.9) (31.4) (14.9) (25.8) (22.2) (38.5) (13.1) 
Nineteen .120 .154 .210 .114 .062 .057 .097 .035 
 (20.0) (25.7) (35.1) (19.0) (24.6) (22.6) (38.5) (13.9) 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Figures in parentheses 
represent the percentage of the total wage gap. 
 
In the case of the BMZ methodology, Table 2.18 shows that augmenting the number of 
occupational categories has the opposite effect, as this tends to decrease the proportion of 
the total wage gap attributed to the explained component. Focusing on the four terms that 
constitute the BMZ decomposition it can be seen that in general the BU component 
increases with the number of categories. Relative to blacks, for FG immigrants going 
from six to 19 occupations augments the BU term from 1.1% to 11.1% of the total wage 
gap, while for TG workers the effect is still negative but now closer to zero. With respect 
to whites, going from six to 19 occupations increases the BU term from 9.3% to 19.0% 
of the total wage gap, while for TG workers this rises from 9.5% to 13.9%. Summarising, 
the results of the BMZ decomposition appear quite sensitive to the number of 
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occupational categories. Given that the BU component tends to rise with the level of 
aggregation, the main findings may be interpreted as offering a lower-bound of the effect 
played by occupational segregation in observed wage differentials.11 
 
2.6.3 The Role of English Language Proficiency 
An important variable not regularly included in the CPS March supplement and not 
incorporated in Section 2.5 is English language proficiency. Given that the literature has 
previously presented ample evidence of its importance, this section employs a 5.0% 
sample from the 2000 U.S. Census to analyse the proportion of the wage gap between 
natives and Mexican-born workers attributed to differences in language skills. 
 
The census asks respondents how well do they speak English, in which case they can 
respond “very well”, “well”, “not well” or “not at all”. To compare the results with those 
previously obtained, estimations where language skills are not included are also presented 
based on the census and 2000 CPS.12 
 
Table 2.19 presents results for the decomposition of log wage differentials between 
natives and Mexican-born immigrants. Relative to the census, the CPS slightly overstates 
observed wage differentials, especially those pertaining to African-Americans. Relative 
to blacks (whites), the CPS presents a wage gap that rises to .425 (.622) log points, while 
                                                          
11 A caveat associated with the MNL is that it imposes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
property. This is problematic when the different outcomes are closely related to one another in the sense 
that they can be considered close substitutes. Estimations of the BMZ and DGSX decompositions while 
utilizing an Ordered Probit (OP) to model occupational attainment were also performed. The OP model 
does not impose the IIA property, but does require that the outcomes be ordered in one way or another. 
Using an OP model did not significantly alter the results. 
12 The 2000 U.S. Census does not ask respondents about the birthplace of their parents and therefore does 
not allow distinguishing between second and higher generation order immigrants. Because of this, in this 
section I only compare natives to first generation immigrants. Nonetheless, this should not be an issue under 
the plausible assumption that natives and second and third generation Mexican-Americans have similar 
language skills. 
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the census presents one which is situated at .361 (.618) log points. With respect to 
explained differences, these account for approximately 81.0% of the total wage gap 
relative to blacks in both the census and the CPS. Concerning whites, the explained 
component is much larger in the census as it rises to 73.9% of the total wage gap, 
compared to the CPS where it is situated at 65.8%. As expected, the inclusion of language 
variables increases the proportion of the explained component in terms of the total wag 
gap, which rises from 81.2% to 83.4% with respect to blacks, and from 73.9% to 78.5% 
relative to whites. White these results suggest that some of the previously unexplained 
differentials are actually accounted for by differences in language proficiency, these 
explain less than 5.0% of the observed wage differentials. 
 
Table 2.19 OB decomposition: 
Natives and FG Mexican-Americans with language dummies 
 Relative to Blacks Relative to Whites 
 CPS Census  CPS Census 
Total log wage differential .425*** .361*** .622*** .618** 
 (.019) (.002) (.015) (.002) 
Without English Dummies     
     
Explained: Differences in average characteristics .347*** .293*** .409*** .457*** 
 (.040) (.004) (.015) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients .078* .068*** .213*** .161*** 
 (.042) (.004) (.019) (.002) 
With English Dummies     
     
Explained: Differences in average characteristics --- .301*** --- .485*** 
  (.039)  (.011) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients --- .060*** --- .133*** 
  (.040)  (.011) 
     
Observations 
(% Black/White) 
2,914 
(58.0%) 
218,323 
(71.5%) 
17,121 
(92.8%) 
1,555,625 
(96.0%) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Note: The OLS coefficients of blacks and whites are taken as the non-discriminatory vector in the first two and last two 
columns respectively. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 2000 and the 2000 U.S. Census. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. Decomposition based on OLS regressions results which include as independent variables years of 
education, potential experience, potential experience squared, the state unemployment rate and dummy variables for 
occupations, metropolitan status, state, census division, marriage and English language proficiency. 
 
Table 2.20 presents results of the BMZ decomposition based on census data with and 
without language dummies. Relative to blacks, including language skills decreases the 
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proportion of the explained component and increases the share of the unexplained term. 
This implies that within certain occupations, Mexicans have better language skills and 
higher returns to these skills than blacks. Nevertheless, the differences in the unexplained 
and explained components with and without English language proficiency are not 
statistically different from zero, suggesting that the variable is not robust in explaining 
wage differentials between blacks and Mexicans. On the other hand, the results pertaining 
to white workers are as expected. The inclusion of language variables reduce the 
explained components and increase the unexplained components. Most importantly, the 
BU terms drops from .070 to .065 log points, or from representing 11.3% to 10.5% of the 
total wage gap. 
 
Table 2.20 BMZ decomposition: 
Natives and FG Mexican-Americans with language dummies 
 Relative to Blacks Relative to Whites 
Total log wage differential .361*** .361*** .618*** .618*** 
 (.006) (.014) (.002) (.012) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .186*** .182*** .228*** .253*** 
 (.005) (.014) (.002) (.012) 
Between .057*** .059*** .136*** .142*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .093*** .097*** .182*** .157*** 
 (.006) (.014) (.002) (.012) 
Between .024*** .022*** .070*** .065*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
     
English language dummies No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 
(% Black/White) 
218,323 
(71.5%) 
218,323 
(71.5%) 
1,555,625 
(96.0%) 
1,555,625 
(96.0%) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the 2000 U.S. Census. Standard errors are in parentheses. Decomposition based 
on six occupation specific OLS regressions which include as independent variables years of education, potential 
experience, potential experience squared, the state unemployment rate, and dummy variables for metropolitan status, 
state, census divisions, marriage and English language proficiency. 
 
Furthermore, Table 2.21 displays the results of the DGSX methodology. Relative to 
blacks, introducing language skills substantially decreases the WE component and 
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marginally increases the BE term. Unlike the BMZ decomposition, under the DGSX 
framework the reduction in the WE component not only responds to a different set of 
average characteristics, but also to a different sorting function which changes the 
individuals predicted to be in each occupation. As a result, the decrease in the WE 
component compounds these two effects. The increase in the WU component suggests 
that within certain occupations Mexicans have better language skills and receive higher 
returns for these skills than blacks. Moreover, while the BU component is reduced by 
.011 log point a hypothesis test that the magnitude of this term is the same under both the 
BMZ and DGSX methodologies cannot be rejected. Finally, regarding white labourers 
results in line with those previously presented with the BMZ decomposition are obtained. 
Introducing English language variables reduces the BU term from .052 to .049 log points 
or from accounting 8.4% to 7.9% of the total wage gap. 
 
Table 2.21 DGSX decomposition: 
Natives and FG Mexican-Americans with language dummies 
 Relative to Blacks Relative to Whites 
Total log wage differential .361*** .361*** .618*** .618*** 
 (.017) (.032) (.012) (.021) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics     
     
Within .087*** .050*** .161*** .212** 
 (.008) (.021) (.002) (.013) 
Between .057*** .059*** .136*** .142*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients     
     
Within .159*** .206*** .267*** .214*** 
 (.009) (.021) (.005) (.013) 
Between .057*** .046*** .052*** .049*** 
 (.010) (.009) (.011) (.009) 
     
English Language Dummies No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 
(% Black/White) 
218,323 
(71.5%) 
218,323 
(71.5%) 
1,555,625 
(96.0%) 
1,555,625 
(96.0%) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the 2000 U.S. Census. Standard errors are in parentheses. Decomposition based 
on six occupation specific OLS regressions which include as independent variables years of education, potential 
experience, potential experience squared, the state unemployment rate, and dummy variables for metropolitan status, 
state, census divisions, marriage and English language proficiency. 
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2.6.4 Wage Differentials between Legal and Illegal Immigrants 
A factor that affects the wage gap between natives and Mexican-born immigrants is that 
the latter includes individuals who are not lawfully authorised to work in the United 
States. While there is ample evidence that unauthorised workers are represented in both 
the CPS and the census, it is not possible to identify in either data source who is a legal 
worker and who is not. Different studies have found that after controlling for observable 
characteristics, undocumented status reduces wages by up to 20.0% (see, e.g. Kossoudji 
and Cobb-Clark, 2002). Among the studies that perform wage decompositions among 
legal and illegal Mexican immigrants, Rivera-Batiz (1999) employs both cross-sectional 
information and a longitudinal database which allows seeing the impact of legalisation 
on the previously undocumented workforce. After inserting a number of controls, 
including occupation related variables, the author shows that illegal immigrants tend to 
be clustered in low-paying occupations and that differences in observable characteristics 
of legal and illegal immigrant men explain 48.0% of their total wage gap. This implies 
that unexplained wage differentials between natives and first generation workers are 
accentuated by the inclusion of unauthorised workers. Specifically, the estimation of the 
impact of occupational segregation is likely to be affected given that, due to their legal 
status and predominantly low levels of human capital, illegal immigrants tend to be 
concentrated in specific low-wage activities in the agricultural and service sectors. As a 
consequence of the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, 
employers face the risk of incurring in additional expenses when they hire unauthorised 
workers. Thus, not all firms will employ illegal workers; those who do, will only hire 
them if their wages are low enough to compensate for the potential penalties they may 
incur in. 
 
64 
 
 
 
While ideally a data set which includes natives and explicitly distinguishes between legal 
and illegal immigrants would be used, I am not aware of any survey which satisfies these 
conditions. Given this limitation, the present section solely focuses on the wage gap 
between legal and illegal workers. In order to do this, the Encuesta sobre Migración en la 
Frontera Norte de México (EMIF, Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of 
Mexico) is employed. The EMIF is a cross-sectional survey which is similar in design to 
the United Kingdom’s International Passenger Survey. The survey’s occupation 
classification scheme is based on the Mexican Classification of Occupations, which is not 
directly comparable to the scheme employed in the CPS. Because of sample size 
restrictions, workers are grouped into high, medium and low skilled occupations. 
 
Additionally, there may be important unobserved differences between authorised and 
unauthorised workers. For example, if legal status is granted to those with higher 
unobserved ability, then unexplained differences between the two groups will be 
overstated, since part of this differential is a result of the higher skill levels of lawful 
workers. In order to reduce these differences, the sample is restricted to the comparison 
of legal and illegal workers who initially entered the U.S. without legal authorisation to 
work. Moreover, the analysis is limited to immigrants who state that their country of 
residence is the U.S. (i.e. permanent immigrants). 
 
Table 2.22 presents the OB decomposition of the wage gap between legal and illegal 
workers. The first column displays the results for the period ranging from 1994 to 2008 
where language proficiency is not included, while columns two and three present the 
results for the years 2004-2008 without and with language dummies. For brevity, I will 
discuss the results pertaining to the third column. It can be seen that there are significant 
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wage differentials between legal and illegal immigrants. The total wage gap between 
these two cohorts ascends to .172 log points, of which 62.8% is explained by differences 
in average characteristics. 
 
Table 2.22 OB decomposition: Legal and illegal FG Mexican-Americans 
 EMIF 1994-2008 
EMIF 
2004-2008 
Total log wage differential .150*** .172*** .172*** 
 (.010) (.013) (.013) 
    
Explained: Differences in average characteristics .038*** .078** .108*** 
 (.008) (.015) (.015) 
Education .003** .007*** .005*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.001) 
Experience .027*** 041*** .042*** 
 (.004) (.008) (.008) 
Occupation .027*** .029*** .026*** 
 (.002) (.003) (.003) 
Time in the U.S. -.029*** -.020* -.015 
 (.004) (.011) (.011) 
Region .002 .003 .001 
 (.001) (.003) (.003) 
Period -.012*** -.000 .001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) 
English --- --- .027*** 
   (.003) 
    
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients .112*** .093*** .064*** 
 (.011) (.019) (.019) 
Education .010 -.027 -.036 
 (.026) (.037) (.038) 
Experience .055 .133*** .135*** 
 (.037) (.051) (.051) 
Occupation -.055 -.036 -.031 
 (.037) (.053) (.058) 
Time in the U.S. -.010 -.038** -.030 
 (.009) (.018) (.018) 
Region .070 -.034 -.025 
 (.132) (.170) (.169) 
Period .051* .088*** .084*** 
 (.027) (.023) (.023) 
English --- -- -.174*** 
   (.066) 
Intercept -.019 -.010 .125 
 (.152) (.023) (.217) 
    
English language dummies No No Yes 
Observations 
(% Legal) 
13,985 
(81.3%) 
5,594 
(77.9%) 
5,594 
(77.9%) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the EMIF. Standard errors are in parentheses. Decomposition based on OLS 
regressions which include as independent variables years of education, potential experience, potential experience 
squared, years since immigration, the state unemployment rate, and dummy variables for occupations, metropolitan 
status, year, state, census divisions, marriage and English language proficiency. 
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Among the terms belonging to the explained component, potential experience has the 
largest effect, while occupation of employment and language proficiency also account for 
a significant part of the wage differential. Moreover, years of education does not play a 
large role as the variable does not differ much between legal and illegal immigrants. 
Regarding the unexplained component, it is observed that illegal immigrants have higher 
returns to schooling than their legal counterparts. Nonetheless, this term is not statistically 
different from zero. A similar result is obtained regarding occupation of employment. 
Furthermore, potential experience and language skills play an important role in the 
unexplained component, where the former is far more rewarding for authorised workers 
and the latter generates higher returns for unauthorised immigrants. 
 
Table 2.23 BMZ decomposition: Legal and illegal FG Mexican-Americans 
 EMIF 1994-2008 
EMIF 
2004-2008 
Total log wage differential .150*** .172*** .172*** 
 (.007) (.018) (.018) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics    
    
Within -.010*** .020 .051*** 
 (.007) (.018) (.018) 
Between .004*** .009*** .015*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients    
    
Within .127*** .117*** .085*** 
 (.012) (.022) (.022) 
Between .028*** .024*** .019*** 
 (.001) (.003) (.002) 
    
English Language Dummies No No Yes 
Observations 
(% Legal) 
13,985 
(81.3%) 
5,594 
(77.9%) 
5,594 
(77.9%) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the EMIF. Standard errors are in parentheses. Decomposition based on three 
occupation specific OLS regressions which include as independent variables years of education, potential experience, 
potential experience squared, the state unemployment rate, and dummy variables for metropolitan status, state, census 
divisions, marriage and English language proficiency. 
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Table 2.24 DGSX decomposition: Legal and illegal FG Mexican-Americans 
 EMIF 1994-2008 
EMIF 
2004-2008 
Total log wage differential .150*** .172*** .172*** 
 (.026) (.037) (.038) 
Explained: Differences in average characteristics    
    
Within .016* .047*** .077*** 
 (.009) (.019) (.020) 
Between .004*** .009*** .015*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients    
    
Within .125*** .131*** .078*** 
 (.016) (.025) (.025) 
Between .004 -.015 .001 
 (.018) (.019) (.021) 
    
English Language Dummies No No Yes 
Observations 
(% Legal) 
13,985 
(81.3%) 
5,594 
(77.9%) 
5,594 
(77.9%) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the EMIF. Standard errors are in parentheses. Decomposition based on three 
occupation specific OLS regressions which include as independent variables years of education, potential experience, 
potential experience squared, the state unemployment rate, and dummy variables for metropolitan status, state, census 
divisions, marriage and English language proficiency. 
 
As seen in Table 2.23, the application of the BMZ decomposition decreases the proportion 
of the total wage gap attributable to the explained component relative to the OB 
decomposition, which is reduced from 62.8% to 38.3%. Under the BMZ framework, the 
majority of the wage gap between legal and illegal immigrants is attributed to the WU 
term, which ascends to .085 log points or 49.4% of the total wage gap. Furthermore, the 
BU component arises to .019 log points or 11.0% of the total wage gap. Considering that 
individuals are only divided into three occupations, the result suggests that the 
occupational segregation encountered by illegal workers helps explain a significant part 
of their wage differentials with respect to their legal counterparts. 
 
On the other hand, the implementation of the DGSX methodology generates substantially 
different results. As seen in Table 2.24, under this framework differences in average 
characteristics explain 53.5% of the total wage gap, which are mostly attributable to the 
WE component. Regarding the WU term, it ascends to .078 log points accounting for 
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45.3% of the total wage gap. Finally, the BU component is equal to .001 log points and 
not statistically different from zero. Since this value is lower to the one obtained with the 
BMZ decomposition, it signifies that the indirect effect in the BU term is negative. 
Consequently, when taking into account the indirect effect of the BU component in the 
DGSX decomposition, the effect of occupational segregation on wage differentials 
between authorised and unauthorised migrants disappears. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the role that occupational segregation plays in explaining the 
low wages among Mexican-Americans and their wage differentials with respect to black 
and white workers in the United States. 
 
The study shows that the occupational structure of Mexican-born immigrants differs 
substantially from that of natives. Moreover, the occupations of employment of first, 
second and third generation Mexican-Americans are much more similar to that of blacks 
than of whites. In terms of wages, significant progress is made between first and second 
generation labourers. This is especially true for those individuals who are a product of 
intermarriage between a Mexican-born and a U.S.-born individual. Nonetheless, between 
second and third generation Mexican-Americans progress appears to stall or even regress. 
 
While most, if not all, of the wage differentials between blacks and Mexican-Americans 
can be explained by differences in observable characteristics, a large unexplained 
component remains relative to whites, who throughout the analysis are always in a more 
advantageous position. It is observed that Mexican-born immigrants encounter a similar 
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degree of discrimination as blacks, while second and third generation Mexican-
Americans appear to be in a more privileged position than African-American workers. 
Pertaining to occupational segregation, Mexican-Americans are underrepresented at the 
top of the occupational structure relative to whites. This implies a “glass-ceiling”, where 
Mexican-Americans face significant barriers into high-paying occupations. These 
restrictions, partly manifested through the BU term in the BMZ and DGSX 
decompositions, account from 6.1% to 10.0% of the total wage gap between different 
generations of Mexican-Americans and whites according to the BMZ methodology. 
 
As a caveat, it is important to remember that when using the OB decomposition, it is not 
possible to identify the effects of occupational segregation on wage differentials since the 
decomposition treats occupational attainment, and therefore the underlying occupational 
structure, as exogenously given. In the BMZ and DGSX decompositions, the estimated 
MNL models are reduced forms that capture the propensities to be found working in a 
given occupation. These propensities can be demand driven, i.e. they may be a product 
of restricted access to certain occupations for some groups and hence be explained by 
occupational segregation, or supply driven, i.e. they may reflect different preferences 
across the two groups or depend on the workers’ expected income in occupation 𝑘 
(Démurger et al., 2009). Hence, while it is not possible to separate the effects of 
occupational segregation from those of the occupational structure in the OB 
decomposition, it is to a large extent possible to do so with the BMZ and DGSX 
decompositions. Moreover, to control for the possible presence of selectivity bias in the 
occupational wage equations, the chapter used the method outlined in Lee (1983). This 
was done by integrating the information obtained in the estimation of an occupational 
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attachment equation, i.e. the MNL model, with the occupational wage equations used in 
the BMZ and DGSX decompositions. 
 
The findings suggest that it is necessary to implement policies that tend to equalise 
Mexican-American representation across occupations, as well as policies which 
encourage the undoing of moderately segregated positions within different occupations. 
Moving forward, measures that guarantee that the most qualified workers gain access into 
high-wage occupations irrespective of their ethnic-origin background must continue to be 
implemented and closely monitored. However, in the case of Mexican-born immigrants 
it is unclear exactly how much of their wage disadvantage is due to discrimination or is a 
product of other factors such as the imperfect transferability of their human capital. 
Nonetheless, it is vital for first generation immigrants that they acquire the skills and 
training that will result in an increase in wages. 
 
Given that the great Mexican emigration has begun to slow-down in recent years, the 
focus of political and academic discussions will continue to shift from Mexican-born 
workers to second and third generation immigrants who will influence a wide range of 
aspects of the U.S. economy, including government spending, employment opportunities 
and wages, among others. If Mexican-Americans are unable to make significant 
intergenerational improvements in terms of their education levels, occupations, and 
earnings at a significant rate, social anxiety and political pressure to more carefully 
monitor immigration will continue to increase. Therefore, a poor labour market 
performance by first, second and third generation workers will hinder Mexican 
immigrants in their quest to obtain an easier path towards legally entering the U.S. or 
gaining legal status for those already in the country. In summary, it is of the upmost 
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importance for both Mexican and U.S. authorities that Mexican-Americans perform 
successfully north of the border. 
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3 Does Access to Free Health Insurance Crowd-Out Private Transfers? 
   Evidence from Mexico’s Seguro Popular 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A number of developing countries have implemented social assistance programs with the 
purpose of benefiting the population located in the lower tail of the income distribution. 
Understanding the impact of these programs and how they compare to other public 
policies is central to the development process. This issue is especially salient in Mexico, 
a country with a per capita income approximately one-third of the U.S. and a high degree 
of income inequality, characterised by being at the forefront in putting into effect large 
public assistance programs whose objective is to increase its population’s human 
development levels. Given that such policies are often overlaid on top of pre-existing 
private support networks, various studies have analysed whether public assistance 
programs displace or crowd-out private transfers (e.g. Cox and Jimenez, 1992; 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994; Attanasio and Ríos-Rull, 2000; Jensen, 2003). The 
present chapter contributes to this literature by examining whether the introduction of 
Seguro Popular, a free-of-charge publicly provided health insurance program for informal 
sector workers, crowded-out private transfers in Mexico.13 
 
Seguro Popular covers the costs of 284 unique health care interventions and more than 
300 medicines, where the program’s implementation was accompanied with increased 
resources to state health ministries and the allocation of federal funds for personal and 
                                                          
13 An individual is considered uninsured or an informal sector worker if she or he is not registered with one 
of Mexico’s public social security institutions. According to census data, in 2010 the number of individuals 
eligible for Seguro Popular equalled 63.2 million or 56.5% of Mexico’s population. 
73 
 
 
 
non-personal health services (King et al., 2009). For more than 52 million people, Seguro 
Popular offers a generous means of support since it functions as a source of protection 
against catastrophic health expenditures, and provides a safety net to many of the 
country’s most vulnerable households. The program has been studied at length by 
researchers, who have mostly focused on its impact on health expenditures, health 
outcomes and sector of employment (e.g. King et al., 2009; Barros, 2009; Galárraga et 
al., 2010; Barofsky, 2011; Sosa-Rubí et al., 2009; Azuara and Marinescu, 2013).14 
 
The reduction in health expenditures derived from being affiliated in Seguro Popular may 
be large enough to influence the receipt of private transfers. If households receive private 
transfers to alleviate budget constraints, it might be expected that those enrolled in Seguro 
Popular receive fewer private transfers or stop receiving them altogether, since being 
affiliated to the program is likely to reduce health expenditures and help alleviate budget 
constraints by increasing disposable income. Alternatively, if private transfers are not a 
result of budget constraints or are used for other purposes unrelated to health 
expenditures, then private transfers might not be affected by enrolment in Seguro Popular. 
As a result, it is an empirical question whether and to what extent expenses not incurred 
in resulting from being affiliated to Seguro Popular affect the receipt of private transfers. 
                                                          
14 Among the studies that have examined the impact of Seguro Popular on health expenditures, King et al. 
(2009) using an intent to treat approach observe in treated localities a 23.0% decrease in catastrophic health 
expenditures compared to a 8.4% decrease in control localities. Barros (2009) finds that Seguro Popular 
reduces both the likelihood of having a positive expenditure on primary health care as well the size of the 
primary health care expenditures households incur in. Galárraga et al. (2010) observe that households 
insured with Seguro Popular spent 171 pesos less on outpatient services and 360 pesos less on medicines 
per year relative to non-enrolled households. Barofsky (2011) finds that the introduction of Seguro Popular 
generated a 28.0% reduction in out-of-pocket health spending among households located in the top quartile 
of the health expenditure distribution. Sosa-Rubí et al. (2009) evaluate the impact of Seguro Popular on 
pregnant women’s access to obstetrical services. The scholars show that women affiliated to the program 
had a preference for having a baby in a Seguro Popular sponsored unit rather than paying out-of-pocket for 
a private delivery. Participation in Seguro Popular was also associated with a preference for delivering in 
the private sector rather than at a state-run clinic. Finally, Azuara and Marinescu (2013) use the roll-out of 
Seguro Popular to estimate the program’s effect on choice of sector of employment. The study shows that 
the program had no effect on the informality levels of the overall population. 
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If the program crowds-out private support, then the study is relevant for policy makers 
who must take into account this unintended effect of Seguro Popular, since some of the 
program’s goals, including reducing the risk among vulnerable households of incurring 
in catastrophic health expenses, might have been partially hampered.15 
 
The choice to remit is typically preceded by the decision to migrate. Individuals migrate 
due to a variety of reasons related to income maximisation, minimising risks to family 
income, or overcoming capital constraints, among others. Prior to the implementation of 
Seguro Popular, vulnerable households commonly encountered out-of-pocket and 
catastrophic health expenditures attributed to outpatient care and medication, constraining 
them to reduce expenses in food, shelter, or education (Galárraga et al., 2010). Migrating 
and subsequently remitting represented a plausible alternative to overcome these 
difficulties. 
 
Although declining in recent years, international private transfers represent a significant 
source of income for Mexican households, accounting for 1.8% of Mexico’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2012.16 According to information from the Mexican 
Migration Project (MMP) 143, Mexican migrants residing in the U.S. commonly claim 
that one of their main motives for remitting is to cover health expenditures in Mexico. 
                                                          
15 Prior to the implementation of Seguro Popular in 2000, there were significant differences between 
receivers and donors of private transfers. For instance, households not covered by social security institutions 
were more likely to receive private transfers relative to those who were covered. Whereas 19.4% of 
uninsured households received private transfers, this figure stood at 6.9% among those that were insured. 
Furthermore, among households receiving a positive amount of private transfers, uninsured households 
received on average 29.4% more than insured households. With respect donors, the opposite pattern was 
observed. While 18.2% of households with access to social security institutions were donors, this figure 
dropped to 10.5% among those that did not have access. Moreover, among households that remitted a 
positive amount, uninsured households donated on average 281.4 pesos per month compared to 425.2 
among insured households. 
16 At the household level, in 2000 the sum of domestic and international private transfers represented on 
average 5.0% of total household income. Among households receiving a positive amount of private 
transfers, they accounted for 32.0% of their total income. 
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Table 3.1 shows that, when asked to report up to five reasons why they send private 
transfers to family members left behind, 39.2% of respondents state as one of their reasons 
that they send money to Mexico to cover health expenses. This category is only surpassed 
by food and maintenance, which is claimed to be one of the motives for remitting for 
41.8% of the U.S. based remitters included in the MMP. On the contrary, education 
expenses are only reported as one of the reasons for remitting 12.1% of the time. 
Consequently, various studies have analysed the relationship between private transfers 
and health expenditures, generally finding a positive correlation among the two variables 
(e.g. Airola, 2007; Valero-Gil, 2008; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2011).17 
 
Table 3.1 Motives for remitting 
Motives Percentage of remitters 
Food and maintenance 41.83 
Health expenses 39.23 
Construction or repair of house 15.40 
Education expenses 12.11 
Debt payment 7.99 
Purchase of consumer goods 7.14 
Other 5.07 
Savings 3.12 
Purchase of house or lot 2.63 
Start/expand business 1.54 
Purchase of livestock 0.83 
Purchase of agricultural inputs 0.79 
Purchase of vehicle 0.73 
Recreation/entertainment 0.71 
Finance a special event 0.42 
Purchase of tools 0.34 
Unknown 20.30 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the MMP 143. Figures based on 5,922 respondents, i.e. household 
heads, who report up to five reasons for remitting. 
 
                                                          
17 Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2011) find that a 100 pesos increase in private transfer income is associated 
with a 6 pesos increase in health expenditures. In contrast, for other sources of income, a 100 pesos increase 
is associated with a 2 pesos increase in health expenses. Valero-Gil (2008) estimates that approximately 
10.0% of private transfer income is spent on health care. Moreover, the author observes that while only 
2.0% of households covered by social security institutions receive private transfers, 7.3% of non-covered 
households receive private transfers. Finally, Airola (2007) observes that private transfer income is 
associated with a 44.0% rise in the consumption share of health care. 
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Given the significant segment of the population that Seguro Popular aimed to cover, the 
program was expanded gradually throughout Mexico. The variation in Seguro Popular’s 
availability and intensity over time and space generated by its roll-out allows identifying 
its causal effects, where differences between regions permit circumventing issues of 
selection into treatment among the uninsured population. While the expansion of Seguro 
Popular was not completely random, several studies have relied on the timing and rate of 
the program’s implementation to identify its impact on different outcomes (Bosch, 
Cobacho, and Pagés, 2012). 
 
To date, evidence on the impact of Seguro Popular on private transfers is non-existent, as 
the literature on Mexico has focused on whether social assistance programs such as 
Prospera, previously called Progresa and Oportunidades, or 70 y Más, both of which 
include a cash transfer component, crowd-out private support (e.g. Attanasio and Ríos-
Rull, 2000; Albarran and Attanasio, 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2015). 
 
The related international literature is limited to the study by Klohn and Strupat (2013), 
who investigate whether informal transfers in Ghana were affected by the introduction of 
the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Based on the fifth wave of the Ghanaian 
Living Standard Household Survey, the study uses a difference-in-difference framework 
comparing individuals living in districts where the NHIS was already in place with 
individuals residing in areas where it was not yet available. The scholars estimate a linear 
probability model and a quantile regression model to evaluate the extent to which the 
introduction of the NHIS influenced informal transfers at the extensive and intensive 
margins, respectively. The results show that the policy affected the likelihood of making 
or receiving informal transfers and their monetary equivalents. 
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The present chapter shows that among households eligible for the program, a 1.0% 
increase in the Seguro Popular coverage rate reduced the probability of receiving private 
transfers by 0.0555 percentage points. This finding appears to be driven by domestic 
private transfers, since the program’s effect is statistically significant for private transfers 
originating within Mexico, but is not significant for private transfers sent by foreign based 
migrants. Moreover, the results show that Seguro Popular had a weak and non-significant 
negative effect on the amount of private transfers received. The study suggests that an 
unintended consequence of Seguro Popular is that the program partially crowds-out 
private transfers by reducing the likelihood of receiving them. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the motives for remitting and how 
Seguro Popular may affect private transfers. Section 3.3 provides background information 
on the social security system in Mexico and Seguro Popular. Section 3.4 describes the 
data. Section 3.5 presents the methodology. Section 3.6 discusses the main results. 
Section 3.7 tests the sensitivity of the results. Section 3.8 concludes. 
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
When studying the motives for remitting, the theoretical literature has mainly focused on 
altruism (e.g. Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974) and exchange (e.g. Bernheim, Shleifer, and 
Summers, 1985; Cox, 1987). Altruistic private transfers take place because the donor 
cares about the utility of the recipient. Private transfers motivated by exchange 
compensate the recipient for providing services to the donor, such as providing informal 
care or obeying parental rules (Juarez, 2009). These alternative motives for remitting can 
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imply drastically different outcomes for public policies that reallocate income (Cox, 
1987). 
 
Under the altruistic framework, enrolling in Seguro Popular may crowd-out private 
support as recipients enjoy higher disposable incomes. Barro (1974) and Becker (1974) 
argue that if households are linked through extensive networks, then changes in private 
inter-household transfers could completely neutralise the effects of public income 
redistribution programs. This result arises because in the altruistic model, conditional on 
remitting, an increase in the recipient’s income together with an equal decrease in the 
donor's income unambiguously causes a decrease in the same amount in the transfer paid 
to the recipient. Moreover, an increase in the recipient’s income keeping the donor’s 
income constant would also cause a decrease in private transfers but to a lesser degree 
(Juarez, 2009). 
 
If private transfers are not motivated by altruism, but instead are part of an explicit 
exchange of services between recipients and donors, crowding-out may not occur. The 
reasoning is that an increase in the recipient’s income would decrease her or his supply 
of services and generate an upward movement along the donor’s demand, raising the 
implicit price of services and decreasing the quantity (Juarez, 2009). Consequently, the 
impact of a direct or indirect public transfer on the amount of private transfers received 
depends on the elasticity of the donor’s demand for the services provided by the recipient. 
In the case where demand is inelastic, which may arise because the services provided are 
not easily substituted, the amount of private transfers received would increase along with 
income, reinforcing the effects of the policy (Bernheim et al., 1985; Cox, 1987). 
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Other motives for remitting include a longing to secure access to family resources such 
as an inheritance (see, e.g. Bernheim et al., 1985; Lucas and Stark, 1985), or the desire to 
invest in physical or financial assets to self-insure or to earn higher economic returns (see, 
e.g. Durand, Kandel, Parrado, and Massey, 1996). On the other hand, private transfers 
may also be a product of informal risk-sharing agreements between donors and recipients 
(see, e.g. Rosenzweig, 1988). If private transfers are sent for risk-sharing purposes, 
enrolling in Seguro Popular might have an effect on them since the program provides 
protection against some of the financial costs associated with ill health. Finally, people 
may remit simply because the mere act of giving provides them utility or to comply with 
social norms (Jensen, 2003). Under some of these motives, private transfers might not be 
displaced by increases in the recipient’s disposable income. 
 
3.3 Background 
 
3.3.1 Social Security System and Health Insurance in Mexico 
Among the events that helped shape Mexico’s health care system was the creation of the 
Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS, Mexican Social Security Institute) in 1943. 
The IMSS grouped together the pre-existing union-based and industry-based coverage 
schemes that offered health services for registered private sector workers (OECD, 2005). 
Subsequently, the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del 
Estado (ISSSTE, Institute of Security and Social Services for State Workers) was created 
for registered public sector workers in 1960.18 While IMSS and ISSSTE were created for 
registered workers, the Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia (SSA, Ministry of Health 
                                                          
18 A number of systems were also created to provide health insurance to specific industry groups such as 
workers of Mexico’s oil state enterprise PEMEX in 1942 or to armed and naval forces personnel, i.e. 
citizens enrolled in SEDENA or SEMAR. 
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and Welfare) was created in 1943 to serve the uninsured population outside of the formal 
sector. This system left workers without formal salaried contracts (i.e. the self-employed, 
urban informal sector workers, the rural population, the unemployed, and those out of the 
labour force) and their families generally without health insurance and dependent of the 
services provided by the SSA (OECD, 2005). 
 
Consequently, access to health care in Mexico has been historically linked to work status. 
Formal sector workers and their families, through social security institutions such as 
IMSS or ISSSTE, have the right to health services and a range of prescription drugs, and 
are entitled to a spectrum of benefits including day care, maternity leave, work-risk and 
retirement pensions, and housing loans, among others. 
 
Since the role of the SSA was of social assistance, there was no explicit package of health 
benefits that the uninsured population was entitled to. In practice, the services provided 
by the SSA were limited by health budget allocations and the availability of health 
facilities and medical personnel (Bonilla-Chacín and Aguilera, 2013). As a result, the 
services provided by the SSA were described as limited, frequently unavailable, and often 
requiring out-of-pocket expenditures (Lakin, 2010). 
 
While the health insurance schemes provided by social security institutions were financed 
by a tripartite arrangement derived from federal government, employer and employee 
contributions, the SSA was underfunded as it was financed through a combination of 
federal and state resources.19 Due in part to the differences in their financing schemes, 
                                                          
19 The term “states” is used as shorthand to refer to Mexico’s 31 states and one Federal District, i.e. Mexico 
City. Each state is divided into municipios, i.e. municipalities. In 2010, there were 2,456 municipalities in 
Mexico. 
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public health expenditures for individuals covered by social security institutions were 
twice as high as the expenditures for the uninsured (OECD, 2005). These differences led 
to a lower quality in the health care services provided by the SSA compared to social 
security institutions. 
 
By 2000, according to census data, 33.0% of Mexico’s 97 million residents were covered 
by IMSS, 6.0% were covered by ISSSTE and 2.2% were covered by another public or 
private health insurer. The remaining 57.8% of the population did not have health 
coverage and were lacking social protection against the financial consequences of ill 
health (Frenk, González-Pier, Gómez-Dantés, Lezana, and Knaul, 2006). 
 
3.3.2 Reform and Description of Seguro Popular 
In the early 2000s, Mexico implemented a reform to its health system with the intent of 
achieving universal basic health coverage. At the centre of this reform was Seguro 
Popular, which represented the most ambitious effort to expand basic health protection 
since the creation of IMSS (Parker, Scott, Rubalcava, and Teruel, 2010). The program 
was aimed at uninsured families not covered by social security institutions or without 
access to any other mechanism of social health insurance. 
 
Seguro Popular was established with the objective of promoting the advanced payment 
of medical services, encouraging preventing care, and reducing catastrophic health 
expenses among vulnerable households (DOF, 2003). The implementation of Seguro 
Popular was accompanied by an increase in public health expenditures. Between 2000 
and 2010, the SSA budget increased 142.0%, the budget of IMSS grew 42.0%, and that 
of ISSSTE grew 103.0%. In terms of per capita health expenses, this narrowed the gap 
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between individuals covered by social security institutions and the uninsured population 
(Knaul et al., 2012). 
 
Funding for Seguro Popular is multilateral, as it is financed by the federal government, 
state governments and beneficiary families. The provision of services included under 
Seguro Popular is responsibility of each state’s health service administration (DOF, 
2002). Moreover, state governments are responsible for the management of Seguro 
Popular resources, and they are free to choose the use of the transfers they receive (Barros, 
2009). 
 
Seguro Popular offers primary, secondary and more advanced medical interventions, as 
well as access to medications and laboratory clinical studies, all provided free of charge. 
These interventions are classified into six general groups (i.e. public health, general 
family health and specialty services, dentistry, emergencies, hospitalisation and general 
surgery) covering more than 90.0% of all hospital interventions. The program also covers 
58 interventions contained in the Fondo de Protección contra Gastos Catastróficos 
(Protection Fund against Catastrophic Expenses), which includes treatment for 
prematurely born babies, childhood leukaemia, cervical cancer and HIV. 
 
To register, applicants must reside in Mexico, not be entitled to coverage from a social 
security institution, present a birth certificate or unique population registration code, and 
provide a utility bill. Enrolments are formalised at orientation modules located in health 
centres, clinics and hospitals. Affiliation is not conditioned on health status, pre-existing 
illness, or co-payments according to type of health care. 
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Seguro Popular has a progressive affiliation fee, which substitutes the payment of 
subsequent services. The program is free to families located at the bottom four deciles of 
the income distribution. Since the majority of families enrolled in the program have low 
income levels, according to data provided by the Comisión Nacional de Protección Social 
en Salud (CNPSS, National Commission on Social Protection in Health), during the 
fourth quarter of 2008 Seguro Popular was free to more than 99.0% of its beneficiaries.20 
 
To determine whether families are required to pay the affiliation fee, they are subject to 
a socioeconomic evaluation. Before being handed an affiliation card, the state’s health 
service administration must confirm that the applicant is not registered in any institution’s 
social security database (DOF, 2002). In practice however, applicants are simply asked 
whether they are affiliated to a social security institution, where at the time of enrolment 
this information is not verified (Parker et al., 2010). 
 
By 2010, the budget for Seguro Popular ascended to 48.8 billion pesos, i.e. 3.9 billion 
U.S. dollars. As seen in Figure 3.1, at the end of 2002 the number of families enrolled in 
Seguro Popular stood at 295,513. By 2007, 7.3 million families and 21.8 million people 
were affiliated to the program. By 2012, the number of families and individuals enrolled 
in Seguro Popular ascended to 20.2 and 52.9 million, respectively, from a pool of 
approximately 60 million potential beneficiaries. 
 
                                                          
20 Nevertheless, Scott (2006) shows that in 2004 65.0% of the households affiliated to Seguro Popular were 
non-poor. Lakin (2010) states that upon the introduction of Seguro Popular, applicants were unwilling to 
pay the program’s affiliation fee. Consequently, to increase participation rates and meet affiliation targets, 
state governments misclassified families who were subject to the contributory fee as being poor. States have 
high incentives to enrol a large segment of the population in Seguro Popular since their health service 
administrations receive federal funds in proportion to the number of families that are affiliated to the 
program at the beginning of each year. 
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3.3.3 Implementation of Seguro Popular 
Given the substantial segment of the population that Seguro Popular aimed to reach, the 
program was rolled-out and expanded gradually. Seguro Popular was first put into effect 
in 2002 as a pilot program in selected localities in five states, i.e. Aguascalientes, 
Campeche, Colima, Jalisco and Tabasco. These localities were selected based on their 
social security coverage, their capacity to provide the program’s services, their urban and 
semi-urban concentrations, and the existence of groups already enrolled in assistance 
programs provided by the federal government (DOF, 2002). 
 
Figure 3.1 Families and individuals affiliated to Seguro Popular: 2000-2012 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on administrative data provided by CNPSS. 
 
In the program’s initial rules of operation, it was stated that to implement Seguro Popular, 
the federal government would subscribe coordination agreements with participating 
states. Nevertheless, during 2002 and 2003 a number of states started implementing 
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Seguro Popular without having signed a formal agreement. This was possible before 2004 
if the municipal government agreed to offer the program (Bosch and Campos-Vázquez, 
2014). Furthermore, the program’s rules of operation established that the future selection 
of states and regions into Seguro Popular would be based on their proportion and number 
of uninsured people in the bottom six deciles of the income distribution, the incidence 
and prevalence of diseases, the existence of the health facilities required to offer the 
services covered under Seguro Popular, the potential demand for the program’s health 
insurance scheme, and per capita federal contributions (DOF, 2002). 
 
In 2003, Seguro Popular was formally established as the Sistema de Protección Social en 
Salud (Social Protection System in Health). The program’s rules of operation were 
modified where it was stated that Seguro Popular would gradually expand throughout 
Mexico according to resource availability (DOF, 2003). Furthermore, it was specified that 
the expansion of Seguro Popular would be prioritised in localities according to the set of 
criteria defined in DOF (2002), while taking into account the explicit request of state 
authorities to enrol in the program (DOF, 2003). At the end of 2004, 30 out of 32 states 
had signed the coordination agreement with the federal government formalising their 
participation in Seguro Popular. The remaining two states, i.e. Durango and Mexico City, 
signed the agreements in 2005. 
 
Additionally, a number of different factors played a role in Seguro Popular’s roll-out 
process. Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2006) argue that political reasons were 
an important element during the expansion of Seguro Popular. Barros (2009) also shows 
that political factors affected the program’s expansion and claims that because of 
logistical and political factors that influenced the phase-in process, the size of the program 
86 
 
 
 
supply was not related to initial levels of economic development or health requirements 
across states. Bosch and Campos-Vázquez (2014) find that municipalities with larger 
populations and those located in smaller states joined Seguro Popular at earlier stages. 
The authors also observe that the implementation date of Seguro Popular and the political 
affiliation of state governors in post-pilot municipalities are correlated. Nevertheless, in 
general the scholars do not find evidence towards targeting of Seguro Popular in specific 
municipalities, since covariates associated with social security coverage, income and 
industrial structure are not significant in predicating the date of entry into the program. 
Finally, Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pages (2011) and Azuara and Marinescu 
(2013) show that levels of informality in the labour market prior to Seguro Popular being 
introduced were not correlated with the program’s entry date. In general, these studies 
conclude that the introduction of Seguro Popular was close to random and rely on the 
variation in the program’s expansion or implementation date to identify its effects (Bosch 
et al., 2012). 
 
3.4 Data 
 
3.4.1 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 
To study the effect of Seguro Popular on private transfers, the Encuesta Nacional de 
Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH, National Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey) is used. The ENIGH is a nationally representative cross-sectional household 
survey carried out by Mexico’s national statistical agency. 
 
The ENIGH captures individual-level information on each household member’s 
socioeconomic characteristics and different sources of income, including international 
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and domestic private transfers. Nonetheless, the survey does not include information on 
the characteristics or locality of donors. All net income flows received by the respondent 
over the previous six months are registered. At the household level, the ENIGH captures 
expenditure data for up to the previous six months. All income and expenditure data are 
self-reported. The study uses the 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 editions 
of the ENIGH, which allows examining the impact of Seguro Popular as the program 
grew larger.21 The sample used is limited to economically inactive households and the 
uninsured, i.e. households not covered by a social security institution and who are 
therefore eligible for Seguro Popular. 
 
3.4.2 Expansion of Seguro Popular 
To calculate the expansion of Seguro Popular, a similar strategy to the one put forward 
by Grogger, Arnold, León, Ome, and Triyana (2011) is used. First, administrative data 
provided by the CNPSS on the number of individuals affiliated to Seguro Popular by state 
and quarter was collected. Subsequently, this information was converted into coverage 
rates by dividing it by quarterly estimates of the number of individuals eligible for Seguro 
Popular in each state. Data on the number of eligible or uninsured individuals was drawn 
from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE, National Employment Survey) and from 
the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE, National Occupation and 
Employment Survey). Coverage rates were constructed for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 
and 2012. 
 
                                                          
21 The 2002 edition of the ENIGH is excluded from the study since there is little information regarding 
Seguro Popular’s rules of operation and coverage during its pilot period (Barros, 2009). Furthermore, 
administrative data on the program’s coverage was only provided for the fourth quarter of 2002 onwards. 
Thus, it is not clear what Seguro Popular’s coverage was when the ENIGH 2002 was collected between 
August and November 2002. 
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Figure 3.2 presents the expansion of Seguro Popular at the state level, expressed as the 
proportion of the eligible population covered by the program in 2003, 2006, 2009 and 
2012. Although Seguro Popular started in 2002, the program’s initial expansion was low, 
since at the end of 2003 the average coverage rate within each state stood at 8.0%. 
Nevertheless, Seguro Popular rapidly expanded in the following years, where the 
program’s coverage increased to 33.4% in 2006, 57.5% in 2009, and 82.5% in 2012. 
Additionally, states were introduced to Seguro Popular at different periods, where the 
program grew at different rates within each state. For example, while at the end of 2002 
Colima had a coverage rate of 57.3%, during the same period 12 states had a coverage 
rate of zero. Finally, while in 2004 Nuevo Leon and Zacatecas had similar coverage rates 
of 6.7% and 7.1%, respectively, by 2010 this figures had grown and diverged to 62.6% 
and 81.3%, respectively. 
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Figure 3.2 Seguro Popular coverage as percentage of total eligible population by State 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on administrative data provided by the CNPSS. 
90 
 
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.2 displays the means of selected variables of the uninsured households included 
in the study. It can be seen that in 2000, 19.4% of households received private transfers. 
By 2006 this figure had risen to 25.6%, but by 2012 it had declined to 25.0%. 
Disaggregating total private transfers, it can be seen that during these three periods the 
percentage of households receiving domestic private transfers increased from 14.1% in 
2000, to 18.1% in 2006, and 19.7% in 2012. On the other hand, the number of households 
receiving international private transfers increased from 6.2% in 2000 to 8.9% in 2006. 
Nonetheless, this figure dropped to 5.9% in 2010 before increasing to 6.6% in 2012. This 
pattern is likely related to the economic crisis that began in the U.S. in 2007, which forced 
a large number of Mexican workers towards unemployment and in some cases back to 
their country of origin. Concerning the amount of private transfers received, a similar but 
more pronounced pattern is detected. In 2000, the average amount of private transfers 
received stood at 387.9 pesos per month. By 2006, this figure had increased to 569.5, but 
by 2012 it had declined to 264.2 pesos per month. Distinguishing between the amount of 
international and domestic private transfers received, it is observed that they both 
followed a similar pattern to that of total private transfers. 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable 2000 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Received private transfers (%) .194 .209 .211 .256 .218 .205 .250 
Received international private transfers (%) .062 .057 .068 .089 .077 .059 .066 
Received domestic private transfers (%) .141 .160 .151 .181 .155 .155 .197 
Private transfers received 387.9 458.7 449.1 569.5 355.7 311.5 264.2 
International private transfers received 140.6 168.9 184.0 286.1 176.8 137.6 105.2 
Domestic private transfers received 247.3 289.8 265.0 283.4 178.9 173.8 159.0 
Rural locality (%) .435 .300 .342 .349 .343 .345 .530 
HH head male (%) .823 .782 .783 .767 .791 .806 .799 
HH head years of schooling 5.68 7.40 7.17 7.21 7.05 7.05 6.41 
Total income 7692.3 9764.3 9109.7 9327.3 9251.5 7020.4 6604.8 
Total expenditures 7534.1 10052.6 8909.1 9586.5 8105.4 7360.6 6707.1 
Health expenditures 194.9 257.5 224.9 264.5 175.9 139.9 122.1 
Seguro Popular coverage by state (%) 0 .136 .254 .334 .538 .759 .825 
Observations 4,779 9,142 9,984 8,759 9,850 8,864 3,476 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. HH denotes households. Monetary figures are per 
month and in real 2006 Mexican pesos. 
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With respect to other variables, it is observed that while household income increased by 
21.3% between 2000 and 2006, it encountered a sharp decline between 2006 and 2012 
falling by 29.2%. Household expenditures faced a similar pattern increasing by 27.2% 
between 2000 and 2006, and subsequently declining by 30.0% between 2006 and 2012. 
As a result, during the period of study, the average household included in the sample went 
from being a net saver to a net debtor. On the other hand, household health expenditures, 
which stood at 194.8 pesos per month in 2000, increased to 264.5 in 2006, but decreased 
to 122.1 pesos per month in 2012. Nevertheless, looking at the raw data it is not possible 
to identify how much of this decline is due to a reduction in household income or is a 
result of the implementation of Seguro Popular. Concerning the socio-demographic 
variables included in the table, it is noteworthy to mention that the proportion of 
households located in rural areas varies significantly between years. This variation in the 
sampling likely affects other variables such as the average years of schooling of the 
household head, and highlights the importance of controlling for additional factors when 
performing the econometric analysis. Finally, looking at the Seguro Popular coverage rate 
by state, in 2006 an average of 33.4% of the households in each state were enrolled in the 
program. By 2012, the coverage rate had grown to 82.5%. 
 
3.5 Methodology 
 
3.5.1 Identification Strategy 
To examine whether Seguro Popular crowds-out private transfers among eligible 
households, the program’s expansion throughout Mexico is exploited. Seguro Popular 
was introduced at different points and with different coverage rates between states, as the 
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program’s availability and the share of eligible individuals covered by Seguro Popular 
varied between regions. 
 
The variation in the expansion of Seguro Popular has been widely used (e.g. Barros, 2009; 
Aterido et al., 2011; Grogger et al., 2011; Azuara and Marinescu, 2013; Bosch and 
Campos-Vázquez, 2014). To make use of this variation over time and space, I put forward 
a strategy similar to Grogger et al. (2011) and estimate the following model: 
 
𝑦௛௦௧ = 𝛾𝑆𝑃௦௧ + 𝑋௛௦௧𝛽 + 𝑊௠௧𝜃 + 𝑍௦௧𝜆 + 𝛿௧ + 𝜇௦ + 𝜖௛௦௧                     (3.1) 
 
where 𝑦௛௦௧ denotes the amount of total, international or domestic private transfers 
received by household ℎ in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡; 𝑆𝑃௦௧ represents the Seguro Popular coverage 
rate in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡; 𝑋௛௦௧ denotes a vector of  household level characteristics that may 
affect private transfer receipt; 𝑊௠௧ and 𝑍௦௧ represent vectors of municipality and state 
level variables, respectively; 𝛿௧ represents a time period dummy which helps control for 
national trends in private transfer receipt; 𝜇௦ denotes state fixed effects that capture time-
invariant characteristics which may affect private transfer receipt and the availability or 
scope of Seguro Popular coverage in the state; and 𝜖௛௦௧ is a random error term assumed 
to be uncorrelated with 𝑆𝑃௦௧, 𝑋௛௦௧, 𝑊௠௧ and 𝑍௦௧.22 
 
To analyse the impact of Seguro Popular on the amount of private transfers received, i.e. 
the intensive margin, Eq. (3.1) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). When 
studying the effect of Seguro Popular on the probability of receiving private transfers, i.e. 
                                                          
22 Various regressions presented in sections 3.6 and 3.7 include 𝜇௠, which denotes municipality fixed 
effects, in place of 𝜇௦.    
93 
 
 
 
the extensive margin, Eq. (3.1) is estimated using OLS as a linear probability model 
(LPM). In the latter case, 𝑦௛௦௧ represents a binary variable that takes the value of one if 
household ℎ receives a positive amount of private transfers or zero otherwise. Both 
models include as covariates the Seguro Popular coverage rate at the state level; the 
household head’s age, years of schooling and gender; the number of household members 
under age 12; the number of household members age 65 and older; indicator variables for 
low quality roofs, floors, and walls in the household; a dichotomous variable denoting 
whether the household is located in a rural locality; and a set of state or municipality and 
year dummy variables. Municipality level controls introduced in Eq. (3.1) include 
government revenue, number of housing credits granted and number of workers affiliated 
to IMSS. State level variables include the state population and binary variables indicating 
the political affiliation of the Governor.23 Eq. (3.1) also includes an indicator variable 
denoting whether any of the household’s members receives a scholarship or transfer from 
Prospera. Prospera is a poverty reduction cash transfer program with education and health 
components, where households receive transfers conditional on sending their children to 
school and visiting health clinics.24 Eq. (3.1) is estimated separately for total, international 
and domestic private transfers.25 Standard errors are clustered by state to account for 
possible correlation among households.26 
                                                          
23 Information on the political affiliation of state Governors was taken from the CIDAC electoral data base. 
See http://www.cidac.org/eng/Electoral_Database.php. 
24 Beneficiaries of Prospera are also eligible for Seguro Popular. The original Prospera program included a 
health component which covered 13 medical interventions. Frenk et al. (2006) argue that while Prospera 
proved to be a valuable instrument in reducing poverty and improving health levels, a large portion of the 
cash transfers received by affiliated families were used to finance medical care not included in the 
program’s catalogue of interventions. 
25 Distinguish between international and domestic private transfers is important since they may be crowded-
out to different degrees as a result of differences in donor characteristics, motivation, or information about 
the program (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2015). 
26 While some studies exploit the municipality level variation in the availability of Seguro Popular, this 
study mainly focuses on the program’s expansion at the state level. Obtaining the coverage ratio of Seguro 
Popular at the municipality level is problematic because information on the number of individuals eligible 
for Seguro Popular at the municipality level can only be obtained from either the 2000 and 2010 censuses 
or the 2005 population count. Nevertheless, subsection 3.7.2 exploits the municipality level variation of 
Seguro Popular by using the program’s availability instead of its coverage rate. 
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3.5.2 Challenges to Identification 
Prior to analysing whether Seguro Popular crowds-out private support, it is important to 
examine if the identification strategy used in this study, i.e. the exogeneity of Seguro 
Popular’s implementation across regions, is valid. The test is relevant because using the 
expansion and availability of Seguro Popular as a source of identification assumes that 
these two factors are not correlated with the outcomes of interest. The endogeneity of 
Seguro Popular is examined by testing whether the program’s quarter and year of 
introduction and expansion rates in 2005 and 2010 are predicted by pre-program 
municipality and state level characteristics compiled from Mexico’s 2000 Census.27 The 
test is performed by estimating the following model by OLS: 
 
𝑦௠ = 𝑋௠𝛽 + 𝑍௦𝛿 + 𝜀௠                                            (3.2) 
 
where 𝑦௠ denotes either the quarter and year of introduction of Seguro Popular in 
municipality 𝑚, expressed as an index equal to one beginning in the fourth quarter of 
2002 which increases by one unit each quarter, or is a continuous variable between zero 
and one that indicates the proportion of the eligible population enrolled in Seguro Popular 
in municipality 𝑚 in 2005 or 2010. 𝑋௠ and 𝑍௦ are vectors of municipality and state level 
characteristics in 2000, respectively; and 𝜀௠ is the error term.28 The municipality level 
covariates included in Eq. (3.2) are population size, the share of insured population, the 
share of urban population, the median wage, the population’s average years of schooling, 
                                                          
27 The analysis performed in this subsection is conducted at the municipality level and not the state level 
given that performing it at the state level limits the sample to 32 observations. The small sample size implies 
that the estimated regressions would be unlikely to have sufficient power to adequately distinguish between 
zero and non-zero coefficients. Nevertheless, the estimation of Eq. (3.2) was also performed at the state 
level are presented in the Appendix in Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2. 
28 A similar analysis is conducted by Azuara and Marinescu (2013) and Bosch and Campos-Vázquez 
(2014), who investigate whether the implementation of Seguro Popular affected participation rates in the 
formal-informal labour markets. 
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the unemployment rate, and demographic and industry composition shares. The state 
level regressors are population size, the political party of the Governor, and state 
dummies. Eq. (3.2) also includes the share of households that receive international and 
domestic private transfers, the median of international and domestic private transfers 
received, and the average number of international migrants per household. The 
estimations are performed for all municipalities and for those municipalities included in 
the ENIGH. 
 
The endogeneity analysis results are presented in Table 3.3. In column (1), the dependent 
variable is an index denoting the quarter and year of implementation of Seguro Popular. 
It can be seen that the municipality’s date of entry into Seguro Popular is negatively 
related with its population size and positively related with the state’s population size. 
Moreover, the date of entry is positively associated with the share of the population 
covered by a social security institution. Additionally, the date of entry is negatively 
related with having a Governor from the PRI party and with demographic variables 
pertaining to the share of the population under the age of 24 and between the ages of 24 
and 40. Above all, the municipality’s initial quarter and year of participation in Seguro 
Popular is not associated with any of the study’s main outcomes of interest. 
 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 3.3 presents regression results where the dependent variable 
is the proportion of eligible individuals covered by Seguro Popular at the municipality 
level in 2005 and 2010, respectively. It is observed that the expansion is not related to the 
municipality’s population size or to the state's population size. Although not significant, 
the negative signs of the state population variable are in line with the arguments put 
forward by Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2006) and Bosch and Campos-Vázquez (2014). The 
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scholars claim that prior to the 2006 presidential election, smaller states were given 
preference to achieve full coverage so that the federal government could declare that it 
had achieved universal coverage in these states. Municipalities with low median wages 
also had lower expansion rates in 2010. It could be that poorer municipalities which have 
lower median wages have a scarcity of health facilities which are a requirement for 
implementing Seguro Popular. Furthermore, the expansion of Seguro Popular in 2005 
was slower in states governed by the PRD left-wing party, the main opposition of the 
ruling right-wing PAN party. With respect to the variables of interest, as in column (1), 
the expansion of Seguro Popular in 2005 and 2010 is not correlated with the average 
number of international migrants per household, the log medians of international or 
domestic private transfers, or the shares of the population that receive international or 
domestic private transfers. 
 
While the implementation of Seguro Popular was not completely exogenous, Table 3.3 
does not provide evidence suggesting that the program was targeted in specific 
municipalities in relation to the outcomes of interest, since they have no effect on the date 
of entry or on the expansion of Seguro Popular.29 In summary, the results support the 
identification strategy used in this study. Nevertheless, the fact that there was no 
randomisation in the implementation of Seguro Popular implies that it is not possible to 
rule out the potential existence of other treats to the identification of the program's effects. 
This represents an important limitation of the study. 
 
 
                                                          
29 Estimations of Eq. (3.2) using more flexible specifications were also performed. These included 
incorporating nonlinearities and interactions between municipality and state level controls, among others. 
The results were generally similar to those reported in Table 3.3.  
97 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Determinants of SP date of entry and expansion by municipality 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Date of entry Expansion 2005 Expansion 2010 
Log population -1.303*** .0025 -.0064 
 (.1720) (.0100) (.0093) 
Log state population 4.250*** -.0241 -.0075 
 (.2960) (.0205) (.0208) 
Share of insured population 3.780*** -.1370 .0371 
 (1.269) (.0889) (.0819) 
Share of urban population .6660 .0243 -.0692 
 (.6540) (.0543) (.0548) 
Log median wage .8370 -.0517 -.1380*** 
 (.5540) (.0516) (.0509) 
Unemployment rate -10.81 .8010 1.022 
 (9.754) (.6360) (.7590) 
PRI Governor -3.074*** .0242 -.0096 
 (.8050) (.0788) (.0593) 
PRD Governor -.7550 -.4140*** -.0826 
 (1.469) (.0674) (.0600) 
Share of population under age 24 -7.431* .0430 .1700 
 (4.222) (.2700) (.2400) 
Share of population between ages 24 and 40 -15.38* .4290 -.8850 
 (8.597) (.5520) (.5570) 
Avg. number of international migrants per HH 1.139 .0250 .1820 
 (1.962) (.1320) (.1390) 
Log median international private transfers .0463 .0104 .0030 
 (.0880) (.0080) (.0055) 
Log median domestic private transfers -.1230 -.0168 .0056 
 (.2580) (.0270) (.0176) 
Share of pop. that receives int. private transfers -2.775 -1.048 -.0737 
 (9.886) (.6900) (.7310) 
Share of pop. that receives dom. private transfers 12.75 .9480 -.1160 
 (10.27) (.7260) (.6840) 
Observations 1,161 569 597 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: In column (1) the dependent variable is an index beginning in the fourth quarter of 2002 that denotes 
the municipality's date of entry into SP, and includes all the municipalities in the ENIGH. In columns (2) 
and (3) the dependent variable is the proportion of eligible individuals covered by SP at the municipality 
level in 2005 and 2010, respectively, and include all the municipalities in the ENIGH in those years. Data 
on the number of eligible individuals was taken from the 2005 Population Count and the 2010 Census. Data 
on the number of individuals covered by SP was provided by the CNPSS. Explanatory variables are drawn 
from the 2000 Census. The regressions also include variables denoting average years of schooling and share 
of male population in the municipality, state dummies, and industry share dummies by municipality. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
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3.6 Results 
 
Results of the effect of Seguro Popular on private transfers based on Eq. (3.1) are 
presented in Table 3.4. In all columns, the first row shows the coefficient of the Seguro 
Popular (SP) coverage rate at the state level. It can be seen in column (1) that Seguro 
Popular had a negative but not statistically significant effect on the amount of private 
transfers received. Under the preferred specification presented in column (2), which 
includes a full set of controls as well as municipality fixed effects, it is estimated that 
Seguro Popular reduced on average the monthly amount of private transfers received by 
50.86 pesos. While the coefficients are negative, since they are not statistically 
significant, it is not possible to state that the implementation of Seguro Popular affected 
the amount of private transfers received.30  
 
Focusing on other variables, it is observed that male headed households receive a lower 
amount of private transfers than female headed households. Moreover, residing in a 
household located in a rural locality is positively and statistically significantly associated 
with the amount of private transfers received. Additional variables which influence the 
amount of private transfers received include indicators of the quality of the household and 
the number of years of schooling of the household head, which are positively associated 
with the outcome of interest; and the age of the household head, which is negatively 
associated with the dependent variable. 
 
 
                                                          
30 On the other hand, when Eq. (3.1) is estimated using health expenditures as the dependent variable, the 
effect of Seguro Popular is that the program reduced health expenditures by 92.03 pesos per month. This 
estimation includes a full set of controls as well as municipality fixed effects and is statistically significant 
at the 10.0% level. Moreover, this result is always significant and is relatively consistent across different 
specifications. See Table A.3.3 in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.4 SP coverage and total private transfers 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS: Amount of private transfers received 
LPM: Probability of 
receiving private transfers 
SP coverage at the state level -118.6 -50.86 -.0577* -.0555* 
 (116.8) (128.8) (.0333) (.0297) 
HH head age -4.128*** -4.345*** .0012*** .0011*** 
 (1.260) (1.325) (.0003) (.0003) 
HH head years of schooling 34.18*** 33.89*** -.0009* -.0005 
 (4.657) (4.422) (.0005) (.0006) 
HH head male -1058.5*** -1041.5*** -.3220*** -.3150*** 
 (74.22) (73.60) (.0140) (.0137) 
HH enrolled in Prospera -3.860 -.0155 -.0112** -.0160*** 
 (17.67) (17.18) (.0048) (.0044) 
HH members under age 12 -14.19 -16.32* -.0032 -.0031 
 (9.195) (9.115) (.0020) (.0020) 
HH members age 65 and older 19.66 13.50 .0440*** .0425*** 
 (19.79) (21.73) (.0070) (.0069) 
Good quality walls in the HH 35.38 47.61** .0130 .0183* 
 (21.90) (22.73) (.0110) (.0099) 
Good quality roofs in the HH 141.8*** 130.6*** .0196*** .0158*** 
 (17.12) (18.29) (.0053) (.00513) 
Good quality floors in the HH 95.42*** 66.16*** .0341*** .0241*** 
 (18.55) (19.91) (.0063) (.0059) 
Rural locality 166.9*** 173.9*** .0511*** .0446*** 
 (31.57) (57.87) (.0081) (.0083) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,854 54,854 54,854 54,854 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. State level controls include the state population size 
and binary variables that indicate the political affiliation of the Governor. Municipality level controls 
include government revenue, number of housing credits granted and number of workers affiliated to IMSS. 
Monetary figures are in real 2006 pesos. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
 
Table 3.4 also presents results where the relationship between Seguro Popular and the 
likelihood of receiving private transfers is analysed. It is observed in column (3) that the 
relationship between Seguro Popular and the probability of receiving private transfers is 
negative and statistically significant. Column (4) shows that when a full set of controls 
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are introduced, including municipality fixed effects, the estimated effect of Seguro 
Popular is that a 1.0% increase in its coverage rate reduced the probability of receiving 
private transfers by 0.0555 percentage points, where this coefficient is significant at the 
10.0% level.  
 
Additionally, since the crowding-out effect is only observed at the extensive margin, it is 
possible to quantify this estimate in pesos. This is done by multiplying the effect reported 
in column (4) by the mean amount of private transfers received by uninsured households 
prior to the program's introduction. Since the mean amount of private transfers received 
by households in 2000 was 387.9 pesos per month, multiplying this amount by the 
estimated coefficient of -.0555 produces a reduction of 21.5 pesos per month, which is 
equal to 23.3% of the estimated effect of Seguro Popular on health expenditures. 
Concerning the other variables, male headed households have a lower probability of 
receiving private transfers than female headed households. Moreover, households located 
in rural localities have a higher likelihood of receiving private transfers than those located 
in urban settings. Additional controls which affect the probability of receiving private 
transfers include indicators of the quality of the household, the age of the household head, 
and the number of household residents over 65, all of which are positively associated with 
the probability of receiving private transfers; and being enrolled in Prospera, which is 
negatively associated with the dependent variable.31 
 
                                                          
31 The main results are robust to the use of a tobit model when analysing the effect of Seguro Popular on 
the amount of private transfers received, and to the use of a logit specification when studying its impact on 
the likelihood of receiving private transfers. See Table A.3.4 in the Appendix. Moreover, Table A.3.5 in 
the Appendix allows for a more flexible specification of Eq. (3.1), where the program’s effects are assumed 
to differ by year. 
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To study whether the previous findings are driven by private transfers originating from 
Mexico or abroad, Table 3.5 presents estimations where private transfers are classified as 
international or domestic according to the sender’s country of residence. It is observed 
that the introduction of Seguro Popular did not have a statistically significant effect on 
either the amount of international private transfers received or on the probability of 
receiving them. In fact, when a full set of control are added the coefficient becomes 
positive although not significant. Focusing on domestic private transfers, it can be seen 
that under all the different specifications the relationship between Seguro Popular and the 
amount of domestic private transfers received is negative. When a full set of controls are 
introduced, including municipality fixed effects, it is estimated that the program reduced 
the amount of domestic private transfers received by 72.48 pesos per month. Nonetheless, 
this coefficient is not significant. Turning our attention to the probability of receiving 
private transfers, when a full set of controls are included, the estimated effect of Seguro 
Popular is that it reduced the likelihood of receiving domestic private transfers by 6.25 
percentage points, where this coefficient is statistically significant at the 10.0% level.  
 
These results suggest that the findings presented in Table 3.4 are driven by domestic 
private transfers, since Seguro Popular does not have an effect on international private 
transfers at either the intensive or extensive margins. The previous findings may arise 
because most senders located within Mexico are aware of Seguro Popular and therefore 
changed their remitting behaviour upon the program's introduction. This is likely to be 
case since the program was widely publicised by the federal government. On the other 
hand, a large number of senders located in foreign countries may not be aware of the 
program and consequently did not alter their remitting behaviour. Alternatively, domestic 
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and international donors may have different motives for remitting and thus reacted 
differently upon the implementation of Seguro Popular.32 
 
Table 3.5 SP coverage and international and domestic private transfers 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 International Domestic 
 OLS: Amount of private transfers received 
SP coverage at the state level -43.57 21.62 -75.03 -72.48 
 (57.06) (71.12) (114.0) (115.4) 
 LPM: Probability of receiving private transfers 
SP coverage at the state level -.0107 -.0021 -.0540* -.0625* 
 (.0237) (.0248) (.0313) (.0321) 
     
HH level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,854 54,854 54,854 54,854 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. HH level controls include the variables presented in 
Table 3.4. State level controls include the state population size and binary variables that indicate the 
political affiliation of the Governor. Municipality level controls include government revenue, number of 
housing credits granted and number of workers affiliated to IMSS. Monetary figures are in real 2006 pesos. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
 
3.7 Sensitivity Checks 
 
3.7.1 Different Subsamples 
To further examine the sensitivity of the results, Table 3.6 presents estimations of Eq. 
(3.1) when focusing on different population groups or when the ENIGH’s survey weights 
are used.33 Panel A presents the results obtained in Table 3.4, so that comparisons with 
                                                          
32 This result is similar to that obtained by Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015), who analyse whether the 
70 y Más program for the rural elderly in Mexico crowded-out private transfers. In their study, the scholars 
observe a crowding-out effect at the extensive margin but not at the intensive margin. Moreover, their 
results are largely driven by a reduction in the likelihood of receiving domestic private transfers. 
33 With the exception of the results presented in Table 3.6 column F, estimations presented throughout the 
chapter do not include sample weights. According to Solon, Haider and Wooldridge (2015, p. 302), 
potential motives for weighting when attempting to estimate causal effects include: 1) to achieve more 
precise estimates by correcting for heteroskedasticity; 2) to obtain consistent estimates by correcting for 
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the study’s main findings can be more easily made. Panels B to G report sensitivity checks 
for different subsamples analysed according to the gender of the household head; the 
household’s urban-rural status, income level and health expenditure level; when using 
survey weights; and when limiting the sample to households that received a positive 
amount of private transfers. 
 
Panel B shows that Seguro Popular had different effects which varied according to the 
gender of the household head. The program had a stronger impact in female headed 
households at both the intensive and extensive margins. Nonetheless, when a full set of 
controls are included, due to the large standard errors, the estimated coefficients are 
generally not significant. It is only in column (3), when estimating the program’s effect 
on the probability of receiving private transfers for women and when state fixed effects 
are included, that a negative and significant effect of 11.6 percentage points is observed. 
 
Panel C analyses the effect of Seguro Popular in urban and rural localities. These 
coefficients are similar to one another and to the one displayed in Panel A. Moreover, 
even though the coefficients are not significant, it can be seen in column (2) that when a 
full set of controls are added, the program’s effect is larger in urban settings. This result 
may be related to the finding presented in Grogger et al. (2011), where the authors state 
that the program’s impact is stronger in urban localities, since health centres and hospitals 
located in cities are better equipped and generally offer all of the interventions covered 
under Seguro Popular. On the other hand, health facilities located in rural localities are 
frequently limited in the amount of the services they provide. Consequently, the impact 
of Seguro Popular on health expenditures tends to be lower in rural localities. 
                                                          
endogenous sampling; and 3) to identify average partial effects in the presence of heterogeneous effects. 
For further discussion, see Solon et al. (2015). 
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Nevertheless, column (4) shows that the program’s effect on the likelihood of receiving 
private transfers, although not significant, is larger in absolute value in rural areas. 
 
Table 3.6 SP coverage and private transfers. Subsamples 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS: Amount of 
Private transfers received 
LPM: Probability of 
receiving private transfers 
A. Main  
 -118.6 -50.86 -.0577* -.0555* 
 (116.8) (128.8) (.0333) (.0297) 
B. Men-Women 
Men -44.01 .1090 -.0474 -.0506 
 (81.18) (104.4) (.0334) (.0347) 
Women -548.6 -499.0 -.1160* -.0892 
 (430.7) (471.0) (.0623) (.0662) 
C. Urban-Rural 
Urban -125.6 -124.5 -.0488 -.0444 
 (152.6) (166.4) (.0334) (.0347) 
Rural -65.11 -8.376 -.0759 -.0776 
 (173.4) (202.1) (.0509) (.0512) 
D. Low and high income households 
Low -74.72* -42.91 -.0516 -.0677 
 (38.18) (42.02) (.0437) (.0436) 
High -110.3 -21.58 -.0592* -.0457 
 (211.8) (234.8) (.0345) (.0341) 
E. Low and high health expenditure households 
Low -249.9** -222.3* -.0628 -.0762* 
 (113.3) (122.4) (.0432) (.0383) 
High 33.27 145.1 -.0458 -.0273 
 (156.3) (185.0) (.0365) (.0370) 
F. Weighted results 
 -99.26 -38.66 -.0236 -.0285 
 (129.4) (123.8) (.0440) (.0332) 
G. Conditional on receiving a positive amount of private transfers 
 -100.9 126.1 --- --- 
 (443.1) (535.9)   
     
HH level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. Figures presented represent coefficient estimates for SP 
coverage at the state level. HH level controls include the variables presented in Table 3.4. Low and high 
income households refer to the households located above and below the median of the household income 
distribution, respectively. Low and high health expenditure households refer to the households located 
above and below the median of the household health expenditure distribution, respectively. Monetary 
figures are in real 2006 pesos. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Panel D differentiates between low and high income households. The program’s effect is 
relatively stable throughout the income distribution, where the effect of Seguro Popular 
at both the intensive and extensive margins is similar for both groups. Moreover, these 
effects closely resemble those presented in Panel A, where their weaker significance is 
partly driven by their smaller sample sizes.34 
 
Panel E separates households according to whether they incur in high or low health 
expenditures. The program’s effect is much stronger in low health expenditure 
households. When focusing on the effect of Seguro Popular on the amount of private 
transfers received, it is observed that the estimated coefficients are negative and 
significant in low health expenditure households. Moreover, it can be seen in column (2) 
that when a full set of controls are included, the program’s effect rises to 222.3 pesos per 
month. For high health expenditure households, the coefficients are not significant. 
Focusing on the extensive margin, column (4) shows that in low health expenditure 
households the introduction of Seguro Popular reduced the likelihood of receiving private 
transfers by 7.62 percentage points, where this coefficient is statistically significant at the 
10.0% level. In high health expenditure households, it is estimated that a 1.0% increase 
in the program’s coverage reduced the probability of receiving private transfers by 0.0273 
percentage points. Nonetheless, this coefficient is not significant. 
 
Panel F makes use of the household weights included in the ENIGH. The results show 
that, when household weights are used, the impact of Seguro Popular on the amount of 
                                                          
34 Since the division of low and high income households according to whether they are below or above the 
median may seem arbitrary, estimations were also performed where households were classified depending 
on whether they fall below or above the mean. Households were also grouped by quartiles, where a 
comparison was made between those located at the lowest and highest quartiles. The results presented in 
Panel D in Table 3.6 are robust to these different specifications. 
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private transfers received is generally negative and not statistically significant. 
Concerning the program’s impact on the likelihood of receiving private transfers, it can 
be seen in columns (3) and (4) that when a full set of controls are included, although 
negative, neither of the coefficients are significant. 
 
Finally, Panel G focuses on households that report receiving a positive amount of private 
transfers. When state fixed effects are used along with a full set of controls, it is estimated 
that Seguro Popular reduced private transfers by 100.9 pesos per month. When 
municipality fixed effects are used, the effect of Seguro Popular is limited to an increase 
of private transfer income of 126.1 pesos per month. Nevertheless, neither of these two 
coefficients are statistically significant. These results offer additional evidence that the 
introduction of Seguro Popular did not affect the amount of private transfers received. 
 
3.7.2 Municipality Level Variation 
This section exploits the municipality level variation in the availability of Seguro Popular. 
Defining the availability of Seguro Popular in each municipality involves outlining an 
arbitrary threshold, since there is no official record of when the program’s services were 
initially offered in each municipality.35 In this study, a municipality is considered as 
having direct access to Seguro Popular when in its first observed in any given period that 
10 or more of its households are affiliated to the program. 
 
                                                          
35 In each state where Seguro Popular was introduced, it was up to the local government to undertake the 
actions required to identify beneficiary groups, their affiliation and the programs diffusion within their state 
(DOF, 2002). Thus, the decision of which municipalities were affiliated first was based on agreements with 
local governments, where each state decided to implement Seguro Popular according to its own goals, while 
generally satisfying the rules of operation of the program (Bosch and Campos-Vázquez, 2014). Moreover, 
the extent of Seguro Popular’s coverage within each municipality was decided by the municipal 
governments and was based on numerous factors including the availability of resources related to health 
infrastructure and health personnel. 
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Table 3.7 presents results of Eq. (3.1) at both the intensive and extensive margins, where 
the availability of Seguro Popular at the municipality level is introduced as a binary 
variable in place of the program’s coverage rate at the state level. Panel A includes all 
households in the sample. Panels B through E divide the sample by quartiles according 
to the household’s position in the income distribution.36 
 
Table 3.7 SP availability and private transfers. Municipality level variation. 
Full sample and divided by position in the income distribution 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS: Amount of private transfers received 
LPM: Probability of 
receiving private transfers 
A. Full sample  
 -28.05 2.660 -.0097 -.0145* 
 (28.56) (36.43) (.0081) (.0084) 
B. First quartile 
 -46.57*** -37.80** -.0249* -.0358** 
 (13.88) (18.54) (.0129) (.0178) 
C. Second quartile 
 -14.72 5.351 .0004 -.0128 
 (25.91) (28.94) (.0137) (.0158) 
D. Third quartile 
 -64.15* -53.92 -.0190 -.00611 
 (38.05) (41.23) (.0130) (.0148) 
E. Fourth quartile 
 83.41 88.26 -.0031 -.0067 
 (91.44) (126.0) (.0143) (.0165) 
     
HH level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. Figures presented represent coefficient estimates for SP 
availability at the municipality level. HH level controls include the variables presented in Table 3.4. State 
level controls include the state population size and binary variables that indicate the political affiliation of 
the Governor. Municipality level controls include government revenue, number of housing credits granted 
and number of workers affiliated to IMSS. Monetary figures are in real 2006 pesos. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level. 
 
                                                          
36 While generally consistent, when using Seguro Popular’s availability at the municipality level as the 
main explanatory variable, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is dependent on which threshold is 
used to denote when the program first became available in each municipality. Furthermore, using the 
program’s availability instead of its coverage rate conceals substantial information, particularly considering 
that the study covers a period of both low and high Seguro Popular coverage. Due to these shortcomings, 
estimations when using the program’s state coverage rate instead of its municipality availability are 
presented as the main results. 
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Column (1) of Panel A shows that when a full set of controls are introduced jointly with 
state fixed effects, the negative effect of Seguro Popular on the amount of private transfers 
received stands at 28.05 pesos per month, where this effect is not statistically significant. 
When municipality fixed effects are used as in columns (2), this effect becomes positive 
but remains non-significant. Focusing on the extensive margin, it is observed in column 
(4) that, when a full set of controls are included along with municipality fixed effects, the 
program reduced the likelihood of receiving private transfers by 1.45 percentage points, 
where this result is statistically significant at the 10.0% level. Consequently, an analysis 
that uses the program’s availability at the municipality level provides further evidence 
that Seguro Popular did not crowd-out private transfers at the intensive margin. On the 
other hand, it supports the finding that the program had weak but statistically significant 
effect at the extensive margin. 
 
Focusing on households located at different parts of the income distribution, Panel B 
shows that the program’s effect was stronger among households located in the bottom 
quartile. Column (1) shows that at the intensive margin, when a full set of controls are 
introduced including state fixed effects, it is estimated that Seguro Popular reduced the 
amount of private transfers received by 46.57 pesos per month, where this coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1.0% level. Moreover, when municipality fixed effects are 
used, it is observed in column (2) that the program reduced private transfers by 37.80 
pesos per month, where this coefficient is significant at the 5.0% level. At the intensive 
margin, similar results are found. Column (3) shows that, when a full set of controls are 
used including state fixed effects, it is estimated that the program reduced the likelihood 
of receiving private transfers by 2.49 percentage points. When municipality fixed effects 
are incorporated, it can be seen in column (4) that Seguro Popular reduced the likelihood 
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of receiving private transfers by 3.58 percentage points, where this coefficient is 
significant at the 5.0% level. Finally, regarding the households located in the top three 
quartiles of the income distribution, Panels C, D and E show that in general Seguro 
Popular did not affect private transfers at either the intensive or extensive margins. The 
program's effect might be larger among low income households given that they are 
actually more likely to be enrolled in Seguro Popular relative to higher income 
households. Furthermore, the fact that the program crowds-out private support among 
low-income households but not among those located higher in the income distribution 
may be a result of differences in the motives for remitting among donors depending on 
the receiving household’s level of income.37 
 
3.7.3 Donors 
Since the ENIGH collects information on household expenditures, it is possible to focus 
on donors instead of recipients and examine the effect of Seguro Popular on the amount 
of private transfers sent and on the probability of remitting a positive amount.38 To 
calculate the effect of Seguro Popular on donors, Eq. (3.1) is again estimated where the 
dependent variable is either the monthly amount of private transfers sent or a dichotomous 
variable that takes the value of one if the household remitted a positive amount during the 
                                                          
37 Since the introduction of Seguro Popular partially crowded-out private transfers and the program reduced 
health expenditures by an even larger amount, the matter of how households used their additional income 
derived from being affiliated to the program was also examined. Eq. (3.1) was estimated with a full set of 
controls with the dependent variable being household savings or a variety of expenditure categories such 
as food, clothing, housing, transportation or education. In results not presented, the estimated equations 
show that the introduction of Seguro Popular did not affect household savings, suggesting that the additional 
resources were likely used for consumption purposes. The different expenditure categories were also 
unaffected by the program’s introduction. These results are likely to arise because health expenditures 
constitute a very small fraction of total household expenses. Thus, even if Seguro Popular reduced health 
expenditures, its effect may not be large enough to influence household expenses in other categories. 
Nonetheless, this result may also be a product of measurement error which is a common issue when working 
with expenditure data. 
38 While it is likely that the majority of the private transfers sent by the donors included in the ENIGH are 
directed towards families residing within Mexico, the survey does not contain information on the 
characteristics of beneficiary households. 
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previous six months or zero otherwise. Additionally, to minimise unobserved 
heterogeneity that may affect remitting behaviour, households are classified according to 
whether they are eligible or ineligible for Seguro Popular. 
 
Table 3.8 SP coverage and total private transfers sent 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SP eligible HH SP ineligible HH 
 OLS: Amount of private transfers sent 
SP coverage at the state level 10.92 18.48 -149.7* -157.6* 
 (13.67) (12.89) (82.30) (82.85) 
 LPM: Probability of sending private transfers 
SP coverage at the state level .0231 .0301 -.0438 -.0293 
 (.0227) (.0251) (.0396) (.0428) 
     
HH level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,854 54,854 55,478 55,478 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. HH level controls include the variables presented in 
Table 3.4. State level controls include the state population size and binary variables that indicate the 
political affiliation of the Governor. Municipality level controls include government revenue, number of 
housing credits granted and number of workers affiliated to IMSS. Monetary figures are in real 2006 pesos. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
 
Table 3.8 shows that among households eligible for Seguro Popular, when a full set of 
controls are introduced along with state fixed effects, it is estimated that the program 
increased the amount of private transfers sent by 10.92 pesos per month, where this effect 
is not statistically significant. When municipality fixed effects are included, the effect 
increases to 18.48 pesos per month but is once again non-significant. With respect to the 
program’s effect on the probability of remitting, a similar relationship is observed. 
Whether state or municipality fixed effects are included along with a full set of controls, 
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it is estimated that Seguro Popular increased the probability of remitting, where this effect 
is never statistically significant. 
 
Concerning how the introduction of Seguro Popular affected the remitting behaviour of 
households that were not eligible for the program, a different pattern is observed. Column 
(3) shows that, when state fixed effects are used, it is estimated that Seguro Popular 
reduced the amount of private transfers sent by 149.7 pesos per month, where this 
coefficient is significant at the 10.0% level. When municipality fixed effects are 
incorporated jointly with a full set of controls, it is estimated that the program’s 
introduction reduced the amount of private transfers sent by 157.6 pesos per month, where 
this effect is once again significant at the 10.0% level. With respect to the probability of 
remitting, it is observed that Seguro Popular reduced the probability of remitting among 
ineligible households between 2.93 and 4.38 percentage points. Nevertheless, these 
coefficients are not statistically significant. 
 
In summary, the results show that while the introduction of Seguro Popular did not affect 
the remitting behaviour of households that were eligible for the program, it did affect the 
remitting behaviour of households that were not eligible to enrol in Seguro Popular. This 
may be driven by the fact that households covered by social security institutions were 
much more likely to remit relative to those that were uninsured. It may also be that 
households have different motives for remitting depending on whether they have access 
to a social security institution or not. 
 
Focusing on recipients and donors, it can be seen that Seguro Popular affected both 
recipients of private transfers as well as donors residing in Mexico and the United States. 
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Nevertheless, the effect on donors is limited to households that were not eligible for the 
program. Furthermore, since they were not affiliated to Seguro Popular, donor households 
ineligible for the program did not experience a reduction in health expenses. Whether 
these households encountered welfare gains or losses is uncertain, since this is likely a 
function of the relationship between the increase in taxes they were subject to in order to 
finance Seguro Popular and the amount by which they decreased their donations of private 
transfers. Concerning households ineligible for Seguro Popular, it is clear that they were 
subject to a positive welfare effect. This arises because Seguro Popular facilitated access 
to health facilities, reduced health expenses and while the program did partially crowd-
out private support, this figure only represents one-fifth of the reduction in health 
expenses. Moreover, since eligible households are outside the formal sector, they were 
largely unaffected by the potential increase in taxes incurred in order to finance Seguro 
Popular. 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
 
This study examined the empirical question of whether the implementation of Seguro 
Popular affected the amount of private transfers received and the likelihood of receiving 
private transfers among Mexico’s uninsured households. The effects of Seguro Popular 
were identified using the spatial variation in the program’s coverage induced by its 
sequential roll-out throughout Mexico. 
 
Based on multiple waves of the ENIGH, the results show that among households eligible 
for the program Seguro Popular had no effect on the amount of private transfers received. 
This may be due to the fact that prior to the program’s implementation in 2000, health 
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expenditures only accounted for 2.6% of total household expenditures. On the other hand, 
the implementation of Seguro Popular reduced on average a household's probability of 
receiving private transfers by 5.55 percentage points, a 28.6% reduction with respect to 
the .194 probability that uninsured households had of receiving private transfers prior to 
the program's introduction in 2000. This estimate is driven by domestic private transfers, 
since international private transfers were not affected by the program’s implementation 
at either the intensive or extensive margins. Seguro Popular’s negative effect on the 
likelihood of receiving private transfers is robust to the use of the program's state level 
expansion or municipality level availability. 
 
The fact that Seguro Popular had a clear social welfare improving effect has been well 
documented, since the program has provided millions of Mexicans access to health care. 
Nonetheless, the finding that an unintended consequence of Seguro Popular is that it 
partially crowds-out private support highlights the importance of looking at unexpected 
outcomes when analysing public policies, since the presence of crowding-out effects has 
important implications for the effectiveness of redistributive policies. The crowding-out 
effect suggests that the net effect of Seguro Popular is smaller than when just analysing 
its impact on health expenditures or health outcomes. Consequently, an evaluation of the 
effects of Seguro Popular should take into account possible changes in private behaviour. 
Failure to do so may overstate the program’s potential benefits or distributional impacts. 
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4 Crime Exposure and Educational Outcomes in Mexico 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Driven by drug-trade related crimes, homicide levels in Mexico have dramatically 
increased in recent years. From 2007 to 2012, the annual homicide and drug-trade related 
homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Mexico increased by 192.8% and 439.6%, 
respectively. Moreover, during this period 121,613 homicides and 66,217 drug-trade 
related homicides were committed in the country.39 The rise in crime and insecurity has 
proved extremely costly, totalling 1.4% of Mexico’s GDP in 2012 (INEGI, 2012). Since 
violence affects not only those directly involved in illegal activities but also reaches a 
much broader segment of society, it is likely to have important welfare effects. In the 
short run, these include negatively affecting school enrolment rates, the number of contact 
hours, academic performance and grade failure rates, among others. In the long run, it 
may influence educational attainment levels and income streams. This study examines 
the effect of students’ exposure to local homicides on educational outcomes in Mexico. 
The effects of crime exposure are investigated for both standardised test scores and grade 
failure rates.40 
 
                                                          
39 Author’s calculation based on the Sistema Estatal y Municipal de Bases de Datos (SIMBAD, State and 
Municipal Database System) and the Comisión Nacional de Seguridad (CNS, National Security 
Commission). 
40 In Mexico, basic education is divided into primary school (first to sixth grade) and secondary school 
(seventh to ninth grade). Since 1993, education has been compulsory until ninth grade. This was modified 
in 2013 becoming compulsory until twelfth grade. In 2009, Mexico ranked in the 48th position among 65 
countries that undertook the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test (OECD, 2010). 
In 2010, public expenditure in education as percentage of the country’s GDP stood at 5.2% (World Bank, 
2015). 
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The mechanisms linking violent crime exposure and educational outcomes operate across 
different channels. At the individual level, it may affect educational attainment due to 
changes in behaviours or mental health. Children and adolescents exposed to different 
types of violence frequently display a number of symptoms related to acute or post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Martinez and Richters, 1993; Berman et al., 1996; 
Osofsky et al., 2004). These characteristics, which include intensified levels of stress, 
anxiety, interrupted sleep, a lack of awareness, aggressive behaviour and difficulty 
concentrating, have been shown to affect educational outcomes (Margolin and Gordis, 
2000; Ding et al., 2009). Nevertheless, Di Tella et al. (2015) state that individuals who 
are victimised or are regularly exposed to violence may become “vaccinated” or develop 
“immunity” against the psychological effects of crime. 
 
At the household level, being exposed to violent crime may also affect parents’ time 
preferences. For example, parents exposed to high levels of crime may shift their focus 
to ensure the basic safety of their children, dedicating less time and energy towards 
improving their education (Harding, 2010). Parents may resort to bounding techniques, 
which limit children to the home setting while restraining access to neighbourhood 
relations and influences (Jarret, 1997). This may reduce social ties between households, 
teachers and the community, all of which help monitor children and are generally 
associated with better educational outcomes (Bryk et al., 2010). Furthermore, parents that 
have previously undergone a traumatic experience are more likely to have children with 
PTSD symptoms, since they may transmit the effects of their experiences to them (Linares 
et al., 2004). 
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High levels of violent crime may also impact educational outcomes by affecting both 
current and expected outside opportunities. Studies for Mexico have shown that the rise 
in homicides increased the unemployment rate, led to a contraction of wages and reduced 
labour force participation rates, therefore deterring economic growth in the short-run and 
possibly in the long-run (see, e.g. Enamorado et al., 2014; Robles et al., 2014; Dell, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, the rise in violent crime has been largely concentrated among males. Dell 
(2015) reports that approximately 95.0% of drug-trade related homicide victims are male 
and 45.0% are under 30 years of age. This asymmetric increase in homicides may lead to 
changes among parents in their perceptions of the dangers encountered by their male 
children. As a result, intra-household resource reallocation may occur, thereby affecting 
gender differences in human capital accumulation.  
 
Extreme crime related events can also affect the school routine by causing closings and 
temporarily interrupting classes. Since in Mexico unionised primary and secondary 
teachers’ salaries are largely unaffected by the number of days they are absent from work, 
violence may lead to high levels of attrition and absenteeism.41 Staff turnover may also 
increase given that managing a school in a locality with high levels of crime can be 
difficult as well as risky (Monteiro and Rocha, 2013, p. 15). If exposure to violent crimes 
leads to short term interruptions of classes, an implication is that children and adolescents 
exposed to these incidents are likely to function at a consistently lower level over the 
entire school year (Sharkey et al., 2014, p. 203). 
 
                                                          
41 Due to the substantial power that the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (SNTE, 
National Educational Workers Union) has in Mexico, affiliated teachers are highly protected. Their benefits 
include frequently receiving their full wage even if they are absent from work for a significant amount of 
time. 
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Table 4.1 Due to fear of being a crime victim, did you stop…? 
Action Yes No Observations 
Going out at night 54.5% 45.5% 61,177 
Let underage kids go out 59.9% 40.1% 35,950 
Visit family or Friends 33.1% 66.9% 64,220 
Take a taxi 27.6% 72.4% 40,833 
Use public transportation 16.5% 83.5% 51,838 
Carry money in wallet 44.5% 55.5% 64,238 
Go to school 7.2% 92.8% 7,237 
Go to the cinema or theatre 30.8% 69.2% 31,561 
Go for a walk 31.6% 68.4% 55,864 
Wear jewellery 59.6% 40.4% 36,709 
Go out for dinner 26.9% 73.1% 52,381 
Carry credit or debit card 36.5% 63.5% 34,496 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENVIPE 2011. 
 
Table 4.2 Due to fear of being of crime victim, did you stop going to school? 
Violence level by municipality Yes No Observations 
Total homicides    
High 8.9% 91.1% 1,006 
Medium 5.8% 94.2% 2,173 
Low 3.6% 96.4% 4,058 
Drug-trade related homicides    
High 10.4% 89.6% 3,301 
Medium 5.2% 94.8% 3,025 
Low 2.5% 97.5% 911 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENVIPE 2011. Municipalities with high, medium and low violence 
levels refer to those located in the upper, medium and lower tercile, respectively, of the homicide 
distribution. 
 
Students may also attempt to side-step attending school due to safety concerns. Based on 
the Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE, 
National Victimization and Perception of Public Safety Survey), Table 4.1 shows that in 
2011 approximately 7.2% of Mexico’s students self-reported that they stopped going to 
school due to fear of being a crime victim. Furthermore, it can be seen in Table 4.2 that 
this figure is positively related to the homicide level in the municipality of residence. 
 
A number of recent studies have examined the relationship between violence and 
educational outcomes in Mexico.42 Caudillo and Torche (2014) investigate the effect of 
                                                          
42 Among the studies that have examined the effects of the rise in crime in Mexico, Dell (2015) finds that 
municipalities that elected a mayor from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN, National Action Party), the 
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crime on grade failure among first to sixth grade students. Based on school level data 
covering the 1990 to 2010 period, the authors estimate a series of fixed effects, first 
difference and group-specific intercepts and slopes models. The study shows that a one-
unit rise in the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants increases the failure rate between 
0.027 and 0.089 percentage points. Michaelsen and Salardi (2013) quantify the effects of 
the rise in violent crime on standardised test scores among third to sixth grade students. 
Focusing on the years 2007 to 2011 and estimating fixed effects models, the scholars 
observe that the rise in homicides negatively affected test scores.43 The study also 
distinguishes between the effects of recent violent events and the impact of accumulated 
events before the exams took place, generally obtaining similar results. Furthermore, the 
findings show that the occurrence of at least one homicide in the seven days prior to the 
examination week reduces the attendance rate during the test by 0.3 percentage points. 
Finally, Márquez-Padilla et al. (2015) examine the effects of homicides and drug-trade 
related homicides on school enrolment, migration, employment and test scores. Covering 
the 2009 to 2011 period, the authors estimate a series of fixed effect models. The study 
shows that higher homicide rates lead to a small reduction in enrolment rates among high 
school-age individuals. Nonetheless, the scholars do not find an effect of the rise in 
violence on standardised test scores among third to ninth grade students.44 
 
                                                          
party of President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), encountered an upsurge in crime rates in the months 
following the election relative to those municipalities where PAN lost by a small margin. The authors also 
observes that the rise in violence led to a reduction in female force participation rates and a contraction in 
wages among men employed in the formal sector. Enamorado et al. (2014) exploit cross-municipal income 
and crime data and observe that from 2005 to 2010 drug-trade related crimes deterred economic growth. 
Focusing on the 2006-2010 period, Robles et al. (2014) assess the economic costs of drug-trade related 
violence. Using electricity consumption as an indicator of the level of economic activity, the study finds 
that marginal increases in homicide rates negatively affected labour force participation rates and increased 
the proportion of unemployed workers in an area. 
43 Specifically, with an average score of 514 in the standardised test, the scholars observe that a one-unit 
increase in the homicide rate per 1,000 inhabitants reduces average scores between 1.96 and 2.22 points. 
44 Table A.4.1 in the Appendix explicitly presents the characteristics of the present study and the work by 
Caudillo and Torche (2014), Michaelsen and Salardi (2013) and Márquez-Padilla et al. (2015). 
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This study contributes to the literature on crime and educational outcomes in Mexico in 
several ways. First, the period of investigation is updated and extended as it focuses on 
the years covering from 2006 to 2012. Second, the econometric analysis controls for 
different school and household level programs implemented by the federal government 
which have been shown to strongly affect educational outcomes in Mexico, and which 
surprisingly have been mostly ignored in the literature. Third, with respect to standardised 
test scores, different subsamples of the population are examined. Among secondary 
schools, heterogeneous effects depending on when the homicide occurred with respect to 
examination date are investigated and potential spillover effects originating from 
homicides registered in nearby municipalities are analysed. Fourth, regarding grade 
repetition, the study includes secondary schools, distinguishes between homicides and 
drug-trade related homicides, examines different population groups and investigates 
spillover effects. Fifth, the potential endogeneity of the homicide rate is addressed by 
using the instrument first proposed by Castillo et al. (2014), based on the proximity of 
Mexico’s municipalities to the U.S. border interacted with information on cocaine 
seizures in Colombia. Sixth, evidence is provided on the mechanisms driving the negative 
relationship between crime exposure and educational outcomes. This is done by focusing 
on the effects of violence on the number of contact hours and the amount of time spent 
performing school related activities in the household. Lastly, from a public policy 
standpoint the study provides evidence regarding the fact that non-educational policies, 
such as those concerning the country’s security, affect educational outcomes. 
 
The results show that a one-unit increase in the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants 
reduces average standardised test scores between 0.0035 and 0.0142 standard deviations. 
This effect is larger in secondary schools, grows stronger if the homicide occurs closer to 
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the examination date, and is relatively stable when using either total homicides or drug-
trade related homicides to measure crime exposure. Higher homicides rates are also 
associated with an increase in the grade failure rate. 
 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related international literature. 
Section 4.3 discusses the main motives behind recent increases in homicides and drug-
trade related crimes in Mexico. Section 4.4 describes the data and presents summary 
statistics. Section 4.5 outlines the econometric methodology. Section 4.6 discusses the 
results. Section 4.7 tests the robustness of the results. Section 4.8 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
Within the international literature that examines the impact of crime exposure on 
educational outcomes, a series of studies have focused on the effects of school level 
violence (see, e.g. Grogger, 1997; Abouk and Adams, 2013; Beland and Kim, 2014; 
Poutvaara and Ropponen, 2010). These investigations tend to observe that bringing 
weapons to school, fights between students and school shootings are associated with 
lower enrolment rates, a reduction in attendance and graduation rates and lower scores in 
national standardised tests.45 Nevertheless, while these studies focus on violence 
                                                          
45 Focusing on the U.S., Grogger (1997) finds that moderate levels of violence, including fights between 
students and bring weapons to school, reduce the likelihood of high school graduation by 5.1 percentage 
points and the probability of attending college by 6.9 percentage points. Abouk and Adams (2013) analyse 
high school shootings and observe that public school shootings tend to be followed by a 10.0% to 12.0% 
increase in private high school enrolment rates. Beland and Kim (2013) examine how fatal shootings in 
high schools affect test scores and enrolment, graduation, attendance and suspension rates. The authors find 
that homicidal shootings decrease the enrolment of students in ninth grade as well as test scores in English 
and Mathematics. Potvaara and Ropponen (2010) perform a similar analysis for Finland and observe that 
average test scores among male students tend to decline due to the school shootings, whereas for female 
students no effect is observed. 
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occurring within the school, the present chapter examines exposure to violent crime 
outside the school. 
 
Another strand of the literature has centred on the effects of widespread conflict. Armed 
conflict has been shown to have strong long term effects on primary school completion 
rates in Timor-Leste (Justino et al., 2014), to affect human capital accumulation in 
Guatemala (Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011) and Peru (León, 2012), to increase school 
drop-out rates and labour force participation rates in Colombia (Rodríguez and Sánchez, 
2012) and to decrease women’s enrolment rates and mandatory schooling completion 
rates in Tajikistan (Shemyakina, 2011), among others. 
 
Furthermore, a series of studies have examined the effects of violent crimes and illegal 
activities. Focusing on Colombia, Gerardino (2014) observes that teenage males are less 
likely to be enrolled at secondary school relative to girls when male-biased violence is 
high. Monteiro and Rocha (2013) analyse the impact of armed struggles between drug 
gangs in Rio de Janeiro on student achievement, and show that the negative effects of 
violence increase with its intensity, duration, and proximity to the examination dates. 
Finally, Sharkey et al. (2014) study the impact of exposure to violent crime on students’ 
standardised test scores in New York City, where the authors observe that violence 
reduces performance on English assessments but has no effect on Mathematics scores. 
Furthermore, the effect of exposure to violent crime is stronger among African-
Americans and reduces their grade passing rates by approximately 3.0 percentage points. 
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4.3 Violence in Mexico 
 
The increase in violent crime observed in Mexico in recent years is a result of a long-term 
political and economic process. Characterised by being a chaotic decade long episode, 
the Mexican revolution scarred the country and resulted in the creation of strong state led 
by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party). The 
PRI suppressed political opposition by integrating different groups of society including 
labourers, peasants, businessmen, academics, and the armed forces into its organisation. 
It granted concessions and monopolies to private-sector supporters, paid off labour 
leaders, and assigned numerous well remunerated public-sector jobs to proponents. 
Backed by a strong repressive capacity, the PRI used its patronage machine to subdue 
rebellious voices and control Mexico for decades (O'Neil, 2009, p. 65). 
 
Links between the PRI and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) date back to the 1920s 
during the Prohibition era, a relationship that grew stronger and had been solidified by 
the 1950s. Through the Secretariat of the Interior, local governments and the federal 
police, the state created patron-client relationships with different sectors of society 
including the DTOs. This agreement minimised the number of violent acts committed 
against government officials, high-ranking drug-traffickers and the general population, 
while also defining the rules of operation for DTOs and guaranteeing that police 
investigations did not reach kingpins or other cartel leaders (O'Neil, 2009, p. 65). These 
conditions allowed organised crime groups to be virtually unchallenged by the 
government, permitting them to operate with relative liberty and grow into highly 
powerful consortiums (Astorga and Shirk, 2010, p. 8). While the PRI did not generally 
accept criminal activity, such behaviour was more likely to go unpunished when public 
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officials were more easily accessible for bribes and corruption. This association remained 
true even in the 1970s and 1980s when drug trafficking and production intensified 
throughout the country (O'Neil, 2009; Astorga and Shirk, 2010). 
 
The equilibrium in the relationship between government authorities, including law 
enforcement, and DTOs began to change during Mexico’s decentralization and 
democratization process in the late 1980s and 1990s. By losing a number of state 
governorships and subsequently failing to obtain absolute majority in Congress in 1997, 
the PRI lost its political monopoly as well as control over the drug trade. Once different 
political parties started coming into power, it invalidated the previous understanding 
requiring DTOs to negotiate with the new political establishment and encouraging rival 
crime groups to bid for market opportunities. With the election of President Vicente Fox 
(2000-2006), candidate of the right wing PAN, the old model dependent on PRI control 
was shattered (O'Neil, 2009). In certain instances, the country’s political transformation 
provided the necessary impulse to spur accountability, transparency, better governance 
and a head on approach towards DTOs. In other cases, it simply unsettled political 
connections to favour one DTO over another. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to mention 
that none of Mexico’s major political parties have been immune from acts of corruption, 
as this is a widespread occurrence in the country (Astorga and Shirk, 2010, p. 8). 
 
The political opening in Mexico allowed DTOs the opportunity to gain autonomy and put 
a halt to their subordination to government authorities. Instead of buying off the necessary 
public servants, organised crime groups implemented a strategy of intimidation to ensure 
the safe passage of their merchandise. The rise of democratic competition also affected 
the state’s capacity to react forcefully. As the influence of Congress increased, legislative 
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gridlock weakened the later years of President Ernesto Zedillo’s term (1994-2000) as well 
as the administration of Vicente Fox, delaying the judicial and police reforms needed by 
the country. Moreover, since they often belonged to different parties, problems often 
emerged between federal and local governments due to a lack of information being shared 
and the absence of coordinated policies (O'Neil, 2009). Consequently, when the Mexican 
state was divided into many different units that had different objectives, criminal 
behaviour became more violent since the probability of being punished decreased (Rios, 
2014b, p. 4). 
 
The relationship between government authorities and DTOs was radically altered in 2006. 
Following a closely contested election and just a few days after coming into power, 
President Felipe Calderón made the fight against organised crime groups, commonly 
referred to as the “war against drugs”, the centrepiece of his administration by sending 
troops to state of Michoacán in December 2006.46 While initially 6,500 troops were 
deployed to fight the DTOs, by the end of Calderón’s administration this figure had risen 
to 45,000. The crackdown was largely unanticipated as the election made narrow mention 
of security issues in Mexico (Dell, 2015). 
 
The “war against drugs” was largely based on the non-selective arrest of criminal leaders, 
which in turn led to the fragmentation of DTOs and the emergence of violent conflicts 
between crime organisations. Without their heads, a power vacuum emerged in many 
DTOs. Oftentimes, aspiring leaders who worked as part of the enforcement arms of the 
illegal drug trafficking organisations resorted to the use of high levels of violence to try 
                                                          
46 Between 2006 and 2012 troops were also deployed to the states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, 
Durango, Guerrero, Morelos, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz. In 2009, the Mexican 
government spent 9 billion U.S. dollars to fight drug trafficking (Keefer and Loayza, 2010). 
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to gain control of the fragmented markets, which resulted in a significant increase in the 
number of homicides. The neutralisation of kingpins and leaders was especially high 
between 2008 and 2010, while actions related to drug seizures and crop eradication 
remained stagnant (O'Neil, 2009; Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011). 
 
Figure 4.1 Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Mexico, 2000-2012 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SIMBAD and CNS. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that in 2000, the homicide rate in Mexico per 100,000 inhabitants stood 
at 11.0. Beginning in 2008, the homicide rate grew significantly, reaching a maximum of 
24.3 in 2011. The increase in the homicide rate was largely driven by an escalation in the 
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number of drug-trade related homicides. It can be seen that the trend in the homicide rate 
is very similar to the one observed for drug-trade related homicides.47 
 
Since the approach taken by President Calderón was to go after all DTOs, this strategy 
resulted in intensified and geographically dispersed conflict (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011). 
Figure 4.2 shows the geographic distribution and intensity of the homicide rate per 
100,000 inhabitants by municipality from 2006 to 2012. While initially concentrated in a 
few states, homicides became more spatially diverse over time. Furthermore, a large part 
of drug-trade related homicides occur in areas close to drug trafficking routes and in 
border cities such as Ciudad Juárez or Tijuana, since the most lucrative part of the drug 
trafficking business chain takes place at border crossing points (Rios, 2014a, p. 201).48 
 
In addition to the increase in the homicide rate, a rise in the number of illegal activities 
targeting the general population was also observed. When the leaders of the DTOs were 
neutralised, crime organisations often lost the ability to operate their international drug 
trafficking routes in an effective and economic manner. Thus, remaining members 
commonly turned against civilians to extract economic resources through exploitative 
criminal acts (Robles et al., 2014, p. 3). These included kidnappings, extortions, assault 
and car-thefts, among others.
                                                          
47 A large part of the violence among DTOs consist of drug traffickers killing each other, where this 
represents over 85.0% of all drug-trade related homicides (Dell, 2015). 
48 Dell (2015) reports that in 2008 in 68.0% of the country’s municipalities there was either a major DTO 
or a local drug gang operating within its territory. Figure A.4.1 in the Appendix presents the geographic 
distribution of drug-trade related homicides in Mexico. 
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Figure 4.2 Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants by Municipality 
  
  
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SIMBAD.
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Other major changes also occurred around the same time President Calderón took office, 
both of which affected the illegal drug market and homicide rates in Mexico. As explained 
by Castillo et al. (2014), in 2006 the Colombian government redefined its anti-drug 
strategy changing from a policy that emphasised attacking coca crops, which produce 
lower value added, to one that focused on the confiscation of drug shipments and well as 
the destruction of cocaine processing labs. This resulted in an increase in the amount of 
cocaine seized in Colombia, Mexico’s main cocaine supplier. This created scarcity of 
cocaine and increased drug-trade related violence in Mexico. Another factor that also 
contributed to the increase in violent crime was the expiration of the U.S. Federal Assault 
Weapons Ban in 2004. Dube et al. (2013) observe that this made semiautomatic weapons 
more accessible to DTOs in Mexican states along the U.S. border, except for Baja 
California. Thus, the Mexican municipalities located near the non-California border states 
encountered differential increases in homicides and gun-related homicides after 2004. 
 
While on the campaign trail, President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) had promised to 
cut down on the government’s dependence on the counter-drug tactics used by the 
previous administration. Nonetheless, Peña Nieto has continued to heavily rely on the 
military while targeting the arrest of major DTO figures (Heinle et al., 2014). 
 
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.4.1 Data 
Academic performance is measured using the scores obtained in the yearly national 
standardised test Evaluación Nacional de Logros Académicos en Centros Escolares 
(ENLACE, National Evaluation of Academic Achievement in Schools). First 
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implemented in 2006, the test is taken by primary school students from third to sixth 
grade, and by secondary school students from seventh to ninth grade.49 ENLACE 
evaluates students’ knowledge and abilities in the subjects of Spanish and Mathematics. 
Since 2008, it also includes a third subject which changes on a rotating basis.50 The test 
was initially implemented with the purpose of providing information on how to better 
structure and improve course outlines, and to help identify the skills-training needed by 
teachers.51 ENLACE is measured on a scale ranging from 200 to 800. An advantage of 
the test is that it allows for a single and direct comparison between all evaluated students 
and schools. School level figures on ENLACE scores were obtained from the Secretaría 
de Educación Pública (SEP, Ministry of Public Education).52 
 
Information on grade repetition rates were taken from the Estadística de Educación 
Primaria y Secundaria database, commonly referred to as Estadísticas 911 (i.e. Statistics 
911). The dataset includes information on students, teachers, school characteristics and 
other elements of the educational system from all the schools in Mexico. 
 
Statistics on the number of homicides at the municipality level were obtained from 
SIMBAD. Total homicides per 10,000 inhabitants were constructed using population 
                                                          
49 Beginning in 2008, twelfth grade students also started taking the ENLACE test. Nevertheless, given that 
we were unable to obtain data for these schools, they were not included in the study. 
50 Specifically, in 2008 the third subject was Natural Sciences, in 2009 was Civics and Ethics, in 2010 was 
History, in 2011 was Geography, and in 2012 was once again Natural Sciences. 
51 ENLACE has undergone important changes since its inception. In 2006, the test was conceived solely as 
a tool that would allow to detect deficiencies among students, where its results could be used by teachers 
and parents to modify study habits and course outlines. Since ENLACE was not a “high impact instrument”, 
the test was supervised by teachers and parents who did so on a voluntary basis. This was modified for the 
2008-2009 school year, where the personnel conducting the test was no longer linked to the school being 
evaluated. Moreover, ENLACE scores were also linked to teacher compensation and school accountability, 
the latter by making its results public and creating school rankings (Backhoff, 2014). 
52 Although the ENLACE test does not determine if a student passes onto the next grade, Campos and 
Urbina (2011) show that its scores are closely related with bimonthly test results at the classroom level. 
Thus, the authors conclude that what is taught and learned in the classroom is reflected in the scores 
obtained in ENLACE. 
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figures derived from the 2005 Population Count and the 2010 Census of Population and 
Housing, both conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Geografía y Estadística (INEGI, 
National Geography and Statistics Institute). For years for which there are no population 
figures, the data was extrapolated assuming a constant yearly population growth-rate. 
Furthermore, the same yearly growth-rate observed between 2005 and 2010 was taken 
for 2010 to 2012. 
 
To properly identify the effect of crime exposure on educational outcomes, a series of 
school, municipality and state level controls are introduced. Information on narcotics 
sentences at the municipality level and the unemployment rate and GDP per capita at the 
state level was taken from SIMBAD. Data on school level characteristics such as the 
number of students, groups, and the student-teacher ratio, among others, were obtained 
from Statistics 911. Information on whether the school participates in the Programa 
Escuela de Calidad (PEC, Quality School Program), Programa Escuela Tiempo Completo 
(PETC, Full-Time School Program) or the Programa Escuela Segura (PES, Safe School 
Program) was taken from SEP.53 Cabrera-Hernandez (2015) observes that the 
implementation of the PEC and PETC had positive effects on ENLACE scores among 
primary school students. Data on the Seguro Popular coverage rate was obtained from the 
Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud (CNPSS, National Commission of 
Social Protection in Health). Alcaraz et al. (2013) show that the expansion of Seguro 
Popular positively affected ENLACE scores. Finally, information regarding the Prospera 
coverage rate was taken from the Coordinación Nacional de Prospera Programa de 
Inclusión Social (CNPPIS, National Coordination of Prospera Social Inclusion Program). 
                                                          
53 The PETC extends the school day from four or five hours to between six and eight hours per day. The 
PEC allows each school to design an education improvement plan which includes teacher training and 
additional course materials, among others. The PES grants economic and technical resources to schools 
which may be used on training, course materials or equipment related to school safety. 
131 
 
 
 
A number of studies have noted that Prospera has had a strong positive effect on 
educational outcomes in Mexico (see, e.g. Behrman et al., 2005; Attanasio et al., 2011).54 
 
The period examined covers from 2006 to 2012. The analysis is limited to primary and 
secondary schools in which the ENLACE test was applied in all of the years included in 
the study. In total, there are 59,673 and 22,932 primary and secondary schools, 
respectively, in the sample, each observed for six periods.55 
 
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 displays the means and standard deviations of selected variables included in the 
econometric analysis. Regarding the outcomes of interest, for all years ENLACE scores 
in Mathematics are slightly larger than those in Spanish. Additionally, between 2006 and 
2012 ENLACE scores steadily increased each year for both subjects. The opposite 
relationship is observed with respect to the grade failure rate, which gradually decreased 
during the period analysed. 
 
Among school level controls, it is observed that the total number of students per school 
encountered a modest decrease between 2006 and 2012, dropping from 192.9 to 188.1, 
respectively. On the other hand, the average number of school groups per school remained 
relatively constant at around 7.9. The fact that the number of school groups is highly 
correlated with the number of classrooms used signals that classrooms are generally not 
                                                          
54 Seguro Popular is a free-of-charge publicly provided health insurance program for otherwise uninsured 
households. Prospera, previously called Progresa and Oportunidades, is a poverty reduction cash-transfer 
program with education and health components, where households receive transfers conditional on sending 
their children to school and visiting health clinics. 
55 Data for 2008 was not included since at the time of writing I was unable to obtain for this year ENLACE 
scores separated by subject. Furthermore, the state of Oaxaca is excluded from the analysis since the 
ENLACE test was not applied in the state in some of the years included in the study. 
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shared among different school groups. Moreover, since there are between 4.0 and 4.1 
teachers per every 100 students, this implies that on average there are close to 25 students 
per every teacher. Focusing on the different school level programs, Table 4.3 shows that 
the coverage rate of both the PETC and PES increased each year between 2006 and 2012. 
Specifically, while the coverage of the PETC was 0.0% in 2006, by 2012 this figure had 
increased to 2.2%. Furthermore, the PES which started in 2007 increased its coverage rate 
from 1.1% in its initial year to 35.0% in 2012. The PEC followed a less predictable 
pattern, where its coverage rate varied between 22.4% and 30.5% during the period of 
study. 
 
Turning our attention to municipality and state level characteristics, it is observed that the 
total number of homicides per 10,000 inhabitants more than doubled during the period of 
analysis. While this figure stood at 0.9 in 2006, it escalated to 2.1 in 2011 and 2012. 
Moreover, the increase in the total homicide rate was largely driven by a rise in the 
number of drug-trade related homicides, which stood at 0.2 in 2007 and reached a 
maximum of 1.5 in 2011. While not as pronounced, there was also an increase in the 
number of narcotics sentences per 10,000 inhabitants, which rose from 1.2 in 2006 to 1.7 
in 2011. Regarding different social assistance programs, it can be seen that the expansion 
of Seguro Popular coincided with the period analysed. In 2006, 21.6% of the population 
was enrolled in Seguro Popular. By 2012, this figure had more than doubled and stood at 
55.9%. On the other hand, the coverage rate of Prospera remained fairly stable between 
30.9% and 33.4%, as its main expansion occurred before 2006. 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics 
 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
School characteristics       
ENLACE test scores: Spanish 487.4 492.7 502.7 508.4 515.4 522.8 
 (57.8) (61.3) (57.7) (61.2) (65.5) (70.4) 
ENLACE test scores: Mathematics 491.6 497.6 506.4 516.4 529.6 554.4 
 (57.5) (61.4) (61.9) (65.6) (70.2) (77.4) 
Grade failure rate (%) 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 1.8 
 (4.3) (4.2) (4.1) (4.0) (3.9) (3.5) 
Number of students 192.9 193.2 192.2 190.8 189.3 188.1 
 (195.0) (195.3) (194.4) (193.1) (192.0) (191.3) 
Number of school groups 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.9 
 (4.4) (4.4) (4.4) (4.4) (4.4) (4.4) 
Teachers per 100 students 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 
 (3.0) (3.0) (3.2) (3.4) (3.4) (3.3) 
Number of classrooms used 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 
 (6.1) (6.0) (6.4) (5.8) (5.9) (5.7) 
Principal is also a teacher (%) 41.6 41.6 41.2 40.7 40.4 40.6 
 (49.3) (49.3) (49.2) (49.1) (49.1) (49.1) 
PEC (%) 24.7 25.1 22.4 24.3 30.5 26.7 
 (43.1) (43.4) (41.7) (42.9) (46.0) (44.2) 
PETC (%) 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.9 2.2 
 (0.0) (0.0) (6.6) (8.9) (9.3) (14.6) 
PES (%) 0.0 1.1 14.9 25.8 31.1 35.0 
 (0.0) (10.3) (35.6) (43.8) (46.3) (47.7) 
Municipality and State characteristics       
Homicides per 10,000 pop. 0.9 0.8 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.1 
 (1.1) (1.0) (3.0) (3.8) (3.4) (3.4) 
Drug homicides per 10,000 pop. 0.0 0.2 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.3 
 (0.0) (1.0) (2.4) (4.0) (3.6) (2.8) 
Narcotics sentences per 10,000 pop. 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.5 
 (2.1) (1.8) (1.7) (2.7) (3.2) (2.9) 
Seguro Popular coverage (%) 21.6 28.2 36.8 48.3 55.2 55.9 
 (19.8) (21.1) (21.3) (22.9) (22.8) (22.5) 
Prospera coverage (%) 33.4 32.3 30.9 32.5 32.1 31.8 
 (28.5) (27.6) (25.5) (25.8) (25.6) (25.6) 
State unemployment rate (%) 3.6 4.0 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.2 
 (1.1) (1.5) (1.8) (1.8) (1.5) (1.6) 
GDP per capita/1000 108.1 109.2 102.1 105.5 107.7 110.1 
 (111.0) (103.1) (86.3) (82.3) (79.6) (78.5) 
Observations 82,619 82,619 82,619 82,619 82,619 82,619 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and 
SIMBAD. PEC denotes the Programa de Escuelas de Calidad (Quality Schools Program). PETC denotes 
the Programa Escuelas Tiempo Completo (Full-time School Program). PES denotes the Programa Escuela 
Segura (Safe School Program). GDP per capita is in 2010 pesos. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Finally, the state unemployment rate fluctuated between 3.6% in 2006 and 5.6% in 2010. 
With respect to GDP per capita, it reached its lowest point in 2009, when it dropped to 
approximately 102,100 pesos per year. The reduction in GDP per capita was largely 
driven by the global economic crisis where in 2009 Mexico’s GDP contracted by 4.7% 
(World Bank, 2015).56 
 
4.5 Methodology 
 
To estimate the effect of crime exposure on standardised test scores and grade repetition 
rates, the variation in homicide rates across municipality and time is exploited. This is 
done by estimating a fixed effects (FE) model specified in the following manner: 
 
𝑦௜௠௧ = 𝛾𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒௠௧ + 𝑋௜௠௧𝛽 + 𝑊௠௧𝛿 + 𝑍௦௧𝜆 + 𝛼௜ + 𝜇௧ + 𝜖௜௠௧                  (4.1) 
 
where 𝑦௜௠௧ denotes either the average ENLACE score obtained in Spanish or 
Mathematics or the grade repetition rate observed in school 𝑖 in municipality 𝑚 in year 𝑡; 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒௠௧ represents the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants in municipality 𝑚 in year 
𝑡; 𝑋௜௠௧ denotes a vector of  school level characteristics that may affect ENLACE test 
scores or grade repetition rates; 𝑊௠௧ and 𝑍௦௧ represent vectors of municipality and state 
level variables, respectively; 𝜇௧ denotes a time period dummy which helps control for 
national trends in homicide rates; 𝛼௜ represents school fixed effects that capture time-
                                                          
56 Table A.4.2 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics at different percentiles of the distribution. It 
shows that the observed annual increase in ENLACE scores in both Spanish and Mathematics did not solely 
occur at the mean but also at different points of the distribution. Furthermore, homicide rates and drug-
trade related homicide rates remained unchanged at the 10th percentile and relatively stable at 50th 
percentile. On the other hand, a significantly larger increase in both variables, with respect to what occurs 
at the mean, is observed at the 90th percentile. 
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invariant characteristics which may affect the educational outcomes of interest; and 𝜖௜௠௧ 
is a random error term assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒௠௧, 𝑋௜௠௧, and 𝑍௦௧.57 
 
In addition to the homicide rate at the municipality level, the model includes as covariates 
school level characteristics such as total number of students, number of groups, number 
of teachers per 100 students, number of classrooms used, and dummy variables denoting 
whether the principal is also a teacher and whether the school participates in the PEC, 
PETC and PES. Municipality and state level covariates include the number of narcotics 
sentences per 10,000 inhabitants, the Seguro Popular and Prospera coverage rates at the 
municipality level, and the unemployment rate and GDP per capita at the state level. Eq. 
(4.1) is estimated separately for primary and secondary schools, and for ENLACE scores 
in Spanish and Mathematics and grade repetition rates. Standard errors are clustered by 
municipality to account for possible correlation among schools in some unknown way. 
 
4.6 Results 
 
4.6.1 Homicides and Academic Performance 
Table 4.4 presents the effects of homicides on ENLACE scores in Spanish and 
Mathematics for primary and secondary school students.58 Columns (1) and (2) show that 
among primary school students, an increase of one unit in the number of homicides per 
10,000 inhabitants reduces average standardised test scores in Spanish and Mathematics 
                                                          
57 When focusing on grade repetition rates, 𝑦௜௠௧  represents a continuous variable between 0 and 100 that 
captures the proportion of students from 3rd to 6th grade in primary schools and from 7th to 9th grade in 
secondary schools that failed the grade during the current academic year. 
58 The homicide rates presented in Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 were calculated based on the total 
number of homicides registered in the municipality where the school is located in the 12 months prior to 
the ENLACE test being taken. In 2006 ENLACE was applied from June 5 to 9, in 2007 from April 23 to 
27, in 2008 from April 14 to 18, in 2009 from April 23 to 29, in 2010 from April 19 to 23, in 2011 from 
May 23 to 27, and in 2012 from June 4 to 8. 
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by 0.0035 and 0.0039 standard deviations, respectively. Regarding secondary school 
students, columns (3) and (4) show that the effect of homicides is again negative and 
statistically significant. Specifically, an increase of one unit in the number of homicides 
per 10,000 inhabitants reduces ENLACE scores in Spanish and Mathematics by 0.0089 
and 0.0142 standard deviations, respectively. The stronger effect in secondary schools 
may be a result of older students being more generally aware of the violence around them. 
 
Table 4.4 Homicides and academic performance 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ENLACE test scores: Primary ENLACE test scores: Secondary 
 Spanish Math Spanish Math 
Homicides per 10,000 pop. -0.0035** -0.0039** -0.0089*** -0.0142*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0032) 
Number of students/100 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.093*** 0.058*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Number of groups -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Teachers per 100 students 1.570*** 1.950*** 0.580*** 0.628*** 
 (0.202) (0.224) (0.133) (0.138) 
Number of classrooms used 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.005* 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Principal is also a teacher -0.009 0.003 -0.047*** -0.051*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) 
PEC 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
PETC 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.233*** 0.256** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.081) (0.101) 
PES -0.011 -0.012 -0.056*** -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.023) 
     
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R-squared 0.218 0.270 0.082 0.169 
Observations 358,038 358,052 137,592 137,592 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and 
SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. PEC denotes the Programa de Escuelas de Calidad 
(Quality Schools Program). PETC denotes the Programa Escuelas Tiempo Completo (Full-time School 
Program). PES denotes the Programa Escuela Segura (Safe School Program). Standard errors are in 
parenthesis and are clustered at the municipality level. 
 
Focusing on other controls, it is observed that in all cases the number of students at the 
school and the number of classrooms used are positively associated with standardised test 
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scores. On the other hand, the number of school groups is negatively related with 
ENLACE scores in primary schools, but is not significant for secondary schools. The 
number of teachers per 100 students is positively associated with standardised test scores, 
where this variable is highly significant and is especially strong for primary schools. This 
finding implies that students have better academic performance when the student-teacher 
ratio is lower. With respect to the school’s Principal also being teacher, under this 
scenario secondary school students tend to perform worse in both Spanish and 
Mathematics, whereas for primary schools there is no effect. The fact that the Principal 
is also a teacher may be signalling that there exists a shortage of teachers in the school.  
 
Turning our attention to the different federal programs that were in effect during the 
period of study, it can be seen in all four columns that the PEC and PETC are positively 
associated with ENLACE scores. These results are in line with those reported by Cabrera-
Hernandez (2015), who shows that students benefit from spending more hours at school. 
Finally, the PES is negatively related with standardised test scores, although this variable 
is generally not significant. 
 
Table 4.5 shows how homicides affect the distribution of ENLACE scores within each 
school. For primary schools, an increment of one unit in the number of homicides per 
10,000 inhabitants increases the proportion of students obtaining a score in the 
“Insufficient” category by 0.078 percentage points for Spanish and 0.089 percentage 
points for Mathematics. Thus, for primary schools violent crime seems to mostly affect 
the performance of students located in the lower part of the ENLACE score distribution. 
Concerning secondary schools, increasing the number of homicides per 10,000 
inhabitants by one unit generates a rise in the percentage of students obtaining an 
138 
 
 
 
“Insufficient” score by 0.153 percentage points for Spanish and 0.251 percentage points 
for Mathematics. Homicides also affect the upper part of the score distribution, by 
reducing the proportion of students in the “Good” and “Excellent” categories. 
Consequently, for secondary schools an increase in violent crime levels produces a strong 
shift to the left of the ENLACE score distribution. 
 
Table 4.5 Homicides and the distribution of scores 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Insufficient Elemental Good Excellent 
 Dependent variable: Proportion of students in each score range 
Primary     
Spanish 0.0784*** -0.0298 -0.0433 -0.0047 
 (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0275) (0.0209) 
Math 0.0886*** -0.0364 -0.0582* 0.0008 
 (0.0314) (0.0296) (0.0316) (0.0241) 
Secondary     
Spanish 0.1532** 0.0043 -0.1753*** -0.0194*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0371) (0.0377) (0.0059) 
Math 0.2514*** -0.0265 -0.1332*** -0.1281*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0430) (0.0302) (0.0349) 
     
School level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Coefficients reported in the table correspond to the total number of homicides per 10,000 
inhabitants. Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) 
and SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
 
Table 4.6 presents how the effects of homicides vary depending on their timing and how 
close they occur to the date the ENLACE test was taken. In general, it can be seen that 
the effects of homicides grow stronger if they occur closer to the examination date. For 
primary schools, whereas homicides registered during the entire academic year reduce 
Spanish test scores by 0.0043 standard deviations, homicides committed in the week prior 
to the test being taken decrease average scores by 0.0214 standard deviations. A similar 
relationship is observed for ENLACE scores in Mathematics, where homicides 
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committed the week before the exam reduce average scores by 0.0325 standard deviations 
compared to 0.0048 for homicides committed during the entire academic year. Among 
secondary schools, the relationship between Spanish scores and the timing of the 
homicides remains fairly stable over the different time periods. On the other hand, the 
effect of homicides on Mathematics scores stands at 0.0155 standard deviations for 
homicides committed during the entire academic year and gradually rises to 0.0203 for 
homicides registered during the 3 months prior to the ENLACE test. The larger impact of 
homicides as they occur closer to the examination date may be indicating that the 
emotional and psychological effects of being exposed to a violent crime gradually 
decrease over time. On the other hand, it could also be signalling that classes missed 
closer to the examination date have a stronger effect on test performance than classes that 
were cancelled earlier in the academic year. 
 
Table 4.6 Homicides and academic performance. Different effects by time 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Academic Year 6 months 3 months Week 
 Primary school 
ENLACE scores: Spanish -0.0043** -0.0049* -0.0042 -0.0214* 
 (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0119) 
ENLACE scores: Math -0.0048** -0.0057* -0.0066 -0.0325*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0125) 
 Secondary school 
ENLACE scores: Spanish -0.0098*** -0.0094** -0.0121** -0.0097 
 (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0137) 
ENLACE scores: Math -0.0048** -0.0057* -0.0066 -0.0325*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0125) 
     
School level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Coefficients reported in the table correspond to the total number of homicides per 10,000 
inhabitants. Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) 
and SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
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To examine if there are heterogeneous effects, Table 4.7 focuses on different subsamples 
of schools. It can be seen it columns (1) and (2) that for both primary and secondary 
schools, the effect of violent crime is stronger when schools are based in a locality with 
high marginality levels. This likely reflects the fact that homicides are more likely to 
occur in highly deprived areas. Moreover, the negative effects of homicides are larger in 
schools located in rural areas compared to those registered in urban localities, where for 
the latter there is generally no significant effect. Additionally, the effects of homicides 
tend to be larger for schools teaching in the morning session compared to those that teach 
in the afternoon session. The stronger effect in the morning session may due to the fact 
that because homicides tend to occur at night, bodies are usually discovered in the early 
morning leading to classes being suspended in the morning session and resumed by the 
time the afternoon session starts. 
 
For primary schools, the negative effect of homicides is larger among public schools 
relative to private schools. Moreover, among private schools it is estimated that an 
increase in the homicide rate actually increases ENLACE test scores in both subjects, 
although the coefficient is only significant for Spanish. This result may be signalling that 
pupils studying in private schools, due to their generally privileged socioeconomic status, 
are being compensated in some manner (e.g. by being given private tutoring) in order to 
minimise the adverse effects of being exposed to homicides or to keep them away from 
the perceived dangers brought by an increase in the levels of violent crime. On the 
contrary, due to hesitation driven by resource constraints or because some parents may 
not perceive their children to be aware of the situation or at risk due to their young age, it 
may be that students attending public schools are not being compensated in the same 
manner. Nonetheless, academic performance in indigenous schools appears to be greatly 
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affected by increases in violent crime levels, where an increase of one unit in the homicide 
rate per 10,000 inhabitants reduces ENLACE scores in Spanish and Mathematics by 
0.0264 and 0.0236 standard deviations, respectively. Indigenous schools tend to be 
situated in small communities located in isolated areas with high poverty rates and low 
levels of schooling. Hence, it may be that in these communities there are higher levels of 
kinship or affinity among its residents, where the effects of an increase in the homicide 
rate are more widely felt among its inhabitants relative to schools located in larger or 
more densely populated areas. Moreover, due to a lack of economic resources or 
geographical isolation, there may not be any type of compensating mechanisms in place 
for pupils attending indigenous schools. 
 
Among secondary schools, the estimated coefficients of the effect of homicides on test 
scores are positive for public and private schools, but negative for telesecundarias.59 The 
positive effect for both public and private schools may be signalling that, unlike in 
primary schools, parents may decide to implement compensating mechanisms 
irrespective of their socioeconomic status. This may arise because given the ages of 
secondary school students, who are normally between 12 and 15 years old, they are more 
likely to be aware of their surroundings and therefore encounter a higher risk of being 
affected by high levels of violent crime.  
 
Finally, the lagged effects of homicides are small for primary schools and completely 
disappear after two years. On the other hand, lagged effects are strong for secondary 
schools, where these only become non-significant after three years. The strong impact of 
lagged effects may be signalling the lasting impacts of crime exposure. 
                                                          
59 Telesecundarias are distance education schools that provide secondary school education mainly through 
television broadcasts in rural or difficult to access areas in Mexico. 
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Table 4.7 Homicides and academic performance. Subsamples 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ENLACE test scores: Primary ENLACE test scores: Secondary 
 Spanish Math Spanish Math 
A. Main -0.0035** -0.0039** -0.0089*** -0.0142*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0032) 
B. Marginality Level     
High -0.0087** -0.0065 -0.0183*** -0.0196** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0059) (0.0088) 
Medium -0.0037 -0.0027 0.0033 -0.0036 
 (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0058) 
Low 0.0004 0.0005 0.0072*** 0.0018 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0017) 
C. Locality Size     
Urban -0.0015 -0.0019 0.0024 -0.0031* 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
Rural -0.0057** -0.0041 -0.0161*** -0.0191*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0049) 
D. Session     
Morning -0.0040** -0.0043** -0.0103*** -0.0151*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0034) 
Afternoon -0.0013 -0.0017 0.0127*** 0.0052 
 (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0034) 
E. School Type     
Public -0.0032* -0.0032* 0.0086*** 0.0041** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0021) 
Private 0.0062** 0.0044 0.0143** 0.0130*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0049) 
Indigenous -0.0264*** -0.0236*** --- --- 
 (0.0066) (0.0071)   
Telesecundaria --- --- -0.0178*** -0.0220*** 
   (0.0037) (0.0048) 
F. Lagged Homicide Rate     
t-1 -0.0034* -0.0033 -0.0109*** -0.0177*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0038) 
 
t-2 -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0063** -0.0139*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0048) 
     
School level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Coefficients reported in the table correspond to the total number of homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants. Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) 
and SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
 
Spillover effects generated by homicides committed outside of the municipality where 
the school is located are also explored. Table 4.8 shows the effects of homicides registered 
away from the municipality but within a 20, 30 or 40 km radius. In general, it can be seen 
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that there are negative spillover effects brought about by homicides committed outside of 
the municipality, where the estimated coefficients are generally statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, relative to homicides registered within the municipality, these effects are 
quite small. Furthermore, as would be expected, the spillover effects grow smaller as a 
larger area away from the municipality is considered.  
 
Table 4.8 Homicides and academic performance. Spillover effects 
Homicides occurring: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ENLACE test scores: Primary ENLACE test scores: Secondary 
 Spanish Math Spanish Math 
In Municipality -0.0035** -0.0039** -0.0089*** -0.0142*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0032) 
Outside Municipality, 20 km -0.0002* -0.0003* -0.0006* -0.0008* 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Outside Municipality, 30 km -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Outside Municipality, 40 km -0.0002* -0.0002** -0.0002 -0.0002* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
     
School level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Coefficients reported in the table correspond to the total number of homicides per 10,000 
inhabitants. Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) 
and SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
 
Finally, Eq. (4.1) is again estimated where the main explanatory variable of interest is no 
longer the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants at the municipality level. Instead, it 
includes four categorical variables constructed according to the total number of homicides 
in the municipality. This allows analysing if the results are consistent when using an 
alternative measure of the homicide variable and examining for the potential presence of 
non-linear effects. 
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Table 4.9 shows that, with respect to the reference category of having zero homicides in 
the municipality, having between 1 and 15 homicides or between 16 and 30 homicides 
does not affect average ENLACE scores. When a municipality has between 31 and 60 
homicides, violent crime exposure has a small impact on academic performance, 
particularly in primary schools. Furthermore, when a municipality registers more than 60 
homicides in a 12-month period, ENLACE scores in primary and secondary schools are 
both strongly and negatively affected. This suggests that the negative effect of violent 
crime exposure on academic performance is highly non-linear and concentrated in the 
municipalities with the highest number of total homicides. 
 
Table 4.9 Non-linear effects: Homicides and academic performance 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ENLACE test scores: Primary ENLACE test scores: Secondary 
 Spanish Math Spanish Math 
0 < Homicides ≤ 15 0.0069 0.0128 0.0185 0.0194 
 (0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
15 < Homicides ≤ 30 -0.0171 -0.0191 -0.0132 -0.0256 
 (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0278) (0.0283) 
30 < Homicides ≤ 60 -0.0418** -0.0435* -0.0332 -0.0464 
 (0.0209) (0.0238) (0.0399) (0.0382) 
Homicides > 60 -0.0768*** -0.0908*** -0.1140** -0.1360*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0282) (0.0443) (0.0434) 
     
School level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R-squared 0.218 0.270 0.083 0.169 
Observations 358,038 358,052 137,592 137,592 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and 
SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The reference category for the Homicides dummy 
variables is constituted by municipalities where there where zero registered homicides during the 12 months 
prior to the ENLACE examination date. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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4.6.2 Homicides and Grade Repetition 
Attention now turns to effect of homicides on grade repetition. Based once again on Eq. 
(4.1) and according to the results presented in Table 4.10, it can be seen that an increase 
of one unit in the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants is associated with a rise in the 
grade failure rate of 0.028 percentage points for primary schools and 0.027 percentage 
points for secondary schools. 
 
Column (1) shows that for primary schools, the effect of homicides is only significant for 
schools located in areas with low marginality levels. Nevertheless, although not 
significant, the estimated coefficient is largest for schools situated in high marginality 
areas. For schools located in areas with medium marginality levels, although negative, 
the estimated coefficient is highly non statistically significant. Moreover, the stronger 
effect among schools situated in high marginality localities might be a result of these 
schools being located in areas exposed to higher homicides rates. Concerning the locality 
size, the effect of violent crime is significant in schools located in both urban and rural 
localities, where the effect of homicides is stronger among schools located in rural 
settings. With respect to whether classes are taught in the morning or afternoon session, 
the effect of homicides is slightly larger for schools that teach in the afternoon. Regarding 
the school type, the effect of crime exposure is stronger in public schools compared to 
private schools. The larger impact of crime exposure on grade repetition in public schools 
relative to private schools may be a result of classes having a higher likelihood of being 
suspended in the former upon the occurrence of a violent crime. Specifically, while 
unionised public school teachers are highly likely to receive their wages even if classes 
are cancelled, this is not the case with private school teachers whose wages are more 
dependent on them going to work and teaching. In indigenous schools the results show 
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than an increase in the homicide rate is negatively associated with the grade failure rate, 
although the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
lagged homicide rate is positively related with grade repetition rates for up to two periods. 
 
Table 4.10 Homicides and grade repetition 
Sample (1) (2) 
 Primary Secondary 
A. Main 0.0282*** 0.0268*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0082) 
B. Marginality Level   
High 0.0151 0.0545*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0209) 
Medium -0.0016 0.0041 
 (0.0151) (0.0252) 
Low 0.0129** 0.0196** 
 (0.0058) (0.0093) 
C. Locality Size   
Urban 0.0172*** 0.0220** 
 (0.0066) (0.0104) 
Rural 0.0276*** 0.0403*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0132) 
D. Session   
Morning 0.0273*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0085) 
Afternoon 0.0309*** 0.0258 
 (0.0096) (0.0164) 
E. School Type   
Public 0.0293*** 0.0168** 
 (0.0073) (0.0072) 
Private 0.0137* 0.0279 
 (0.0075) (0.0246) 
Indigenous -0.0576 --- 
 (0.0522)  
Telesecundaria --- 0.0447*** 
  (0.0151) 
F. Lagged Homicide Rate   
t-1 0.0357*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0083) 
t-2 0.0362*** 0.0306*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0075) 
   
School level controls Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Coefficients reported in the table correspond to the total number of homicides per 10,000 
inhabitants. Grade failure rate is measured on a scale from 0 to 100. Author’s elaboration based on 
ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 
and 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Turning our attention to secondary schools, it can be seen in column (2) that the effect of 
homicides on grade repetition rates is larger in schools based in localities with high 
marginality levels. Once again, the negative effect of violent crime is stronger in rural 
areas compared to urban settings. Further, the effect of homicides on grade repetition rates 
is stronger for secondary schools that teach in the afternoon session. Moreover, while 
there is no significant effect for private schools, crime exposure does increase the grade 
repetition rate for public schools and telesecundarias or distance education secondary 
schools. Finally, one- and two-year lagged values of the homicide rate significantly affect 
current grade repetition rates.60 
 
4.7 Robustness Checks and Mechanisms 
 
4.7.1 Drug-trade Homicides and Instrumental Variable Estimations 
Since the increase in homicide levels observed from 2007 onwards was largely driven by 
a rise in drug-trade related homicides, this section examines their effect on educational 
outcomes. Provided by the CNS, data on drug-trade related homicides is available on an 
annual basis starting in December 2006. Unlike the homicide level information obtained 
from the SIMBAD, this dataset does not provide information on the date when the 
homicide occurred or when it was registered. Instead, only information regarding the total 
number of drug homicides at the municipality level during the calendar year is available. 
 
This section also addresses the different challenges to identification that arise when 
attempting to estimate the effect of crime exposure on educational outcomes. First, 
                                                          
60 The effects of homicide rates on grade repetition separated by different time periods and the analysis of 
spillover effects are also examined. See Tables A.4.3 and A.4.4 in the Appendix, respectively. Moreover, 
Table A.4.5 analyses non-linear effects of homicides on grade repetition. 
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regardless of the inclusion of a wide range of school, municipal and state level controls, 
unobserved variables may jointly determine educational outcomes and variations in the 
homicide rate. Factors such as institutions may generate a downward bias on the 
coefficient if municipalities with weak institutions offer lower quality schooling and have 
poorer educational outcomes, while also being exposed to larger increases in crimes levels 
due to less effective police and judicial services (Basu and Pearlman, 2014, p. 18). 
Second, the potential reverse causality between educational outcomes and violent crime 
levels cannot be disregarded. Whereas an increase in the homicide rate is likely to 
negatively affect academic performance and grade repetition rates, it is plausible to 
assume that violent crime levels are higher where educational outcomes are worse. This 
is likely to arise because DTOs may more easily employ adolescents who study at badly-
performing schools (Michaelsen and Salardi, 2013). Lastly, while measurement error in 
homicide variables is not generally considered a serious problem compared to other types 
of crime, evidence suggests that this could be a problematic issue for the case of Mexico. 
According to official government data, between 2006 and 2013 an estimated 1,273 
bodies, of which only 142 were identified, were found in different clandestine graveyards 
throughout the country (PGR, 2014). Moreover, it is highly probable that there many 
other illegal graveyards that have not yet been discovered and never will be. Measurement 
error in the homicide rate biases the coefficient towards zero. That is, it leads to 
attenuation bias by overestimating, or estimating as more positive, a negative coefficient. 
Considering all the factors mentioned above, the potential direction of the bias is 
uncertain. 
 
To address the endogeneity issues, this study follows a similar strategy to the one first put 
forward by Castillo et al. (2014). Specifically, an instrumental variable (IV) model is 
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estimated using as a source of exogenous variation the interaction of a municipality’s 
proximity to the U.S. border with the percentage of cocaine seized in Colombia. Castillo 
et al. (2014) state that when the Colombia government seizes large quantities of cocaine, 
its price rises due to a reduction in supply. This increases the market value of cocaine, 
even more so in localities close to the U.S. border. Mexican municipalities that are close 
to the border have a comparative advantage due to their strategic geographic location 
since the U.S. is the final market. It is assumed that it will be these municipalities that see 
the highest increase in homicide levels because their control is more valuable to the 
DTOs.61 In the IV model, the exclusion restriction is upheld if the change in the proportion 
of total cocaine production seized in Colombia jointly with the municipality’s proximity 
to the U.S. border only affects homicide levels and therefore does not directly impact 
educational outcomes after controlling for all the covariates. This assumption is plausible, 
even though it cannot be tested directly.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 Information on cocaine seizures in Colombia was obtained from UNODC (2014). Figure A.4.2 in the 
Appendix presents the relationship between homicide levels in Mexico and the proportion of cocaine seized 
in Colombia. 
62 It may be argued that change in the proportion of total cocaine production seized in Colombia, and the 
subsequent variation in cocaine prices, not only affects violent crime levels but also the value of the criminal 
involvement outside option, thus making organised crime activities potentially more attractive. However, 
Márquez-Padilla et al. (2015) show that the “war against drugs” was not accompanied with either a decrease 
or an increase in enrolment rates among primary or secondary school students. 
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Table 4.11 First stage results of IV-FE estimation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Homicides Drug-trade homicides 
 Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
 Dependent variable: Homicides per 10,000 inhabitants 
(Proximity to U.S. border)*(% Colombian cocaine seized) 0.0091*** 0.0074*** 0.0089*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0011) 
Number of students/100 -0.326** -0.022 -0.240*** -0.065 
 (0.131) (0.039) (0.084) (0.055) 
Number of groups -0.012 -0.047** -0.004 -0.025 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) 
All grades -0.086 0.225** -0.143** -0.014 
 (0.054) (0.091) (0.063) (0.152) 
Number of classrooms used -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) 
Principal is also a teacher -0.031 -0.040 0.046* 0.027 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.038) 
Student/Teacher ratio 0.147 0.371 0.268 0.831** 
 (0.775) (0.388) (0.922) (0.413) 
PEC 0.072 0.044 0.066 0.070** 
 (0.057) (0.033) (0.044) (0.034) 
PETC -0.212** -0.292* -0.191 -0.335* 
 (0.102) (0.163) (0.128) (0.193) 
PES 0.423** 0.262*** 0.161 0.034 
 (0.169) (0.094) (0.131) (0.076) 
     
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R-squared 0.185 0.157 0.133 0.103 
F-test on instrument 21.74 25.47 37.37 38.50 
Observations 358,038 137,592 358,038 137,592 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911), 
SIMBAD and CNS 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. PEC denotes the Programa de Escuelas de 
Calidad (Quality Schools Program). PETC denotes the Programa Escuelas Tiempo Completo (Full-time 
School Program). PES denotes the Programa Escuela Segura (Safe School Program). Standard errors are in 
parenthesis and are clustered at the municipality level. The reported F statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic, which is robust to the presence of clustering in the data.  
 
Table 4.11 presents the first stage results of the instrumental variable estimations. In all 
cases, the interaction of the municipality’s proximity to the U.S. border and the 
percentage of cocaine seized in Colombia is positive.63 This relationship is of the expected 
sign, since it is assumed that if a municipality is closer to the U.S. its homicide rate will 
                                                          
63 The municipality’s proximity to the border variable is in kilometres. The variable was constructed using 
the maximum distance within Mexico to the U.S. border and subtracting from this value the municipality’s 
distance to the border. Moreover, the percentage of Colombian cocaine seized variable is between 0 and 1. 
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be higher. It is also expected that if the percentage of cocaine seized increases, more 
homicides will occur. Furthermore, the interaction term is a strong predictor of the 
homicide rate at the municipality level, where the coefficient is in all models significant 
at the 1.0% level. For example, the municipality of Tijuana has a value of 1,345.9 in the 
proximity to the U.S. border variable. Hence, the estimated coefficient in the first row of 
column (1) says that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of Colombian 
cocaine seized variable increases the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants in Tijuana by 
0.1225 units. On the contrary, for Cancun which is located in the municipality of Benito 
Juarez, this figure drops to 0.0135 units. Finally, the value of the F statistic is comfortably 
above the rule of thumb of 10 commonly used in the literature and the Stock-Yogo critical 
values at the 10.0% significance level. 
 
Fixed effects and instrumental variable estimations of the effects of drug-trade related 
homicides on educational outcomes are presented in Table 4.12. Results for the effects of 
total homicides during the last calendar year are also presented in order to have a directly 
comparable measure of the two violent crime variables. Table 4.12 shows in columns (1) 
and (3) that among primary school students, concerning ENLACE scores in Spanish and 
Mathematics, the negative effect of total homicides is larger than that of drug-trade related 
homicides. For grade repetition the same pattern is observed, where the effect of drug 
homicides is smaller relative to that of total homicides. Among secondary schools 
students, although negative, the fixed effects results suggest that ENLACE scores are not 
affected by drug homicides. Nonetheless, grade repetition rates increase with the drug 
homicide level, where this coefficient is significant at the 1.0% level. The stronger effect 
of homicides with respect to drug-trade related homicides may be signalling the presence 
of nonlinearities, where the impact of a one-unit increase in the homicide rate is larger as 
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it increases. With respect to the instrumental variable estimations presented in columns 
(2) and (4), it is observed that when instrumenting for the homicide variables using the 
interaction of a municipality’s proximity to the U.S. border with the percentage of cocaine 
seized in Colombia, the effect is again negative and highly significant. Additionally, for 
secondary school students the relationship between drug homicides and ENLACE scores 
in Spanish and Mathematics is now significant at the 1.0% level. The larger size of the 
total homicides and drug-trade related homicides coefficients when using instrumental 
variable models suggest that the fixed effect estimations may be downwardly biased. 
Moreover, since the IV results are local average treatment effects, it may only be 
identifying the more violent municipalities’ conditions. 
 
Table 4.12 Homicides and drug-trade related homicides 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Homicides Drug-trade homicides 
 FE IV FE IV 
 Primary 
ENLACE: Spanish -0.0035** -0.0470*** -0.0021** -0.0483*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0164) (0.0010) (0.0143) 
ENLACE: Math -0.0039** -0.0584*** -0.0021* -0.0601*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0186) (0.0011) (0.0159) 
Grade Repetition/100 0.0239*** 0.3612*** 0.0190*** 0.3711*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0888) (0.0053) (0.0779) 
 Secondary 
ENLACE: Spanish -0.0059** -0.1552*** -0.0005 -0.1631*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0420) (0.0015) (0.0401) 
ENLACE: Math -0.0099*** -0.1471*** -0.0017 -0.1540*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0409) (0.0019) (0.0383) 
Grade Repetition/100 0.0288*** 0.1782*** 0.0199*** 0.1883*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0477) (0.0055) (0.0446) 
     
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911), 
SIMBAD and CNS 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are 
clustered at the municipality level. 
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4.7.2 Mechanisms 
Attention now turns to the mechanisms by which crime exposure affects educational 
outcomes. It is hypothesised that exposure to violent crime affects academic performance 
and grade repetition rates partly because it leads to a reduction in contact hours. To 
examine this, data from the Encuesta Nacional de Uso del Tiempo (ENUT, National 
Time-Use Survey) is used.64 Table 4.13 explores the relationship between attending 
school, the number of contact hours, engaging in school related work at home, the number 
of hours doing schoolwork at home, and state level homicide rates.65 Column (1) shows 
that among individuals between 8 and 16 years of age, homicide rates are not associated 
with the decision to attend school. Nonetheless, it can be seen in column (2) that higher 
homicide rates are indeed related with a reduction in the number of hours spent at school. 
As a result of the decrease in contact hours, families could compensate by increasing the 
amount of school related activities performed at home. Column (3) shows that the 
homicide rate is not associated with whether or not children and adolescents perform 
schoolwork at home. However, it can be seen in column (4) that higher homicide rates 
are negatively associated with the number of hours students spend performing school 
related activities in the household. Thus, families do not compensate for the reduction in 
the number of contact hours by making their children study more outside of the school. 
On the contrary, these two mechanisms appear to reinforce one another, further 
accentuating the negative effects of crime exposure on educational outcomes.66 
                                                          
64 The ENUT is a nationally representative household survey. Its objective is to obtain information on the 
time-use of men and women 12 years of age and older. The survey includes questions regarding whether 
respondent’s go to school, the number of hours per week spent at school, whether students engage in 
schoolwork at home, and the number of hours per week students engage in schoolwork, among others. On 
the other hand, while the ENLACE dataset includes information on how many of the enrolled students did 
not take the test, neither it nor Statistics 911 include information on school assistance rates or contact hours. 
65 Unfortunately, the ENUT does not contain information on the type of school the respondent attends, 
which would allow examining the presence of heterogeneous effects depending on the type of school. 
66 Instrumental variable estimations of the effect of homicides on school attendance, contact hours and 
schoolwork were also performed. The instrument used was constructed by interacting the state’s proximity 
to the U.S. border and the proportion of cocaine seized in Colombia. The results, which are largely similar 
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Table 4.13 Homicides, school attendance, contact hours and schoolwork 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Attending school 
(Yes = 1, 0 =No) 
Hours 
at school 
Schoolwork at home 
(Yes = 1, 0 = No) 
Hours doing 
schoolwork at home  
Homicides per 10,000 inhabitants 0.0037 -0.1414* 0.0026 -0.1823*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0765) (0.0027) (0.0522) 
     
Observations 10,242 6,607 10,242 6,429 
R-squared 0.264 0.010 0.242 0.030 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENUT 2002 and 2009. Estimations based on individuals between 8 
and 16 years of age. Coefficients correspond to the total number of homicides per 10,000 inhabitants at the 
state level. All regressions include as additional controls age and gender of the respondent, number of 
persons in the household, indicators of quality of the roof, wall and floor in the household, time and size of 
locality dummies, and a constant. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the state level. 
 
High levels of violent crime in a municipality are also likely to affect the characteristics 
of the schools located within their limits. Table 4.14 explores the relationship between 
homicides, teacher and student mobility, and teachers’ education levels. It can be seen in 
column (1) that an increase in the homicide rate is negatively related with the number of 
teachers per school. Moreover, column (2) shows that a rise in homicide levels is also 
negatively associated with the number of students enrolled per school. Students may fail 
to attend school for different reasons such as a fear of violence or because they are 
involved in violent crime. Nevertheless, Márquez-Padilla et al. (2015) show that for the 
2000-2010, 2005-2010 and 2007-2010 periods the rise in homicide levels did not affect 
the enrolment rates of primary and secondary school students. Thus, it can be inferred 
that instead of dropping-out, some students transferred from primary and secondary 
schools located in municipalities with high homicide rates to schools located in other 
municipalities. These statistically significant results suggest that crime exposure affects 
both teacher and student composition. Column (3) presents the effects of the homicide 
                                                          
to those presented in Table 4.13, show that a one-unit increase in the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants 
reduces the number of hours spent at school by 0.764 and the number of hours doing schoolwork at home 
by 0.476, where the latter coefficient is significant at the 10.0% level. Moreover, homicides rates do not 
have a significant effect on the decisions to attend school or do schoolwork at home. Additionally, the effect 
of crime on the number of hours a primary or secondary school teacher works was also examined. It was 
observed that a one-unit increase in the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants is associated with a reduction 
of 0.58 in the number of hours teachers work per week. 
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rate on the student-teacher ratio, where higher incidences of violent crime are associated 
with a reduction in the number of students per teacher. This finding may be partially a 
result of the higher mobility that students have to change schools relative to teachers. 
Column (4) shows that the relationship between homicides and the percentage of teachers 
with graduate studies, interpreted here as a very broad measure of teacher quality, is not 
statistically significant.67 
 
Table 4.14. Homicides, mobility and school characteristics 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No. of teachers 
at school 
No. of students 
at school 
Student-teacher 
Ratio 
Percentage of teachers 
with graduate studies  
Homicides per 10,000 inhabitants -0.0127*** -.6410*** -0.0183* -0.0245 
 (0.0033) (0.1601) (0.0106) (0.0152) 
     
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 495,660 495,693 452,424 495,714 
R-squared 0.043 0.019 0.053 0.017 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 
2011 and 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
 
Finally, previous evidence suggests that the rise in violent crime influenced the migration 
behaviour and mental health status of different segments of the population. Rios (2014) 
observes that a one-unit increase in the drug-related homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants 
is associated with 6.34 Mexicans fleeing their municipality of residency. To minimise the 
effects of this phenomenon, Eq. (4.1) was estimated for schools where the difference in 
the total number of students in any two years during the 2006-2012 period was never 
larger than five, ten or twenty. The results obtained from these subsamples were similar 
                                                          
67 Instrumental variable estimations show that a one-unit rise in the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants 
reduces the number of teachers per school by 0.0356 and the number of students per school by 2.148, where 
these coefficients are significant at the 5.0% level. On the other hand, no significant effect is observed on 
the student-teacher ratio or on the percentage of teachers with graduate studies. 
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to those reported in Table 4.4. The findings are also robust to the elimination of schools 
located in states bordering the United States. Arceo-Gómez (2012) presents evidence on 
how the escalation of violence led some Mexicans living close to the U.S. to migrate north 
of the border. On the other hand, Michaelsen (2012) shows than the high crime rates in 
Mexico affected the depression and anxiety levels of both men and women. The fact that 
the rise in homicide rates is associated with some segments of the population being 
displaced from their municipality of residence and with an increase in PTSD levels 
implies that, besides the reduction in contact hours, these two factors are also likely to be 
explaining why being exposed to violent crimes is negatively associated with educational 
outcomes. 
 
4.8 Conclusions 
 
This study examined the effects of crime exposure on the educational outcomes of 
primary and secondary school students in Mexico. To measure crime, homicides rates at 
the municipality level were constructed. Educational outcomes were analysed based on 
the scores obtained in the ENLACE test in Spanish and Mathematics and on grade 
repetition rates. The econometric analysis was performed using fixed effects and 
instrumental variable models. The results show that a one-unit increase in the number of 
homicides per 10,000 inhabitants reduces average ENLACE scores between 0.0035 and 
0.0142 standard deviations. This effect is larger in secondary schools, grows stronger if 
the homicide occurs closer to the examination date, and is relatively stable when using 
either total homicides or drug-trade related homicides to measure crime exposure. In 
addition, the effect of crime exposure on academic performance is highly non-linear and 
concentrated in the municipalities with the highest number of total homicides. Higher 
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homicides rates are also associated with an increase in the grade failure rate. It is 
hypothesised that the negative effects of crime exposure on educational outcomes are 
partly due to a reduction in the number of contact hours, where students do not 
compensate for this by studying more outside of the school. 
 
Concerning the related literature, fixed effects estimations on the effects of crime 
exposure on educational outcomes are similar to those previously obtained. While the 
present chapter found that a one unit increase in the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants 
increases the grade repetition rate by 0.0239 and 0.0288 percentage points in primary and 
secondary schools, respectively, Caudillo and Torche (2014) obtain a 0.0270 percentage 
point increase in primary schools. With respect to the effects of violence on academic 
performance, the present chapter found a decrease in average ENLACE scores in Spanish 
of 0.2287 points and in Mathematics of 0.2727 points, while Michaelsen and Salardi 
(2013) obtain a decrease in ENLACE scores between 0.1957 and 0.2221 points. Finally, 
it was observed that a one-unit increase in the drug-trade related homicide rate per 10,000 
inhabitants decreases average ENLACE scores in Spanish by 0.1368 points and in 
Mathematics by 0.1471 points in primary schools, while no effect is observed in 
secondary schools. Márquez-Padilla et al. (2015), focusing on ENLACE scores in 
Mathematics, do not find an effect. The discrepancy in the results between studies is likely 
to be a consequence of the different time periods analysed and a product of including or 
not a series of important school and municipality level controls. Moreover, none of these 
related studies examine different subsamples of schools, perform instrumental variable 
estimations or use time-use surveys to identify the mechanisms driving the results. 
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The negative and wide-ranging effects of the “war against drugs” and the increase in 
homicide levels in Mexico from 2007 onwards have been well documented. This study 
has provided evidence on the fact that non-educational policies affect educational 
outcomes. In addition to the short-term effects observed, it can be inferred that the 
increase in violence will have medium and long-term effects since, by affecting current 
educational outcomes, early exposure to homicides is likely to impact subsequent 
educational attainment levels and thus the future income streams of the country’s youth. 
Moreover, since the effects of crime exposure are stronger in public schools and in higher 
marginalized areas, these negative consequences are potentially amplified among 
students residing in households located at the bottom-part of the income distribution. 
Given that educational attainment plays a central role in explaining differences in 
earnings and general economic well-being, this may generate higher inequality in the 
future by widening the gap in human capital attainment levels between the rich and the 
poor. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
The present thesis conducted three empirical essays related to development and labour 
economics issues about Mexico and its emigrant population residing in the United States. 
This section presents a brief summary of each essay and discusses potential avenues for 
further research. 
 
The first essay presented in Chapter 2 examined the role that occupational segregation 
plays in explaining the low wages among Mexican-Americans and their wage 
differentials with respect to black and white workers in the United States. 
 
The study showed that the occupational structure of Mexican-born immigrants differs 
substantially from that of natives. Moreover, the occupations of first, second and third 
generation Mexican-Americans are more similar to that of blacks than of whites. In terms 
of wages, significant progress is made between first and second generation immigrants. 
This is especially true for individuals who are a product of intermarriage between a 
Mexican-born and a U.S.-born individual. Nonetheless, between second and third 
generation Mexican-Americans progress appears to stall or even regress. While most of 
the wage differentials between blacks and Mexican-Americans can be explained by 
differences in observable characteristics, a large unexplained component remains relative 
to whites. It is observed that Mexican-born immigrants encounter a similar degree of 
discrimination as blacks, while second and third generation Mexican-Americans appear 
to be in a more privileged position than African-Americans. Pertaining to occupational 
segregation, Mexican-Americans are underrepresented at the top of the occupational 
structure relative to whites. This implies a “glass-ceiling”, where Mexican-Americans 
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face significant barriers into high-paying occupations. These restrictions, partly 
manifested through the between unexplained term in the BMZ and DGSX 
decompositions, account from 6.1% to 10.0% of the wage gap between different 
generations of Mexican-Americans and whites according to the BMZ methodology. 
 
The chapter’s findings suggest that it is necessary to implement policies that tend to 
equalise Mexican-American representation across occupations, as well as policies that 
encourage the undoing of moderately segregated positions within different occupations. 
Measures that guarantee that the most qualified workers gain access into high-wage 
occupations irrespective of their ethnic-origin background must continue to be 
implemented and closely monitored. Furthermore, it is vital for Mexican-born immigrants 
that they acquire the skills and training that will result in an increase in wages. 
 
While this chapter focused on wage differentials at the mean, an avenue for further 
research would be to examine the wage gap between Mexican-Americans and natives at 
different points of the wage distribution. This could be done performing quantile 
decompositions based on the methodologies proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) or 
Firpo et al. (2009), among others. Furthermore, while wage differentials between 
authorised and unauthorised Mexican-born immigrants were analysed, a dataset that 
includes information on the legal status of first generation Mexican-Americans and 
incorporates natives would not only shed information on the percentage of the wage gap 
attributed to authorised status, but would also allow for a more robust estimation of the 
role of occupational segregation in explaining wage differentials between first generation 
immigrants and natives. Nevertheless, I am unaware of any dataset that satisfies these 
conditions. 
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The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examined whether the implementation of Seguro 
Popular affected the amount of private transfers received and the likelihood of receiving 
private transfers among Mexico’s uninsured households. The effects of Seguro Popular 
were identified using the spatial variation in the program’s coverage induced by its roll-
out throughout Mexico. 
 
Based on the ENIGH, the chapter showed that among households eligible for Seguro 
Popular, the program had no effect on the amount of private transfers received. On the 
other hand, the implementation of Seguro Popular reduced on average a household’s 
probability of receiving private transfers by 5.55 percentage points, a 28.6% reduction 
with respect to the .194 probability that uninsured households had of receiving private 
transfers prior to the program’s introduction in 2000. This estimate is driven by domestic 
private transfers, since international private transfers were not affected by the program’s 
implementation at either the intensive or extensive margins. This result may arise because 
most senders located within Mexico were aware of Seguro Popular and therefore changed 
their remitting behaviour upon the program’s introduction. On the contrary, a large 
number of senders located outside of Mexico were potentially unaware of the program 
and consequently did not alter their behaviour. The chapter’s findings are similar to those 
obtained in the related international literature, where Klohn and Strupat (2013) show that 
the NHIS in Ghana affected the likelihood of making or receiving informal transfers and 
their monetary equivalents. 
 
The fact that Seguro Popular had a clear social welfare improving effect has been well 
documented, given that the program has provided millions of Mexicans access to health 
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care. Nonetheless, the fact that the program partially crowds-out private support 
highlights the importance of looking at unexpected outcomes when analysing public 
policies, since the presence of crowding-out effects has important implications for the 
effectiveness of redistributive policies. The crowding-out effect suggests that the net 
impact of Seguro Popular is smaller than when just analysing its impact on health 
expenditures or health outcomes. 
 
To better identify the magnitude in which Seguro Popular crowds-out private support, it 
would be of relevance to incorporate information on the distance between the household 
and the nearest health facility that offered the program’s services. While information on 
the household’s geographic location is recorded in the ENIGH, this is not publicly 
available, therefore making it impossible to estimate dwelling to health facility distances. 
Furthermore, the ENIGH does not include information on the locality where the 
household is situated. Instead, it only provides information on the municipality and state. 
This is problematic due to the vast sizes of municipalities, thus making it impossible to 
estimate dwelling to health facility distances.  
 
The third essay presented in Chapter 4 examined the effects of crime exposure on the 
educational outcomes of primary and secondary school students in Mexico. To measure 
crime, homicides rates at the municipality level were constructed. Educational outcomes 
were analysed based on the scores obtained in the national standardised ENLACE test 
and on grade repetition rates. The econometric analysis was performed using fixed effects 
and instrumental variable models. The results showed that a one unit increase in the 
homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants reduces average ENLACE scores between 0.0035 
and 0.0142 standard deviations. Higher homicides rates are also associated with an 
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increase in the grade failure rate. In comparison, Cabrera-Hernandez (2015) shows that 
the Full-Time School Program, which extended the school day from four or five hours to 
between six and eight hours per day, increased average ENLACE scores by up to 0.1100 
standard deviations.  
 
It is hypothesised that the negative effect of crime exposure on educational outcomes is 
partly due to a reduction in the number of contact hours, where students do not 
compensate for this by studying more outside of the school. Moreover, it was observed 
that homicides affect school composition by reducing the average number of students and 
teachers per school. Finally, based on the work of Michaelsen (2012) who finds that the 
rise in violent crimes in Mexico increased depression and anxiety levels, it can be inferred 
that the higher levels of PTSD among the country’s men and women was one of the 
channels by which crime exposure negatively affects educational outcomes. 
 
In addition to the short-term effects, it is expected that the increase in violence will have 
medium and long-term effects since, by affecting contemporary educational outcomes, 
early exposure to homicides is likely to impact subsequent educational attainment levels 
and thus the future income streams of current primary and secondary school students. As 
more data becomes available, it will be important to analyse the medium and long-term 
consequences of the rise in violent crime and the “war against drugs” on the country’s 
present day youth. 
 
A natural extension to the chapter includes performing the analysis at the student level 
and incorporating data from 2008. While this information exists and has been requested 
on multiple occasions to the Ministry of Education, it has not yet been provided.  
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Including student level information would allow examining potential heterogeneous 
effects by gender and would provide further information on the effects of the rise in 
homicides on test scores at different points of the distribution. Incorporating data from 
2008 would not only increase the sample size but would also permit analysing if test 
scores in Natural Sciences, for which an exam was applied in both 2008 and 2012, were 
also affected. 
 
As a further robustness check, it may be of relevance to examine the impact of crime 
exposure on academic performance based on the results obtained in the PISA test or the 
Plan Nacional para las Evaluaciones de los Aprendizajes (PLANEA, National Plan for 
the Assessment of Learning) test. Nevertheless, the PISA and PLANEA tests have the 
disadvantage of either not providing nationally representative data or only being applied 
in a limited number of years, among others. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A.2 
 
A.2.1 Long-Run Wage Differentials and Intergenerational Progress over Time 
Chapter 2 examined wage differentials between natives and Mexican-Americans by 
mainly using pooled CPS data from 1994 to 2012. Nonetheless, there may be important 
underlying changes in the economy and in the composition of the different groups that 
occurred during this time period which until now have not been accounted for. 
 
To study this issue, the sample was divided into three different time periods, i.e. 1994-
1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2012. It was observed that between 1994 and 2012, there were 
important changes in the U.S. economy’s occupational structure, where workers in 
general shifted into less labour intensive and better remunerated positions. Given that 
these changes were relatively homogenous among natives and Mexican-Americans, the 
wage differentials between the different groups only encountered modest variations 
during these three time periods. As a result, the findings are in line with those presented 
in Section 2.5. 
 
While the wage gap between natives and Mexican-Americans remained relatively stable 
between 1994 and 2012, I now focus on a longer time frame to analyse if this was also 
the case in the long-run. This is done using data from the 1940 and 1970 U.S. censuses 
and the 1998-2002 CPS. Specifically, for 1940 a 1.0% random sample of the U.S. 
population is used; while for 1970 a 2.0% random sample is employed. Given that these 
two data sources contain more limited information than the CPS, a broader definition of 
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the earnings variable is required compared to the one that has been previously used. 
Therefore, this subsection focuses on monthly wages, where the same construction of the 
wage variable is employed for 1940, 1970 and 2000. 
 
A long-run analysis of wage differentials has the advantage of allowing for a different 
measure of intergenerational progress among Mexican-Americans. By employing data 
from different periods, it is possible to compare the outcomes of immigrants in the past 
with the current performance of their descendants. To analyse intergenerational progress 
over time, FG immigrants are matched with their U.S.-born offspring, i.e. the SG 
population, that entered the labour market 30 years later, and their grandchildren, i.e. TG 
workers, who did so a few decades afterwards. This is done for FG immigrants who were 
employed in 1940, 1970 and 2000, and their descendants that were working in the years 
1970 and 2000. 
 
An additional advantage of using data from different time periods is that relying solely 
on a cross-sectional comparison may generate misleading results when analysing 
intergenerational progress if there are differences in skill compositions across 
generations. As argued by Borjas (1993), if previous cohorts of FG workers had higher 
skills than those of current immigrants, given that these are partly-transmitted to their 
offspring, this would be reflected in a better labour market performance of current SG 
workers, thus overstating the progress between generations relative to current FG 
immigrants. This result would be further accentuated if only the most successful FG 
workers were the ones who permanently settled in the United States. Additionally, the 
sample of FG workers analysed also includes immigrants who just recently arrived in the 
U.S. and who do not have any descendants currently in the labour market; while the SG 
182 
 
 
 
and TG workers studied are the offspring of immigrants who arrived in the country at 
least 20 and 40 years earlier, respectively. Nonetheless, relying on information from 
different points in time also has it disadvantages. The cross-section approach from a 
single period has the benefit of holding constant the socioeconomic environment, whereas 
comparing different periods can give misleading results when there are substantial 
differences between points in time (Trejo, 2003, p. 476). 
 
The OB decomposition of long-run wage differentials is presented in Table A.2.1. It can 
be seen that the wage gap between Mexican-Americans and natives, especially blacks, 
changed considerably during the last 60 years of the 20th century. In 1940, the wages of 
Mexican-born immigrants were .349 log points higher than those of blacks. The negative 
sign of the explained and unexplained components signal that FG immigrants had higher 
levels of human capital and were better compensated for their productivity related 
characteristics than blacks. By 1970, the average wages of FG immigrants were .050 log 
points higher than those of blacks. Moreover, the positive sign of the endowment effect 
implies that from 1940 to 1970 blacks made significant progress in terms of their average 
characteristics relative to FG immigrants. With respect to SG and TG workers, the wage 
disadvantage of blacks was larger in 1940 and 1970 as it stood at .196 and .116 log points, 
respectively. By the year 2000 a significantly different picture had emerged, where the 
wages of all three generations of Mexican-Americans were lower than those of blacks. It 
is likely that this result is largely driven by the civil rights movements that started in the 
1960s, which substantially affected the wages of black workers. Thus, while African-
American workers made substantial gains relative to whites, they also improved relative 
to Mexican-Americans. On the other hand, wage differentials between whites and 
Mexican-Americans remained much more stable between 1940 and 2000, where they 
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were never lower than .204 log points. Concerning FG immigrants, between 1940 and 
1970 the wage gap with respect to whites decreased from .440 to .350 log points. 
Nonetheless, between 1970 and 2000 this increased from .350 to .613 log points. A 
similar story is observed with respect to SG and TG workers, where their wage gap with 
respect to whites increased by more than .100 log points between 1970 and 2000. In 
general, the results are similar to those observed from 1994 to 2012, where Mexican-
Americans appear to make substantial progress between the first and the second 
generation, but not between the second and the third generation. 
 
Table A.2.1 OB decomposition: 
Natives and Mexican-Americans, 1940, 1970 and 2000 
 FG 1940 
SG 
1970 
TG 
2000 
FG 
1970 
SG 
2000 
FG 
2000 
 Relative to Blacks 
Total differential -.349*** -.196*** .035** -.050*** .137*** .329*** 
 (.024) (.008) (.014) (.010) (.017) (.009) 
       
Explained -.060** -.030*** .073*** .062*** .159*** .413*** 
 (.025) (.006) (.012) (.007) (.015) (.018) 
       
Unexplained -.289*** -.165*** -.038** -.113*** -.021 -.084*** 
 (.027) (.008) (.015) (.010) (.018) (.019) 
       
Observations 
(% Black) 
13,190 
(94.6%) 
55,729 
(91.1%) 
11,300 
(72.5%) 
54,024 
(93.9%) 
9,986 
(82.1%) 
16,946 
(48.4%) 
 Relative to Whites 
Total differential .440*** .204*** .470*** .350*** .421*** .613*** 
 (.023) (.007) (.078) (.009) (.015) (.006) 
       
Explained .429*** .134*** .251*** .257*** .345*** .568*** 
 (.017) (.004) (.048) (.005) (.011) (.007) 
       
Unexplained .011 .069*** .219*** .092*** .076*** .045*** 
 (.020) (.006) (.059) (.009) (.013) (.008) 
       
Observations 
(% White) 
113,986 
(99.3%) 
409,305 
(98.7%) 
83,878 
(98.9%) 
407,600 
(99.2%) 
85,573 
(97.9%) 
92,533 
(90.5%) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the 1940 U.S. Census, 1970 U.S. Census and the 1998-2002 CPS March 
Supplement. Wages are in monthly figures. Standard errors are in parentheses. Decomposition based on OLS 
regressions which include as independent variables years of education, potential experience, potential experience 
squared and dummy variables for occupations, metropolitan status, state of residence and marriage. 
 
Shifting our attention to the BMZ decomposition results, it can be seen in Table A.2.2 
that in general occupational segregation has not played an important role in the observed 
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wage gap between blacks and Mexican-Americans. It is only for the case of FG 
immigrants in the year 2000 that occupational segregation has a positive contribution to 
the wage gap, as it rises to 3.9% of the wage differential with respect to blacks. In other 
instances, this term is negative and actually favours Mexican-Americans, implying that it 
is blacks who encounter more barriers into occupations. On the other hand, the fact that 
in 1940 Mexican-born immigrants had higher wages than blacks is primarily a product of 
the formers' higher returns to observable characteristics as captured by the WU term. By 
the year 2000, the lower wages of FG immigrants were mainly a result of differences in 
the WE and BE components. With respect to SG and TG workers, in 1970 the magnitude 
of the BE component suggests that U.S.-born Mexican-Americans were employed in 
similar occupations as blacks. During this period, the higher wages of second and third 
generation workers were mostly a result of their higher compensations within 
occupations. Moreover, while the BE component still favoured SG and TG workers in 
2000, their lower wages with respect to blacks were mostly a product of the WE term. 
Pertaining to whites a different picture is observed, where the BU component has always 
had a positive contribution to the total wage gap between whites and Mexican-Americans. 
The same is true for the three other components of the BMZ decomposition, suggesting 
that from 1940 to 2000 the lower wages of Mexican-Americans were a product of their 
poorer endowment of productivity related characteristics, lower compensation within 
occupations and their employment in lower remunerated positions. 
 
Finally, Table A.2.3 presents the DGSX decomposition results. It is observed that due to 
the indirect allocation effect, the BU component in the wage decomposition between 
blacks and Mexican-born workers in 1940 is now positive. Concerning the factors driving 
the wage gap between blacks and second and third generation workers, the results do not 
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change much with respect to those observed in the BMZ decomposition. With respect to 
whites, some subtle differences arise. Among these, in 1970 the BU term with respect to 
FG immigrants is not statistically significant from zero, whereas for SG and TG 
immigrants this component is now negative. 
 
Table A.2.2 BMZ decomposition: 
Natives and Mexican-Americans, 1940, 1970 and 2000 
 FG 1940 
SG 
1970 
TG 
2000 
FG 
1970 
SG 
2000 
FG 
2000 
 Relative to Blacks 
Total differential -.349*** -.196*** .036*** -.050*** .138*** .329*** 
 (.020) (.005) (.013) (.006) (.014) (.027) 
Explained       
       
Within -.065*** -.001 .089*** .039*** .163*** .241*** 
 (.020) (.004) (.013) (.006) (.014) (.026) 
Between .032*** .013*** .015*** .035*** .034*** .119*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.005) 
Unexplained       
       
Within -.259*** -.168*** -.041** -.102*** -.023 -.044* 
 (.027) (.008) (.017) (.010) (.020) (.027) 
Between -.057*** -.039*** -.027*** -.023*** -.035*** .013*** 
 (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
 Relative to Whites 
Total differential .444*** .208*** .331*** .354*** .433*** .625*** 
 (.008) (.002) (.004) (.003) (.005) (.010) 
Explained       
       
Within .130*** .027*** .092*** .096*** .196*** .156*** 
 (.007) (.002) (.004) (.003) (.005) (.010) 
Between .183*** .064*** .076*** .095*** .107*** .198*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
Unexplained       
       
Within -.001 .084*** .101*** .123*** .086*** .133*** 
 (.019) (.006) (.010) (.009) (.013) (.011) 
Between .131*** .031*** .061*** .038*** .043*** .136*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the 1940 U.S. Census, 1970 U.S. Census and the 1998-2002 CPS March 
Supplement. Wages are in monthly figures. Standard errors are in parentheses. Decomposition based on three 
occupation specific OLS regressions which include as independent variables years of education, potential experience, 
potential experience squared and dummy variables for occupations, metropolitan status, state of residence and marriage. 
 
The results presented in this subsection show that the disadvantaged encountered by 
Mexican-Americans dates back to at least 1940. Unlike the descendants of European 
immigrants that arrived in the U.S. in the latter part of the 19th century and early 20th 
century whose wages subsequently converged to those of U.S.-born whites, Mexican-
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Americans have not assimilated in their entirety into the United States. Instead, they 
continue to face many of the same disadvantages encountered by their ancestors who 
participated in the labour market many decades before them. 
 
Table A.2.3 DGSX decomposition: 
Natives and Mexican-Americans, 1940, 1970 and 2000 
 FG 1940 
SG 
1970 
TG 
2000 
FG 
1970 
SG 
2000 
FG 
2000 
 Relative to Blacks 
Total differential -.349*** -.196*** .036 -.050** .138*** .329*** 
 (.050) (.017) (.035) (.020) (.038) (.051) 
Explained       
       
Within -.226*** .041*** .111*** .076*** .152*** .278*** 
 (.023) (.005) (.017) (.007) (.017) (.035) 
Between .032*** .013*** .015*** .035*** .034*** .119*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.005) 
Unexplained       
       
Within -.227*** -.158*** -.048** -.118*** -.034 -.078* 
 (.033) (.011) (.024) (.013) (.025) (.036) 
Between .071*** -.092*** -.041** -.044*** -.014 .010 
 (.028) (.011) (.019) (.013) (.022) (.007) 
 Relative to Whites 
Total differential .444*** .208*** .331*** .354*** .433** .625*** 
 (.027) (.026) (.029) (.030) (.033) (.025) 
Explained       
       
Within .148*** .189*** .185*** .270*** .259*** .348*** 
 (.008) (.003) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.015) 
Between .183*** .064*** .076*** .095*** .107*** .198*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
Unexplained       
       
Within -.040** .030** .062*** .007 .039** -.002 
 (.020) (.014) (.018) (.017) (.020) (.017) 
Between .152*** -.077*** .007 -.019 .026 .080*** 
 (.016) (.021) (.022) (.024) (.026) (.010) 
***p<.1, **p<.05, *p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the 1940 U.S. Census, 1970 U.S. Census and the 1998-2002 CPS March 
Supplement. Wages are in monthly figures. Standard errors are in parentheses. Decomposition based on three 
occupation specific OLS regressions which include as independent variables years of education, potential experience, 
potential experience squared and dummy variables for occupations, metropolitan status, state of residence and marriage. 
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Table A.2.4 Log wage regressions by occupation with MNL selection 
Coefficients Mexican Americans Natives 
 FG SG-II SG-I TG Blacks Whites 
 Managerial and Professional Specialty 
Intercept 5.564*** 3.527 -.165 1.042 1.081*** .969*** 
 (1.354) (1.407) (.967) (.702) (.305) (.058) 
Education -.089* .039 .141 .068** .078*** .073*** 
 (.051) (.065) (.048) (.033) (.014) (.002) 
Experience -.003 .022** .029** .047** .029*** .046*** 
 (.010) (.010) (.007) (.004) (.002) (.001) 
Experience2/100 .004 -.036* -.036** -.085*** -.045*** -.081*** 
 (.020) (.021) (.018) (.010) (.006) (.001) 
Married .060 .169*** .099** .110*** .129*** .173*** 
 (.051) (.042) (.046) (.022) (.012) (.003) 
State unemployment rate -.003 -.013 .013 -.002 -.007** .001* 
 (.011) (.009) (.010) (.006) (.003) (.000) 
In metropolitan area .087 .225*** .149** .139*** .172*** .240*** 
 (.083) (.083) (.060) (.037) (.025) (.004) 
Lambda -.960*** -.509** .308 -.047 -.039 -.006 
 (.304) (.256) (.191) (.125) (.057) (.012) 
       
R-squared .200 .293 .225 .242 .202 .233 
Observations 894 777 221 2,542 7,847 117,373 
 Technical, Sales and Administrative Support 
Intercept -1.849 .893** .363 .491* .967*** .465*** 
 (.150) (.454) (.384) (.273) (.147) (.035) 
Education .125*** .094*** .110*** .099*** .089*** .098*** 
 (.033) (.014) (.013) (.008) (.004) (.001) 
Experience .032*** .047*** .051*** .040*** .035*** .047*** 
 (.007) (.006) (.006) (.003) (.002) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.027** -.081*** -.090*** -.073*** -.054*** -.088*** 
 (.011) (.015) (.015) (.009) (.005) (.001) 
Married .097*** .178*** .189*** .214*** .163*** .209*** 
 (.033) (.033) (.041) (.021) (.012) (.004) 
State unemployment rate .016* -.014** -.004 -.009* -.001 -.001 
 (.008) (.006) (.008) (.005) (.003) (.001) 
In metropolitan area .149* .107 .047 .140*** .041 .174*** 
 (.068) (.078) (.051) (.040) (.029) (.005) 
Lambda .995* -.050 .050 .024 -.141** .066*** 
 (.471) (.176) (.162) (.118) (.067) (.018) 
       
R-squared .155 .294 .363 .274 .221 .276 
Observations 1,401 1,264 768 3,079 8,238 77,093 
 Precision Production, Craft and Repair 
Intercept 1.297*** 1.044 .730* 1.010*** 1.102 1.130*** 
 (.179) (.167) (.409) (.108) (.103) (.019) 
Education .026*** .061*** .092*** .065*** .085*** .086*** 
 (.002) (.011) (.019) (.008) (.007) (.002) 
Experience .026*** .038*** .030*** .036*** .024*** .032*** 
 (.002) (.005) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.034*** -.070*** -.044*** -.056*** -.032*** -.050*** 
 (.005) (.014) (.016) (.007) (.006) (.001) 
Married .109*** .181*** .136*** .154*** .133*** .160*** 
 (.016) (.033) (.052) (.021) (.014) (.003) 
State unemployment rate -.006 .017** -.003 .002 -.003 .003*** 
 (.004) (.007) (.010) (.005) (.003) (.001) 
In metropolitan area .037* .006 -.010 .049** .144*** .100 
 (.020) (.046) (.050) (.022) (.019) (.003) 
Lambda .219 .155 -.095 .057 -.101 -.156*** 
 (.137) (.186) (.231) (.102) (.088) (.018) 
       
R-squared .093 .206 .248 .210 .162 .196 
Observations 6,740 1,128 719 3,380 5,833 73,432 
 Service 
Intercept .808*** -.572 .123 -.067 .296*** .457 
 (.248) (.566) (.396) (.189) (.089) (.041) 
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Education .028*** .081*** .100*** .092*** .100 .098*** 
 (.001) (.009) (.013) (.006) (.008) (.002) 
Experience .009*** .046*** .026*** .037*** .030*** .045*** 
 (.002) (.007) (.009) (.004) (.002) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.002 -.081*** -.039* -.072*** -.049*** -.086*** 
 (.005) (.018) (.021) (.010) (.005) (.002) 
Married .037* .193*** .247*** .212*** .121*** .252*** 
 (.020) (.044) (.064) (.026) (.018) (.007) 
State unemployment rate .011** -.012 -.009 .006 -.002 -.000 
 (.004) (.010) (.012) (.006) (.003) (.001) 
In metropolitan area .118** -.051 -.090 .165*** .118*** .129*** 
 (.057) (.068) (.070) (.027) (.022) (.006) 
Lambda .370*** .480** .180 .352*** .149 -.020 
 (.141) (.212) (.210) (.101) (.092) (.031) 
       
R-squared .085 .318 .353 .340 .199 .301 
Observations 4,559 675 450 1,860 7,145 29,975 
 Operators, Fabricators and Labourers 
Intercept 1.727*** .860*** 1.158*** 1.072*** 1.258*** 1.115*** 
 (.108) (.127) (.204) (.083) (.066) (.032) 
Education .208*** .074*** .048* .033*** .046*** .077** 
 (.001) (.011) (.038) (.010) (.008) (.044) 
Experience .020*** .036*** .040*** .033*** .025*** .034*** 
 (.002) (.004) (.006) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.023*** -.054*** -.066*** -.051*** -.033*** -.058*** 
 (.003) (.011) (.016) (.006) (.004) (.001) 
Married .117*** .184*** .167*** .147*** .161*** .188*** 
 (.011) (.028) (.039) (.018) (.009) (.004) 
State unemployment rate -.002 .002 -.008 -.005 -.008*** -.000 
 (.002) (.006) (.009) (.004) (.002) (.001) 
In metropolitan area .004 .014 .085** .042** .096*** .108*** 
 (.015) (.041) (.039) (.021) (.016) (.005) 
Lambda -.231** -.050 .248 .086 .086 -.166*** 
 (.100) (.130) (.222) (.060) (.060) (.023) 
       
R-squared .091 .246 .258 .205 .138 .172 
Observations 8,792 1,464 885 3,549 12,016 65,543 
 Other 
Intercept 1.094*** .980*** .660** .585** .291** .037 
 (.280) (.277) (.258) (.289) (.129) (.052) 
Education -.002 .030 .080*** .034 .048*** .087*** 
 (.025) (.027) (.029) (.022) (.009) (.002) 
Experience .010 .028** .002 .015** .023*** .031*** 
 (.090) (.010) (.012) (.008) (.004) (.001) 
Experience2/100 -.011 -.042* .019 -.026 -.062*** -.069*** 
 (.012) (.022) (.028) (.016) (.010) (.004) 
Married .077*** .138* .150 .300*** .375*** .242*** 
 (.021) (.080) (.113) (.088) (.052) (.014) 
State unemployment rate -.011*** -.045** -.010 -.023** -.035*** -.005** 
 (.004) (.020) (.021) (.009) (.006) (.002) 
In metropolitan area -.093 .131 -.070 .070 .099*** .124*** 
 (.188) (.090) (.090) (.074) (.036) (.010) 
Lambda .400 .203 .317 .400 .460*** .291*** 
 (.081) (.314) (.277) (.297) (.093) (.034) 
       
R-squared .081 .210 .385 .295 .289 .333 
Observations 3,494 282 149 687 1,597 12,771 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the CPS March Supplement 1994-2012. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Additional controls incorporated in the regressions include a time trend and dummy variables for state, and census 
division. 
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Table A.3.1 Determinants of SP coverage by State. All controls 
Variable 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Log state population -.106 -.158* -.174** -.163** -.115** -.082** 
 (.067) (.075) (.074) (.055) (.045) (.030) 
Share of insured population .631 .557 .715 .417 .047 .113 
 (.770) (.867) (.817) (.617) (.505) (.303) 
Share of urban population -.604 -.544 -.465 -.166 .064 -.132 
 (.693) (.845) (.776) (.634) (.413) (.315) 
Log median wage -.668*** -.669 -.269 -.249 -.141 .002 
 (.297) (.416) (.389) (.280) (.234) (.198) 
Years of schooling -.002 -.040 -.170 -.068 -.035 -.023 
 (.128) (.162) (.149) (.119) (.115) (.087) 
Unemployment rate 1.49 36.8 49.1 38.4 32.9 19.4 
 (28.3) (33.6) (30.9) (26.4) (21.0) (15.2) 
PRI Governor -.123 -.213* -.204* -.134 -.073 -.059 
 (.088) (.110) (.109) (.083) (.082) (.051) 
PRD Governor -.057 -.231 -.139 -.121 -.115 -.090 
 (.109) (.159) (.141) (.118) (.089) (.068) 
Share of population under age 24 5.83 4.34 3.24 2.63 2.33 2.94** 
 (3.78) (4.04) (3.74) (2.94) (1.94) (1.31) 
Share of population between ages 24 and 40 11.8 9.31 5.17 1.54 2.43 3.42 
 (8.09) (7.95) (8.33) (6.06) (4.33) (2.38) 
Share of male population -12.7 -8.41 -5.13 .270 .942 -2.60 
 (10.4) (9.98) (10.4) (7.65) (6.25) (3.80) 
Avg. number of international migrants per HH -3.65 -3.01 -2.12 -.987 -.314 -.731 
 (2.89) (3.20) (3.06) (2.42) (1.75) (1.09) 
Log median international private transfers -.330 -.366 -.301 -.004 -.139 .128 
 (.274) (.292) (.303) (.193) (.198) (.148) 
Log median domestic private transfers -.030 .059 .031 -.006 -.006 -.198 
 (.268) (.278) (.271) (.218) (.191) (.099) 
Share of pop. that receives int. private transfers 23.6 15.0 2.56 .625 -1.90 1.71 
 (20.0) (20.7) (21.5) (16.2) (11.5) (6.21) 
Share of pop. that receives dom. private transfers 19.9 15.5 19.5 10.1 4.59 1.13 
 (13.9) (13.9) (14.0) (10.2) (7.89) (6.21) 
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Table presents regressions where the dependent variable is the proportion of eligible individuals 
covered by Seguro Popular at the state level in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. Explanatory 
variables are drawn from the 2000 Census. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.3.2 Determinants of SP coverage by State. Controls of interest 
Variable 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Avg. number of international migrants per HH -.169 .059 .257 -.251 -.114 .398 
 (1.99) (2.03) (1.97) (1.45) (1.16) (.816) 
Log median international private transfers -.233 -.365 -.445* -.167 -.225 .094 
 (.181) (.216) (.253) (.275) (.219) (.153) 
Log median domestic private transfers .083 .062 .079 -.015 -.118 -.101 
 (.089) (.111) (.113) (.096) (.082) (.062) 
Share of pop. that receives int. private transfers .516 -2.33 -5.08 .113 -1.43 -2.34 
 (12.0) (11.7) (11.3) (8.86) (7.35) (4.58) 
Share of pop. that receives dom. private transfers 4.74 .628 1.25 -3.29 -5.22 -7.29 
 (5.05) (7.96) (8.11) (8.34) (5.99) (5.29) 
F-test .996 .998 1.22 .126 1.11 1.93 
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Table presents regressions where the dependent variable is the proportion of eligible individuals 
covered by Seguro Popular at the state level in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. Explanatory 
variables are drawn from the 2000 Census. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.3.3 OLS: SP coverage and total health expenditures 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SP coverage at the state level -116.6*** -105.5** -108.8** -99.91* -92.03* 
 (16.31) (49.47) (51.25) (49.13) (49.43) 
HH head age    5.107*** 5.116*** 
    (.6400) (.5780) 
HH head years of schooling    23.52*** 23.46*** 
    (3.633) (3.381) 
HH head male    28.50*** 30.76*** 
    (10.32) (10.81) 
HH enrolled in Prospera    -58.78*** -50.33*** 
    (8.528) (8.693) 
HH members under age 12    17.74*** 18.33*** 
    (2.993) (2.921) 
HH members age 65 and older    61.79*** 63.08*** 
    (21.95) (22.21) 
Good quality walls in the HH    7.329 5.388 
    (9.164) (9.971) 
Good quality roofs in the HH    52.31*** 52.96*** 
    (8.378) (8.486) 
Good quality floors in the HH    38.83*** 19.35 
    (12.55) (11.43) 
Rural locality    14.16 -9.466 
    (8.581) (18.96) 
      
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No 
State level controls No No No Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects No No Yes No Yes 
Municipality level controls No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 62,882 62,882 62,882 62,882 62,882 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. HH denotes households. State level controls include 
the state population size and binary variables that indicate the political affiliation of the Governor. 
Municipality level controls include government revenue, number of housing credits granted and number of 
workers affiliated to IMSS. Monetary figures are in real 2006 pesos. Standard errors are clustered at the 
state level. 
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Table A.3.4 SP coverage and total private transfers. Marginal effects 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Tobit: Amount of private transfers received 
Logit: Probability of 
Receiving private transfers 
SP coverage at the state level -206.4** 168.0* -.0669* -.0654* 
 (102.2) (87.35) (.0343) (.0342) 
HH head age  2.111***  .0013*** 
  (.7987)  (.0003) 
HH head years of schooling  9.817***  -.0010* 
  (1.973)  (.0005) 
HH head male  -1100.8***  -.3280*** 
  (61.87)  (.0083) 
HH enrolled in Prospera  -22.96*  -.0099** 
  (12.63)  (.0048) 
HH members under age 12  -13.07**  -.0035 
  (5.812)  (.0022) 
HH members age 65 and older  84.34***  .0391*** 
  (15.09)  (.0059) 
Good quality walls in the HH  45.51  .0152 
  (29.37)  (.0123) 
Good quality roofs in the HH  77.97***  .0190*** 
  (12.97)  (.0053) 
Good quality floors in the HH  89.17***  .0341*** 
  (14.23)  (.0061) 
Rural locality  150.31***  .0538*** 
  (23.73)  (.0079) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls No Yes No Yes 
Municipality fixed effects No No No No 
Municipality level controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 54,854 54,854 54,854 54,854 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. For the tobit, figures reported denote the unconditional 
marginal effects. HH denotes households. State level controls include the state population size and binary 
variables that indicate the political affiliation of the Governor. Municipality level controls include 
government revenue, number of housing credits granted and number of workers affiliated to IMSS. 
Monetary figures are in real 2006 pesos. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Table A.3.5 SP coverage and private transfers. Different effects by year 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS: Amount of private transfers received 
LPM: Probability of 
receiving private transfers 
SP * 2004 -54.11 38.44 -.0728 -.0691 
 (176.7) (161.1) (.0467) (.0429) 
SP * 2005 -49.06 43.41 -.0736** -.0592** 
 (91.21) (94.86) (.0315) (.0289) 
SP * 2006 -103.6 15.05 -.0530 -.0383 
 (140.3) (144.2) (.0405) (.0385) 
SP * 2008 -212.9 -240.5 -.0452 -.0825 
 (215.0) (210.6) (.0591) (.0532) 
SP * 2010 -254.8 -264.5* -.0240 -.0350 
 (153.7) (151.4) (.0505) (.0412) 
SP * 2012 159.8 75.19 .0008 .0292 
 (178.0) (178.7) (.2000) (.2060) 
     
HH level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,854 54,854 54,854 54,854 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENIGH. Figures presented represent coefficient estimates for SP 
coverage at the state level. HH level controls include the variables presented in Table 3.2. State level 
controls include the state population size and binary variables that indicate the political affiliation of the 
Governor. Municipality level controls include government revenue, number of housing credits granted and 
number of workers affiliated to IMSS. Monetary figures are in real 2006 pesos. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state level. 
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Appendix A.4 
Table A.4.1 Summary of the literature on violence and educational outcomes in Mexico 
Paper Summary Period Observations Data Methodology Results Other 
Caudillo and 
Torche (2014) 
(earlier draft 
presented at 
the 2013 
meeting of the 
Population 
Association 
of America, 
April 11-13) 
Examines the effects 
of homicides at the 
municipality level on 
grade failure in 
primary schools 
(grades first to sixth) 
1990 to 2010 84,404 primary 
schools per year 
Statistics 911 (for construction of grade 
failure rates and school level controls); 
SIMBAD (for homicide information at 
the municipality level); Census 1990, 
2000 and 2010 and Population Count 
1995 and 2005 (for population values at 
the municipality level) 
Fixed effects; 
First differences; 
Group-specific 
intercepts and 
slopes 
Increase in 1 
homicide per 1,000 
population in the 
municipality where a 
school is located 
results in an increase 
between .003 and 
.009 in the 
elementary school 
failure rate 
Examines lagged effects 
of homicides and 
different effects by grade 
(both available in the 
Online Appendix) 
Michaelsen 
and Salardi 
(2013) 
Examines the effects 
of homicides at the 
municipality/locality 
level on academic 
performance in 
primary schools 
(grades third to sixth) 
2007 to 2011 28,632 primary 
public schools 
per year 
ENLACE administrative dataset and 
SEP (for construction of academic 
performance variable, number of 
teachers and students by grade variables 
and exam attendance variable); SALUD 
(for homicide information at the 
municipality/locality level); Census 
2010 (for population values at the 
municipality/locality level); SIMBAD 
(cited as INEGI, for municipality level 
controls) 
 
Fixed effects Increase by one 
homicide per 1,000 
inhabitants decreases 
the average 
ENLACE score 
between 1.957 and 
2.221 points. 
Examines the differential 
effects of homicides 
depending on their 
occurrence with respect 
to the examination period 
and the geographical 
distance to the school. 
Examines the effect of 
violence on the 
attendance rate on the 
day of the ENLACE test 
(also used as a proxy for 
migration) 
Márquez-
Padilla, 
Pérez-Arce 
and 
Rodríguez-
Castelán 
(2015) 
Examines the effects 
of homicides and drug 
related homicides on 
enrolment, migration, 
employment and 
academic 
performance in 
primary and 
2000 to 
2010; 2006-
2010 
(enrolment 
rates); 2009 
to 2011 
(academic 
performance) 
78,830 primary 
schools per year 
and 25,984 
secondary 
schools per year 
SEP (for construction of total school 
enrolment variable); SIMBAD (for 
homicide information at the 
municipality level and municipal and 
state level controls); CNS (for drug 
homicide information at the 
municipality level); Statistics 911 
(unclear); Census 2000 and 2010 and 
Fixed effects Increase of 8 
homicides per 
100,000 individuals 
is associated with no 
decrease in the 
number of enrolled 
students in basic 
education and a 0.3% 
Examines differential 
impacts of violence on 
enrolment by age group; 
on enrolment rates, 
migration and 
employment by age 
group and gender; and on 
the number of teachers 
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secondary schools 
(grades first to twelve) 
 
 
Population Count 2005 (for 
construction of enrolment rate variable, 
migration variable and municipality 
level controls and characteristics); 
ENOE (for construction of enrolment 
rate variable; ENLACE administrative 
dataset (for construction of academic 
performance variable) 
decrease in the 
number of enrolled 
students in secondary 
school (grades 10 to 
12). Effect explained 
by migration and not 
by changes in 
enrolment. No effect 
on test scores 
and schools by 
municipality 
Orraca (2015) Examines the effect of 
homicides and drug 
related homicides on 
academic 
performance and 
grade failure in 
primary schools 
(grades third to sixth) 
and secondary schools 
(grades seventh to 
ninth). Explores the 
effects of homicides 
on time-use (i.e. time 
spent at school and 
time spent performing 
school-related 
activities in the 
household) 
2006 to 2012 59,673 primary 
schools per year 
and 22,932 
secondary 
schools per year 
x ENLACE administrative dataset (for 
construction of academic performance 
variable); Statistics 911 (for 
construction of grade failure rates and 
school level controls); SIMBAD (for 
homicide information at the 
municipality level and municipality and 
state level controls); Census 2010 and 
Population Count 2005 (for population 
values at the municipality level); CNS 
(for drug homicide information at the 
municipality level); UNODC (for drug 
seizure information in Colombia); Site 
of Christopher Woodruff (for 
municipality’s distance to U.S. border); 
ENUT (for construction of time-use 
variables); SEP (for PES, PEC, PETC 
school level controls); CNPPIS 
administrative dataset (for Prospera 
coverage variable at the municipality 
level); CNPSS administrative dataset 
(for Seguro Popular coverage variable 
at the municipality level); ENVIPE (for 
public safety perception descriptives) 
Fixed Effects; IV; 
OLS 
x Increase of one unit 
in the number of 
homicides per 
10,000 inhabitants 
reduces test scores 
between 0.0035 and 
0.0142 standard 
deviations. Higher 
homicides rates also 
associated with an 
increase in the grade 
failure rate. Negative 
effect of crime on the 
number of contact 
hours, where 
students do not 
compensate for this 
by studying more 
outside of the school 
Examines heterogeneous 
effects by subject (i.e. 
Spanish or Math);  by 
municipality’s/school 
type or characteristics 
(i.e. marginality level; 
locality size; session; 
school type); time period 
(i.e. lagged homicide 
rate); date of homicide 
with respect to the 
examination period; 
explores spillover 
effects; analyses the 
effects of homicides on 
the distribution of scores; 
and explores effects of 
violence on the number 
of teachers per school, 
the number of students 
per school, the student 
teacher ratio and the 
“quality” of teachers 
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Table A.4.2 Descriptive statistics. Different percentiles of the distribution 
Variable 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 10th percentile 
ENLACE test scores: Spanish 412.0 410.8 426.6 427.9 428.3 431.8 
ENLACE test scores: Mathematics 419.0 417.0 424.9 431.2 438.5 456.0 
Grade failure rate (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Teachers per 100 students 1.51 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 
Homicides per 10,000 pop. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Drug homicides per 10,000 pop. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 50th percentile 
ENLACE test scores: Spanish 483.5 486.8 497.9 501.4 508.5 514.3 
ENLACE test scores: Mathematics 486.0 492.0 502.1 510.5 522.2 545.8 
Grade failure rate (%) 1.72 1.53 1.20 0.93 0.72 0.53 
Teachers per 100 students 3.57 3.59 3.62 3.66 3.68 3.68 
Homicides per 10,000 pop. 0.61 0.52 0.91 0.83 1.05 1.16 
Drug homicides per 10,000 pop. 0.0 0.0 0.16 0.27 0.46 0.42 
 90th percentile 
ENLACE test scores: Spanish 562.0 571.0 579.3 592.0 606.1 619.5 
ENLACE test scores: Mathematics 566.0 576.5 587.9 603.1 624.8 657.7 
Grade failure rate (%) 8.87 8.88 8.11 7.27 6.88 5.33 
Teachers per 100 students 6.61 6.66 7.05 7.14 7.14 7.14 
Homicides per 10,000 pop. 2.13 2.03 4.54 6.18 6.37 5.64 
Drug homicides per 10,000 pop. 0.0 0.58 2.16 3.83 5.04 3.89 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and 
SIMBAD. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table A.4.3 Homicides and grade repetition. Different effects by time and space 
Homicides within: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Academic Year 6 months 3 months Week 
 Primary 
Municipality 0.0357*** 0.0406*** 0.0591*** 0.1433*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0112) (0.0165) (0.0529) 
10 km 0.0190*** 0.0243*** 0.0264** 0.0481 
 (0.0053) (0.0079) (0.0121) (0.0308) 
20 km 0.0035* 0.0059* 0.0079** 0.0266 
 (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0163) 
30 km 0.0008 0.0023* 0.0032 0.0021 
 (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0069) 
 Secondary 
Municipality 0.0326*** 0.0464*** 0.0715*** 0.1852*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0137) (0.0212) (0.0462) 
10 km 0.0076 0.0156* 0.0209** 0.0742** 
 (0.0051) (0.0081) (0.0104) (0.0293) 
20 km 0.0034** 0.0072** 0.0102** 0.0334** 
 (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0134) 
30 km 0.0013** 0.0039*** 0.0053*** 0.0289*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0086) 
     
School level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Coefficients reported in the table correspond to the total number of homicides per 10,000 
inhabitants. Grade failure rate is measured on a scale from 0 to 100. Author’s elaboration based on 
ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 
and 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the municipality level. 
 
Table A.4.4 Homicides and grade repetition. Spillover effects 
Homicides occurring: (1) (2) 
 Primary Secondary 
In Municipality 0.0282*** 0.0268*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0082) 
Outside Municipality, 20 km radius 0.0005 0.0019*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Outside Municipality, 30 km radius 0.0003 0.0012*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Outside Municipality, 40 km radius 0.0006* 0.0007** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) 
   
School level controls Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Coefficients reported in the table correspond to the total number of homicides per 10,000 
inhabitants. Grade failure rate is measured on a scale from 0 to 100. Author’s elaboration based on 
ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 
and 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table A.4.5 Homicides and grade repetition. Non-linear effects 
Variable (1) (2) 
 Primary Secondary 
0 < Homicides ≤ 15 -0.0732* 0.0236 
 (0.0422) (0.0265) 
15 < Homicides ≤ 30 -0.0910 0.0551 
 (0.0758) (0.0491) 
30 < Homicides ≤ 60 -0.0399 0.0626 
 (0.114) (0.0648) 
Homicides > 60 0.1490 0.0607 
 (0.1230) (0.0845) 
   
School level controls Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Municipality level controls Yes Yes 
State level controls Yes Yes 
   
R-squared 0.044 0.004 
Observations 358,038 137,592 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENLACE administrative data, Estadísticas 911 (Statistics 911) and 
SIMBAD 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The reference category for the Homicides dummy 
variables is constituted by municipalities where there were zero registered homicides during the 12 months 
prior to the ENLACE examination date. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Figure A.4.1 Drug related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants by Municipality 
  
  
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by the CNS. 
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Figure A.4.2: Homicides in Mexico and cocaine seizures in Colombia, 2000-2012 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SIMBAD, CNS and UNODC. 
